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Since the end of World War II, the oil and gas farmout agreement has 
become nearly as important and commonplace in the petroleum industry as 
the oil and gas lease.  In part, this is a reaction to the increased risks and 
real costs of deeper drilling.1 The phenomenon also reflects an increase in 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Though the average depth of wells drilled in the United States between 1975 and 
1981 remained virtually the same (4.531 feet average in 1975 versus 4,501 feet average in 
1981), average drilling costs increased 155% from an average of $177,793 to $453,691.  See 
1986 ENERGY STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK 45, 47, 49, 51, 63, 66–67, 109–10, 116–117.  During 
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sophistication and a proliferation of small oil companies, both of which 
resulted from sharp increases in real prices for oil and gas in the 1970s.2 
Though farmout agreements are ubiquitous in the late 1980s, 
practitioners and scholars have not standardized farmout agreements to the 
degree that they have oil and gas leases. Parties often enter into farmout 
agreements on the basis of informal “letter agreements.” Legal writers have 
given relatively little attention to provisions and interpretative problems of 
farmout agreements.3 Yet, one does not need a crystal ball to predict that 
farmout agreements will demand an increasing percentage of the time of oil 
and gas lawyers and of the courts as the years go by. The purpose of this 
Article, therefore, is to analyze the structure of typical agreements and 
consider some of the problems and alternatives that practitioners must 
confront in drafting or reviewing farmout agreements.4 
                                                                                                                 
that same time period.  United States natural gas reserves decreased 12% from 
approximately 228,000,000 MMCF to 201,500,000 MMCF, while United States oil reserves 
declined 10% from approximately 32,700,000,000 barrels to 29,500,000,000 barrels.  Id. 
 2. The average price of crude oil at the wellhead in the United States increased from 
$3.89 per barrel in 1973 to $31.77 in 1981.  See id. at 295.  The average price of natural gas 
at the wellhead increased from 21.6 cents per MCF to $1.98 during the same period.  Id.  
Partly in response, United States employment in oil and gas extraction increased from 
approximately 273,900 in 1973 to a peak of 708,300 in 1982.  Id. at 395. 
 3. Though none are comprehensive, several excellent papers address issues of farmout 
agreements. See 1 L. MOSBURG, STRUCTURING EXPLORATION DEALS ch. 3 (1983); T. FAY, 
DRAFTING STANDARD FORM FARMOUT AGREEMENTS (A.B.A. Sec. Nat. Res. L. Monograph 
Series No. 1, 1986); Bledsoe, A Detailed Look at Farmout Agreements, ADVANCED OIL, GAS 
AND MINERAL LAW COURSE, 1986 TEX. OIL, GAS & MIN. L. SEC. N-l; Brown, Assignments of 
Interests in Oil and Gas Leases, Farm-Out Agreements, Bottom Hole Letters, Reservations 
of Overrides and Oil Payments, 5 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 25 (1954); Cage, 
Anatomy of A Farmout, 21 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 153 (1970); Glass, Farmout 
Agreements, WORKSHOP ON BASIC OIL AND GAS INSTRUMENTS, 1985 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RES. 
L.; Himebaugh, An Overview of OH and Gas Contracts in the Williston Basin, 59 N.D. L. 
REV. 7 (1983); Klein & Burke, The Farmout Agreement: Its Form and Substance, 24 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 479 (1978); Lamb, Farmout Agreements—Problems of Negotiation and 
Drafting, 8 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 139 (1963); Schaefer, The Ins and Outs of Farmouts: 
A Practical Guide for the Landman and the Lawyer, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1 
(1986); Scott, How to Prepare an Oil and Gas Farmout Agreement, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 63 
(1981). 
 4. This Article is made possible by a grant from the Oil, Gas & Mineral Law Section 
of the Texas State Bar Association, and by the assistance of dozens of lawyers and landmen 
who responded to the author’s request for suggestions and who provided more than one 
hundred example agreements. Those who responded included: Carol B. Arnold, Houston; 
David M. Arnolds, Denver; L.L. Atwell, Jr., Midland; Karen A. Berndt, Houston; Henry C. 
Brumley, Wichita; Wilson H. Busby, Tulsa; Lewis C. Cox, Roswell; Wayne Cummings, 
Dallas; Shonnie L. Daniel, Tulsa; Andrew B. Derman, Dallas; Frank Douglass, Austin; 
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Farmout agreements are important tools of a big business, and only the 
creativity of draftsmen and negotiators limits the options that the parties 
may consider. While this Article does not cover everything that one might 
want to know about farmouts, it does attempt to cover the basic issues that 
an agreement must address and to collect representative language. Even in 
these respects, however, the Article is not complete. In particular, many 
types of clauses are omitted because the author could not find examples 
within the time strictures of writing. 
I. What Is a Farmout? 
An oil and gas farmout agreement is an agreement by one who owns 
drilling rights to assign all or a portion of those rights to another in return 
for drilling and testing on the property.5 The individual or entity that owns 
the lease, called the “farmor” or “farmoutor,” is said to “farm out” its rights. 
The person or entity that receives the right to drill, referred to as the 
“farmee” or “farmoutee,” is said to have “farmed in” to the lease or to have 
entered into a “farm-in agreement.” 
The origin of the term “farmout” is not clear. Professor Hemingway has 
said that the term’s use goes as far back as ancient Roman times, when the 
state transferred the right to collect certain taxes to private individuals who 
                                                                                                                 
Theresa U. Fay, Dallas; Terry Noble Fiske, Denver; Douglas B. Glass, Houston; James C.T. 
Hardwick, Tulsa; Terry E. Hogwood, Houston; Albert D. Hoppe, Houston; Charles C. 
Keeble, Houston; C. Glyn King, Midland; Robert F. LeBlanc, Tulsa; Robert W. Lee, Tyler; 
William J. Legg, Oklahoma City; Pat Long, Amarillo; Thomas W. Lynch, Dallas; Charles F. 
Mansfield, Tulsa; Martha L. Marshall, Oklahoma City; Clyde O. Martz, Denver; Peter C. 
Maxfield, Laramie; Steven F. Meadows, Dallas; George J. Morgenthaler, Minneapolis; 
Joseph W. Morris, Tulsa; R. Clark Musser, Oklahoma City; Kevin McDonald Myles, 
Denver; Ljubomir Nacev, Tulsa; W.F. Pennebaker, Midland; James M. Piccone, Denver; 
David E. Pierce, Topeka; Howard F. Saunders, III, Amarillo; Hugh V. Schaefer, Denver; 
John R. Scott, Dallas; Richard S. Simms, Houston; Ronald T. Sponberg, Midland; Ernest E. 
Smith, Austin; Jeanmarie B. Tade, Houston; Anthony F. Winn, Pittsburgh; and Thur W. 
Young, Pittsburgh. Sample provisions quoted throughout this Article are taken from 
example agreements provided unless the source is otherwise identified. 
The author gratefully acknowledges also the support of Margaret Carpenter, his 
secretary, and the research assistance of Anne L. Box, Mark A. Haney, Charles L. Hamit, 
Brett M. Godfrey, and Eric Carlson, while they were students at the University of Tulsa 
College of Law. Of course, the responsibility for the statements made remains with the 
author. 
 5. E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND 
GAS LAW 624 (1986). 
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received a fee for their services.6 Other commentators have attributed 
“farmout” to the term used in baseball: 
[I]n the oil and gas industry it has substantially the same 
connotation as it has in the more familiar baseball vernacular. 
Like the rookie ballplayer who may be farmed out to a minor 
league team for further training, an oil and gas lease may be 
farmed out for development. In baseball, the major league team 
frequently retains some kind of interest in the player, and the 
grantor in a farm-out transaction retains some kind of property 
interest in the oil and gas lease.7 
Whatever the term’s origin, “farmout” has become firmly entrenched in the 
oil and gas industry, though the courts did not use it until 1957.8 
Farmout agreements must be distinguished from other commonly 
encountered kinds of oil and gas contracts such as operating agreements, 
support agreements, and seismic options. An operating agreement is an 
agreement between owners of the right to drill in an area that sets out the 
rights and duties of each in operations on the property subject to the 
contract.9 The primary distinction between an operating agreement and a 
farmout agreement is functional. A farmout agreement is a contract by 
which one party earns an interest in an oil and gas lease owned by another, 
while an operating agreement is entered into to define the rights and duties 
of parties who already own joint interests in a lease or a drilling unit and to 
combine those interests for joint operations. Another distinction is that the 
farmee “carries” the farmor for all or a portion of the drilling costs in a 
farmout, while the parties to an operating agreement generally share the 
costs of drilling. Typically, those who enter into a farmout agreement also 
will execute an operating agreement to govern their rights after they have 
performed the farmout contract.10 
A support agreement, sometimes referred to as a contribution agreement, 
is a contract by which one party agrees to contribute money or acreage to 
another party in return for geological information developed by the drilling 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Hemingway, The Farmout Agreement: A Story Short But Not Always Sweet, 1 
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT NO. 2 (1985). 
 7. C. RUSSELL & R. BOWHAY, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES U 7.02 
(1986). 
 8. Cage, supra note 3, at 153–54. Cage asserts that the court in Petroleum Fin. Corp. v. 
Cockburn, 241 F.2d 312, 313 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), first used the term “farmout.” 
 9. J. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 350 (1983). 
 10. See infra notes 346–51 and accompanying text. 
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operations of the other.11 Subtypes of support agreements are typically 
described by reference either to the conditions upon which payment will be 
made or to the form of the contribution. A dry hole agreement is a support 
agreement in which the obligation to make payment is conditioned upon the 
drilling of a dry hole.12 A bottom hole agreement is a support agreement 
that conditions the obligation to pay upon drilling to total depth and 
testing.13 An acreage contribution agreement typically looks very much like 
a bottom hole agreement, except that the contribution for drilling and 
testing comes in the form of interests in property that the contributing party 
owns, rather than in money.14 
Support agreements are closely related to farmout agreements, 
particularly farmout agreements for the purpose of exploration and 
evaluation. A well drilled under a support agreement is located on a lease 
owned by the drilling party, while under a farmout agreement a well is 
drilled on a lease owned by the contributing party. Timing may be the 
functional distinction. If the support agreement develops positive 
information, the party who agreed to make the contribution may follow it 
up by proposing a farmout. Indeed, in a variation upon an acreage 
contribution agreement, the contributing party will promise to farm out 
designated property if the drilling party will test its own lease. 
A seismic option agreement may also be preliminary to a farmout 
agreement. A seismic option agreement is a contract in which one party 
agrees to conduct geophysical tests on the property of another, with the 
option or obligation to farm into or to buy a specified amount of acreage 
thereafter.15 Parties often use a seismic option when they deal with large 
leases in unexplored areas. 
Many problems are common to operating agreements, support 
agreements, seismic option agreements, and farmout agreements,16 all of 
                                                                                                                 
 11. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 347. 
 12. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW 255 (1987). 
 13. Id. at 84. 
 14. Id. at 14. 
 15. See Vander Ploeg, Particular Problems in the Structuring of Broad Area 
Exploration Contracts, 5 E. MIN. L. INST. § 14.01 (1984); Himebaugh, supra note 3, at 31–
32. 
 16. See L. MOSBURG, supra note 3, ch. 2 (support agreements); A. DERMAN, JOINT 
OPERATING AGREEMENT: A WORKING MANUAL (A.B.A. Sec. Nat. Res. Monograph Series 
No. 2, 1986) (operating agreements); Hardwick, AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement—
1982: Changes and Continuing Concerns, 1982 ROCKY MTN. MIN. LAW SPEC. INST, ON OIL 
AND GAS AGREEMENTS (operating agreements); Moore, Joint Operating Agreements—Is 
There Really a Standard That Can Be Relied Upon?, 5 E. MIN. L. INST. § 15.01 (1984) 
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which may be described as “exploration agreements.” Frequently parties 
make agreements that encompass more than one kind of contract and blur 
the distinctions made here. Nonetheless, these distinctions are helpful for 
analytical purposes and they reflect the practice of the oil and gas industry. 
II. The Structure of a Farmout 
The interaction of two major factors determines the structure of a 
farmout agreement, the way that its essential terms are put together. One is 
the tax rules applicable. The other is the purposes of the farmor and the 
farmee in entering into the agreement. 
A. The Applicable Tax Rules 
Farmout agreements are drafted with a wary eye upon the Internal 
Revenue Code. In fact, complicated tax rules dictate the structure of a 
farmout agreement. This section reviews the basic tax concepts that apply 
to farmouts and explains how they affect the arrangements that the parties 
negotiate. 
1. Intangible Drilling Costs 
The intangible drilling cost (IDC) deduction provides a very important 
incentive to the oil and gas industry. Section 263(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code grants the IDC deduction.17 It permits those who drill oil or gas wells 
to take a deduction against current income for the intangible costs of 
drilling and completing wells.18 Intangible drilling costs are generally 
defined as those costs that have no salvage value in themselves and are 
“incident to and necessary for the drilling of wells and the preparation of 
wells for the production of oil and gas.”19 Intangible drilling costs include 
                                                                                                                 
(operating agreements); Vander Ploeg, supra note 15, § 14.01 (seismic options and support 
agreements); Young, Oil and Gas Operations: Who Does What, To Whom, For Whom, and 
Who Pays, How, and When, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1651, 1652 (1982) (operating 
agreements); Young, Oil and Gas Operating Agreements: Producers 88 Operating 
Agreements, Selected Problems and Suggested Solutions, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 197, 
198 (1975) (operating agreements). 
 17. I.R.C. § 263(c) (West Supp. 1987). 
 18. Id. The deduction is subject to many limitations. Noncorporate taxpayers who 
deduct IDCs may be subject to minimum taxes and may be limited to the amounts actually at 
risk. See C. RUSSELL & R. BOWHAY, supra note 7, 11.01–.06, 14.19. Integrated oil 
companies must capitalize a portion of intangible drilling costs under I.R.C. § 291(b), (c) 
(West Supp. 1987), and all who claim the deduction are subject to the recapture provisions 
of id. § 1254. 
 19. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-4(a) (1965). 
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the costs of wages, fuel, repairs, hauling, and supplies used in drilling, 
fracturing and cleaning wells, site preparation, and construction of derricks, 
tanks and pipelines necessary for the drilling and preparation of wells for 
production.20 Intangible drilling costs typically amount to between 50% and 
80% of the total costs of drilling and completing an oil or gas well. The 
IDC deduction makes oil and gas investments attractive to tax-oriented 
investors because intangible drilling costs are such a large percentage of the 
total costs of drilling and completing a well. The IDC deduction allows 
investors to drill up their profits at the end of each year.21 
The IRS has limited the IDC deduction by applying what may be called 
the “complete payout” limitation.22 Simply stated, the limitation provides 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. For a list of typical costs incurred in the exploration and development of oil and 
gas and a suggested treatment of such costs for intangible drilling costs deduction purposes, 
see C. RUSSELL & R. BOWHAY, supra note 7, ¶ 14.12. 
 21. See C. RUSSELL & R. BOWHAY, supra note 7, H 14.11-A. The percentage depletion 
provisions of I.R.C. § 613A are also important. 
 22. See Rev. Rul. 71-207, 1971-1 C.B. 160; Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1971-1 C.B. 105; Rev. 
Rul. 70-336,1970-1 C.B. 145, modified, Rev. Rul. 80-109, 1980-1 C.B. 129; Rev. Rul. 69-
332, 1969-1 C.B. 87. The language of the first three revenue rulings is virtually identical: 
 Section 263(c) of the Code, as implemented by section 1.612-4 of the 
Income Tax Regulations, provides an option to charge to capital or to expense 
the intangible drilling and development costs incurred in the drilling of oil and 
gas wells.  This option is available only to an operator who is defined as one 
who holds a working or operating interest in any trace or parcel of land either 
as a fee owner or under a lease or any other form of contract granting working 
or operating rights. Section 1.612-4(a)(3) of the regulations, however, provides 
the following limitation on the option which is pertinent here: 
 * * * except that in any case where any drilling or development project is 
undertaken for the grant or assignment of a fraction of the operating rights, only 
that part of the cost thereof which is attributable to such fractional interest is 
within this option. . . . 
 Thus, the limitation in the regulations is operative if the drilling and 
development project is undertaken “* * * for the grant or assignment of a 
fraction of the operating rights * * The carrying party will have undertaken the 
drilling and development project for the entire working interest only if he holds 
the entire working interest throughout the complete pay-out period. If the 
carrying party holds the entire working interest for a period that is less than a 
complete pay-out period he will have undertaken the drilling and development 
project for the fraction of the operating rights that he receives as his 
“permanent” share in the mineral property. 
Rev. Rul. 70-336, 1970-1 C.B. at 145 (emphasis added). For similar language see Rev. Rul. 
71-207, 1971-1 C.B. at 160 and Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1971-1 C.B. at 105. 
The language quoted does not address whether an agreement would satisfy the complete 
payout test if the definition of payout in the farmout agreement did not require that the 
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that one may not claim an IDC deduction except to the extent that (1) one 
actually pays or accrues the expense, and (2) one will own the working 
interest for which the payment is made for the complete payout period.23 
One cannot take a tax deduction for intangible drilling costs paid for by 
another. For example, if a farmor and a farmee were to enter into a farmout 
agreement on a 50% “straight-up” basis, with the farmor contributing the 
farmed out lease, the farmee paying all costs of drilling and completing the 
well, and the farmor and the farmee sharing operating costs and profits 
equally, 50% of the total IDC deduction would be lost. The farmee, who 
actually paid 100% of the costs, could deduct only the 50% of the IDCs that 
it paid because it would earn only 50% of the working interest. The farmor 
would be entitled to no IDC deduction because the farmor paid none of the 
intangible drilling costs. Thus, a potential tax benefit would be lost24 and 
the farmee would suffer a substantial increase in the cost of performing the 
agreement. 
Because of the complete payout limitation, farmout agreements are 
drafted in a way that often seems strange to those who are not aware of the 
tax rules. The farmee earns an interest in the working interest of the drill 
                                                                                                                 
farmee retain the working interest until payout, but in fact the farmee did retain it. In Rev. 
Rul. 80109, 1980-16 C.B. 129, modifying Rev. Rul. 70-336, however, the IRS concluded 
that the mere possibility of a premature termination of the farmee’s interest was 
disqualifying. 
 23. Rev. Rul. 70-336, 1970-1 C.B. at 145; Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1970-1 C.B. at 105; Rev. 
Rul. 71-207, 1971-1 C.B. at 160. The language of the revenue rulings is virtually identical as 
to the definition of the “complete payout”: 
The determination of the complete pay-out period requires an interpretation of 
the carried interest agreement and the performance of the parties under the 
agreement. As a general principle, however, the period ends when the gross 
income attributable to all of the operating mineral interests in the well (or wells, 
in the case of agreements covering more than a single well) equals all expendi-
tures for drilling and development (tangible and intangible) of such well (or 
wells) plus the costs of operating the well (or wells) to produce such an 
amount. 
Rev. Rul. 71-206, 1970-1 C.B. at 105. See Rev. Rul. 70-336, 170-1 C.B. at 145–46, and 
Rev. Rul. 71-20, 1971-1 C.B. at 161, for similar language. 
 24. The farmee’s tax benefit may not be irrevocably lost, because the farmee could 
capitalize the portion of the IDCs not deducted and recover the IDC through cost depletion 
over the productive life of the well. The parties likely will substantially discount a deferred 
tax deduction in making their deal, however, so that for practical purposes it may be 
considered lost. Moreover, if the farmee qualifies for percentage depletion under I.R.C. § 
613A, capitalized costs effectively are lost because percentage depletion may be taken on a 
zero basis. 
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site acreage equal to the percentage of the costs that it pays. The farmee, for 
example, would earn 100% working interest for paying 100% of the drilling 
and completion costs, 75% working interest for paying 75% of drilling and 
completion costs, etc. The farmor, which typically has a substantial 
investment in the lease, provides for a flow of income by retaining a 
nonoperating interest such as an overriding royalty interest. The farmor will 
often retain the right to “back in” to a working interest in the well site 
acreage after “payout,” that is after the farmee has recovered all of its costs 
of drilling, completing, and producing the well. The IRS has accepted such 
transactions as qualifying the farmee to deduct the full percentage of IDC it 
pays so long as there is no possibility that the farmee’s working interest in 
the drill site acreage will end before complete payout of the costs of 
drilling, completing, and operating.25 
2. Sharing Arrangements and Revenue Rule 77-176 
The IRS generally recognizes a farmout agreement as a “sharing 
arrangement,” which it has defined as a transaction in which one party 
makes a contribution to the acquisition, exploration, or development of a 
mineral property and reserves as a consideration an interest in the property 
to which the contribution is made.26 A sharing arrangement does not trigger 
recognition of income for tax purposes because the transfer of a property 
interest for development is treated as formation of a new economic venture, 
rather than as a sale of property or services.27 The Internal Revenue Code 
contains several sections that permit sharing arrangement treatment to the 
formation of new businesses.28 IRS administrative memoranda, rather than 
specific code provisions, have recognized farmouts as sharing 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Rev. Rul. 80-109, 1980-1 C.B. 129. For an example of the strictness of the IRS 
position, see infra notes 340–43 and accompanying text. Although the logic of the revenue 
rulings should permit a farmee to claim a fraction of the IDCs as long as the complete 
payout limitation is met for that fraction, the black letter law of the revenue rulings states 
that the farmee must hold 100% of the operating rights until payout. See P. MAXFIELD & J. 
HOUGHTON, TAXATION OF MINING OPERATIONS U 9.04[5][b][ii] (1987). 
 26. Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730 (1941). A general counsel memorandum is an informal 
statement of principle for guidance of agency personnel. 
 27. See P. MAXFIELD & J. HOUGHTON, supra note 25, §§ 9.01–.05. 
 28. See I.R.C. § 351 (West Supp. 1987) (no gain or loss recognition on exchange of 
property for stock of corporation); Id. § 721 (no gain or loss recognition to partnership or 
any of its partners when contribution of property is made to partnership in exchange for 
interest in capital and profits). 
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arrangements.29 The IRS reasons that the exchange of interests for 
development in a farmout agreement constitutes a contribution by the 
parties to a pool of capital. The parties to a farmout agreement therefore do 
not recognize income from the farmout transaction. A farmout is treated as 
a tax-free transfer, which has been a very important incentive to its use by 
the industry. 
The little world of farmout agreements turned upside down in 1977 when 
the IRS changed the rules of the game with Revenue Ruling 77-176.30 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933). In Palmer the United States Supreme 
Court characterized oil and gas in place as a reservoir of capital investment of the parties 
who agree to share in production. Id. at 557. The Court reasoned that parties to a pool of 
capital should consider transactions involving assignments of interests in oil and gas that 
required the assignees to assume all or part of the burden of exploitation as contributions. Id. 
at 557–58. The IRS adopted the “pool of capital” concept in Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730 
(1941). In Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730 the IRS recognized that the drilling party under a 
farmout agreement could deduct the full amount of intangible drilling costs paid or incurred 
if that party complied with the complete payout limitation discussed above. One source 
interprets Gen. Couns. Mem. 22,730 to mean that acquiring an interest in a mineral property 
in return for services related to development of the property does not result in income either 
to the person performing the services or to the person receiving the services if three 
conditions are met: 
 First, . . . if the interest received is an economic interest in mineral in place 
for depletion purposes . . . and only if such interest is acquired for services or 
equipment related to exploration or development. An interest would, therefore, 
not qualify if it was received for services rendered after the property was 
developed, if it was not an economic interest in mineral in place, or if it was 
otherwise unrelated to development. . . . 
. . . . 
 Second, an economic interest in the mineral in place must be the agreed-
upon consideration for the services or equipment in order to be received 
without tax. . . . 
 Third, the economic interest must be in the property to which the 
contribution is made. 
A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS INVESTMENTS ¶ 5.02, at 5-2 to 
-3 (1985) (footnotes omitted). The typical farmout transaction does not result in realization 
of income by either the farmor or the farmee because it meets these three conditions. See 
also Linden, Income Realization in Mineral Sharing Transactions: The Pool of Capital 
Doctrine, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 487, 508–09 (1981) (discusses income 
realization in typical farmout transaction). 
 30. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77, 79. A revenue ruling is the IRS’s formal 
statement of its position regarding a particular fact situation and the reasoning for that 
position. A revenue ruling is not law, but effectively warns taxpayers that failure to comply 
with the position taken will result in a tax assessment. See M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE H 3.03[2][a] (1981). 
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Revenue Ruling 77-176 modified application of the sharing arrangement 
concept to farmouts that involved transfers of interests in acreage outside of 
the well site by declaring the well site acreage and the outside acreage to be 
separate properties.31 Thus, while the transfer of interest in the well site 
acreage in exchange for drilling remained sheltered from tax as a sharing 
arrangement, the IRS treated the interest in acreage outside of the well site 
acreage as a separate transfer subject to tax.32 
An example may help in understanding Revenue Ruling 77-176. Assume 
that Y owns a 640-acre lease subject to 40-acre spacing. Assume that Y and 
X enter into a farmout agreement by which Y agrees to assign to X 100% of 
the working interest in a 40-acre well site plus 50% of the working interest 
in the 600 acres outside the well site tract, with Y reserving a 1/ 16th 
overriding royalty interest in production from the well site tract and an 
option to convert that overriding royalty interest into a 50% working 
interest after payout of the initial well. Assume further that Y’s basis in the 
50% interest in the 600 acres outside the well site earned by X is $6,000, 
but that the market value of the 50% interest in the outside acreage when it 
is actually transferred is $100,000 because the transfer occurs after the 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Rev. Rul. 77-176 reasoned as follows: 
Before the assignment of the working interests to X in the instant case, the oil 
and gas lease was, within the meaning of section 614(a) of the Code and 
section 1.614-1 (a) of the regulations, one property in the hands of Y. Upon 
assignment, X received two separate economic interests in the tract or parcel of 
land, each such interest being a separate section 614 property [apparently 
because of the difference in the percentage of the working interests owned in 
the drill site and the surrounding acreage.] The entire working interest in the 
drill site to which X made a contribution in the form of drilling was one 
property, and the undivided one-half of the working interest in the portion of 
the tract exclusive of the drill site was a second property. Likewise, Y retained 
two separate properties in the tract or parcel of land. The overriding royalty 
interest reserved in the drill site was one property, and the undivided one-half 
of the working interest retained by Y in the balance of the tract exclusive of the 
drill site was a second property. 
Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77, 79. 
 32. Rev. Rul. 77-176 concluded that: 
 Because the acreage exclusive of the drill site is a property separate from 
that to which the development contribution was made, drilling by X on the drill 
site did not represent a capital investment in the development of the acreage 
exclusive of the drill site, and the Federal income tax consequences of the 
transfer from Y to X of the undivided one-half of the working interest in such 
acreage is not determined under the pool of capital concept. 
Id. at 79–80. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/4
2017]        Farmout Agreements 277 
 
 
drilling of an initial well on the well site tract has proved the outside 
acreage. 
Revenue Ruling 77-176 reasons that neither Y nor X is subject to any tax 
as a result of the transfer of interest or the conduct of drilling operations 
upon the well site acreage. Since Y transfers to X an interest in the well site 
in exchange for development of the well site, the transaction is a sharing 
arrangement. The transfer of the interest in the remaining 600 acres, how-
ever, relates to another property. The transfer of that interest does not 
qualify as a sharing arrangement because X has made no contribution to the 
development of the outside acreage. Drilling the well is viewed as 
developing only the separate property of the well site acreage. Revenue 
Ruling 77-176 therefore concludes that Y has received taxable income equal 
to the difference between its basis of $6,000 in the fractional interest in the 
outside acreage assigned and the fair market value of $100,000 at the time 
of the assignment.33 X, on the other hand, is deemed to have received 
$100,000 of taxable income, since its drilling expenditures are not a capital 
investment in the development of the property of the outside acreage. Both 
Y and X therefore have incurred a tax liability, but the transaction has 
generated no cash flow for either to use to pay taxes. Tax lawyers call this 
nightmare “phantom income.”34 
The IRS made application of Revenue Ruling 77-176 prospective only.35 
In addition, commentators have criticized its reasoning and a successful 
challenge may yet be forthcoming.36 Nonetheless, the ruling is a major tax 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Y may be subject to tax at ordinary or capital gains rates depending upon whether 
the transaction occurred before or after the effective date of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
provisions relating to capital gains and whether Y is considered a “dealer.” Cf. Corn Prods. 
Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (corn futures not capital assets since integral 
part of taxpayer’s manufacturing business). 
 34. See D. WINDISH, TAX-ADVANTAGED INVESTMENTS ch. 16 (2d ed. 1985). 
 35. The revenue ruling specifically states that it will apply retroactively “to transfers 
made before April 27, 1977, or to transfers made pursuant to binding contracts entered into 
before such date.” Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. at 79–80. In addition, the IRS issued a 
technical advice memorandum indicating that it would not apply related theories reaching 
the same result to pre-April 27, 1977, transactions. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 83-11-005 (Nov. 
19, 1982). 
 36. See Crichton & Griffin, Securities Problems and Tax Implications of Oil and Gas 
Investments by Non-Industry Financiers, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1333, 1392–97 
(1982); Gregg, Oil and Gas Farmouts—Implications of Revenue Ruling 77-176, 29 INST. ON 
OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 601 (1978); Note, New Tax Treatment of Oil and Gas Farm-Outs: A 
Threat to Domestic Production, 15 HOUS. L. REV. 387 (1978). Most of the criticisms of the 
reasoning of Rev. Rul. 77-176 center upon application of § 614 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Note, supra, at 388–414. The revenue ruling describes interests transferred in the drill 
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trap for the oil and gas industry, and a variety of devices have been sug-
gested to avoid or minimize it.37 Among the most popular suggestions are 
(a) avoiding the transfer of an interest in “outside” acreage; (b) structuring 
the farmout to minimize the value of outside acreage transferred; and (c) 
redefining the “property” subject to the farmout by use of a tax partnership. 
a) Assign No Outside Acreage 
Y and X can avoid Revenue Ruling 77-176 entirely if the farmout 
transfers no interest in any acreage outside the well site tract. Then there is 
only a single transaction relating to a single property, and the sharing 
arrangement concept protects both Y and X from recognizing income. No 
tax is due if Y and X agree that X will earn 100% of the working interest in a 
40-acre drill site tract in exchange for drilling a well on a 640-acre lease, 
subject to a 1/16th overriding royalty interest reserved to Y that Y can 
convert upon payout of the well to a 50% working interest in the well site 
tract. 
The problem with this transaction lies with its economic structure, not its 
tax structure. Limiting the interest earned to the well site tract strips from 
the farmout much of the incentive for X. There is a severe limit on the profit 
opportunity for X if the farmout’s purpose is to explore undeveloped leases. 
A farmee will not easily decide to take 100% of the risk of drilling a 
wildcat well38 in return for a 50% interest in the well subject to an 
overriding royalty burden and no interest in development wells. In order to 
make the business deal workable between Y and X, Y will probably have to 
provide X with additional incentives. For example, Y may have to accept a 
lower overriding royalty and agree to accept a lesser percentage back-in, or 
even give up the back-in altogether. These possibilities may make the 
transaction less attractive to Y, and yet still be insufficient to satisfy X. 
                                                                                                                 
site and in acreage outside the drill site, which are parts of the same lease, as separate 
property within the meaning of § 614(a) of the Code. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77, 79. 
A strong argument to the contrary is that since both interests were working interests in the 
same lease they should be treated as interests in a single property under § 614(b). Only one 
reported case, Burke v. Blumenthal, 504 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Tex. 1980), to date has 
challenged the validity of Rev. Rul. 77-176. In Burke the plaintiff sued for declaratory 
injunctive relief arguing that the revenue ruling appeared “unconstitutional, unlawful, null 
and void” because it erroneously interpreted §§ 61 and 1001(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Burke, 504 F. Supp. at 37 n.l. The federal district court dismissed the case on the 
grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 36. 
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 38–59. 
 38. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 12, at 974. 
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Thus, while the parties can easily avoid the tax consequences of Revenue 
Ruling 77-176, the economic cost may be unacceptable. 
A less certain variation on the theme of avoiding Revenue Ruling 77-176 
by transferring no interest in outside acreage is for Y to agree to assign to X 
100% of the working interest in the entire 640 acres in return for drilling a 
well on the 40-acre drill site tract. The 640-acre assignment from Y to X 
may be subject to a 1/16th overriding royalty, which X can convert upon 
payout as to the well site acreage, or at any time as to the outside acreage. 
Thus, while X will own the entire working interest in the entire 640-acre 
tract, if X decides to drill an additional well on the property, Y will be able 
to convert its interest in the additional acreage and participate in drilling as 
a working interest owner. 
This device is less certain to avoid taxation than the first alternative. 
While the form of a transaction that avoids the transfer of an interest in an 
outside acreage is maintained, the substance is not.39 It is highly probable 
that the initial well drilled on the property will drain no more than the 40- 
acre drilling unit established. That is the purpose of the state in establishing 
the drilling unit. If so, X’s contribution to drilling will develop only the well 
site acreage and X will receive an extra interest in outside acreage. Y’s right 
to convert its overriding royalty interest in the outside acreage will add fuel 
to the fire of the argument that the substance of the transaction is the same 
as that considered in Revenue Ruling 77-176. Thus, the IRS may regard the 
outside acreage as a separate property under Revenue Ruling 77-176 and 
assess tax on that acreage. Since the market value of X’s 100% working 
interest in the outside acreage subject to y’s right to convert will be roughly 
the same as the value of X’s interest after the conversion has taken place, 
the tax liability should be approximately the same as if the parties had not 
selected the illusory form. 
A final variation of avoiding Revenue Ruling 77-176 by assigning no 
outside acreage in the farmout agreement is to make the farmee’s earning 
an interest in the well site acreage contingent upon performance by drilling, 
but to give the farmee a noncontingent option to acquire additional interests 
in the outside acreage at an agreed price.40 The farmout transaction is split 
                                                                                                                 
 39. That substance prevails over form in taxation matters is well-established. See Com-
missioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 
465, 470 (1935); West v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723, 727 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 
795 (1945). 
 40. The following example illustrates a noncontingent option to purchase an interest in 
outside acreage: 
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into two parts. In one the farmee earns by drilling. In the other, a 
supposedly unrelated transaction, the farmee buys an option to drill 
additional wells at a fixed price. If the farmor may terminate the option if 
the farmee fails to drill the initial well, however, this device may be 
attacked as a sham, or IRC section 83 may cause the surrounding acreage to 
be valued and taxed to the farmee after the well is drilled.41 In addition, the 
purchase option must be at fair market value, or the farmee as well as the 
farmor may be required to recognize income.42 
b) Minimize the Value for Revenue Rule 77-176 Purposes 
Another general approach to Revenue Ruling 77-176 structures the 
farmout agreement between Y and X so that, while the revenue ruling may 
still trigger the adverse tax effect, its impact will be minimized. A present 
assignment, an assignment of the working interest in acreage outside the 
well site contemporaneous with execution of the farmout agreement, is one 
method. Another method is to structure the agreement so that the farmee 
                                                                                                                 
Farmee, upon execution of this agreement, shall be entitled to purchase an 
undivided ____% of Farmor’s interest in the ____ 1/4 of Section ____, 
Township ____, Range ____, County ____, ____, limited to the depth stated 
above and without warranty of title express or implied. Farmee shall pay 
Farmor for such interest at a rate of $____ per net mineral acre, proportionately 
reduced. Such payment shall be made no later than ____ from the date of 
Farmee’s execution hereof. 
 41. I.R.C. § 83 (Supp. III 1985), provides in part: 
If, in connection with performance of services, property is transferred to any 
person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess 
of— 
 (1) the fair market value of such property . . . at the first time the rights . . . 
are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, over 
 (2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, 
shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services in 
the first taxable year in which the rights . . . are transferable or not subject to a 
substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever is applicable. 
Id. One commentator has argued that Congress did not intend § 83 to apply to farmout trans-
actions. Linden, supra note 29, at 531–33. The IRS, however, has given some indication that 
it does not agree. See Lofgren, Eccentric Orbits—A Tax Overview of Oil and Gas 
Transactions, 7 E. MIN. LAW INST. 12-1, 12-25 to -27 (1986). 
 42. The transaction, structured as a separate sale of the option to drill on the outside 
acreage, is subject to tax. I.R.C. § 83 (Supp. III 1985). If the farmee pays a fair price for the 
option, it recognizes no taxable income. Id. Whether or not the option price is fair, the 
farmor receives taxable income to the extent that the value of the option exceeds its allocated 
basis. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/4
2017]        Farmout Agreements 281 
 
 
earns a restricted drilling option, rather than a portion of the working 
interest in the outside acreage. 
(1) Present Assignment 
If Y assigns its interest to X at the time that they enter the farmout 
agreement, rather than after the earning well has been drilled, the tax effect 
should be less burdensome for both Y and X because the value of the 
interest in the outside acreage will be less. Suppose that in the hypothetical 
situation discussed above43 Y assigned X 100% of the working interest in 
the well site acreage and an undivided 50% of the working interest in the 
additional acreage at the time that they executed the farmout agreement. By 
the logic of Revenue Ruling 77-176, the value of the additional property 
transferred should be determined as of the time the contract was executed.44 
Furthermore, the value should be substantially less since the drilling of the 
earning well has not yet proved the outside acreage. For example, assume 
that in the hypothetical situation above, the parties agreed to a present 
assignment of half the working interest in the acreage outside the well site 
tract at the time that they executed the farmout agreement, and that the fair 
market value of that interest at the time of assignment was $10,000. 
Revenue Ruling 77-176 would cause both Y and X to recognize income for 
tax purposes, but Y’s taxable income would be the difference between the 
fair market value of $10,000 and Y’s $6,000 basis. X’s income would be 
$10,000, rather than $100,000. Both Y and X would receive phantom 
income, but at levels with which they probably could cope.45 
Present assignment presents both practical and theoretical difficulties, 
however. The major practical problem is what Y can do if X does not drill 
the well. By its present assignment, Y has given up the control provided by 
withholding the assignment of interest until after performance. 
Unfortunately, neither of the commonly encountered solutions is entirely 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See supra text accompanying notes 30–34. 
 44. Rev. Rul. 77-176 reasons that Y and X’s taxable income is determined by the fair 
market value of the interest transferred in the acreage outside the well site at the time of the 
transfer, because that is when the transaction is consummated. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 
C.B. 77, 79–80. If the transfer takes place at the time of the execution of the farmout 
agreement, the value should logically be set at that time. 
 45. The present assignment also appears attractive because it should avoid the never-
resolved tax issue of whether transfer of an interest in acreage outside the well site after 
completion of an earning well under a farmout agreement is transfer of a “proven” property 
within I.R.C. § 613A(c)(9) (West Supp. 1987) so that percentage depletion is unavailable to 
the farmee. If the transfer of interest takes place before the drilling of the earning well, the 
property almost certainly cannot be proven. 
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satisfactory. One solution is to draft the agreement so that the interest 
assigned to X is regained by Y if X does not drill the earning well. Providing 
in the farmout agreement for the reassignment of the interest by X may 
accomplish this result. If X is unable or unwilling to drill the earning well, 
however, X may likewise be unable or unwilling to make the reassignment. 
This problem can be overcome by (1) placing a fully executed reassignment 
in escrow at the time that the farmout is executed, (2) by drafting the 
present assignment in the form of a sublease that automatically terminates if 
the farmee does not perform,46 or (3) drafting the present assignment in a 
nonrecordable form and simply refusing to provide the farmee with a 
recordable assignment until the farmee has performed. Whether these 
convoluted structures will stand up under the IRS’s scrutiny, however, is a 
matter for concern. Only a property lawyer is likely to view as significant 
the difference between an interest that is vested in the farmee subject to 
defeasance if the farmee does not perform and one that is contingent upon 
drilling the earning well. 
                                                                                                                 
 46. The following example illustrates a sublease that terminates automatically upon a 
farmee’s failure to perform: 
Farmor hereby subleases and assigns to farmee, its successors and assigns, for 
the term hereinafter specified, the following rights in the farmout leases: 
(1) All of Farmor’s right, title and interest in the Farmout Leases insofar 
as the Farmout Leases cover lands lying within the Drilling and 
Spacing Unit within which the Earning Well is located; and 
(2) an undivided % of Farmor’s right, title and interest in the Farmout 
Leases insofar as the Farmout Leases cover the balance of the 
Farmout Lands; 
subject, however, to the reservation to Farmor, its successors and assigns, of 
Farmor’s Reserved Interest [provided for elsewhere in the agreement], and of 
all other interests in the Farmout Leases and Farmout Lands not expressly 
subleased and assigned to farmee. 
This sublease and assignment will remain in effect until the Commencement 
Date [of drilling operations], and so long thereafter as Farmee shall remain in 
compliance with the Earning Conditions. Upon satisfaction by Farmee of the 
Earning Conditions, this sublease and assignment shall remain in effect for so 
long as any of the Farmout Leases, or any extensions or renewals thereof, 
remain in effect as to any portion of the Farmout Lands; provided that, upon 
completion of the Earning Well, this sublease and assignment shall terminate 
insofar as the Farmout Leases cover depths below the Farmout Depth. 
Upon the expiration of the term of this sublease and assignment, all rights in 
the Farmout Leases shall revert to Farmor, its successors and assigns, free and 
clear of all liens, encumbrances, burdens or obligations created by or through 
Farmee, its successors or assigns. 
L. MOSBURG, PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS IN EXPLORATION AGREEMENTS 218–20 (1982). 
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A risk also exists that IRC section 83 will apply to unravel the purpose of 
the assignment. Section 83 provides that an interest subject to a “substantial 
risk of forfeiture” is to be valued at the time that that substantial risk no 
longer applies, rather than when the interest is received.47 When the interest 
assigned to the farmee is subject to reassignment, perfection by recording, 
or reverter, section 83 arguably will defer valuation of that interest in the 
outside acreage until (and if) the farmee actually fulfills its obligation, and 
the outside acreage is no longer subject to a risk of forfeiture.48 
A second possible solution is for the farmor to forgo the right to obtain 
back the interest conveyed to the farmee, and instead to couple the present 
assignment with the farmee’s covenant to drill the earning well secured by a 
liquidated damages provision49 and a performance bond or other security.50 
While this solution will work in theory, it is likely to prove very difficult to 
negotiate or to put into effect. 
(2) Assign Continuous Restricted Options 
Another way to minimize the effect of Revenue Ruling 77-176 is to 
structure the farmout agreement so that X earns no working interest in 
acreage other than the drill site, but acquires successive options to drill 
additional wells on the outside acreage. For example, the farmout 
agreement may provide that X, by drilling the initial well, earns a 
nonassignable option to drill an additional well at a location of its choice on 
the outside acreage within three months of completion of the earning well. 
Exercise of the option may earn another option, and so forth.51 As an 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See supra note 41. 
 48. Larason, How to Structure the Farmout and Avoid Its Pitfalls, in MATERIALS ON OIL 
AND GAS CONTRACTS 127–28 (J. Lowe ed. 1986). 
 49. For a discussion of liquidated damages provisions, see infra text accompanying 
notes 239–41. 
 50. For an example of a performance bond clause, see infra note 242. 
 51. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Group v. Tarina Oil Co., 664 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1983, no writ), in which the farmout provided that: 
 You agree that in the event we timely commence the re-entry operations 
upon the C-l well, we shall have an option for a period of one-hundred twenty 
(120) days from the date said well is recompleted as a producer of oil or gas . . . 
to reenter the Cooke B-l well located on the lands described under lease No. 1 
above and to re-work said well . . . . 
 In the event we have timely commenced re-entry operations upon the B-l 
well, you grant to us an option for a period of one-hundred twenty (120) days 
from the date we either recomplete said well as a producer of oil or gas or aban-
don same as a dry hole, to re-enter the Cooke A-l well located on the lands 
covered by leases Nos. 2 through 5 as listed above, . . . . 
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alternative, the parties may draft the agreement so that the farmee earns an 
interest in the outside acreage by drilling an initial well in the drill site, but 
an interest that automatically terminates unless continuous drilling occurs.52 
Assigning continuous restricted options may avoid Revenue Ruling 77-176, 
since it is not within the ruling’s literal terms. More likely, however, this 
structure will merely minimize the value of the outside interest earned. A 
restricted option possesses some minimal fair market value, but it is 
minimal, at least until several successful exercises of the option greatly 
increase the value of the remaining acreage subject to the successive 
options. 
Again, however, the attempt to frame the farmout agreement to avoid or 
minimize Revenue Ruling 77-176 has a price that Y and X may not wish to 
pay. The restricted option minimizes the effect of Revenue Ruling 77-176 
because the economic value of a restricted option is substantially less than 
the economic value of an unrestricted working interest in the outside acre-
age. Both Y and X will take the economic truth into account in their 
dealings. All other things being equal, X will find it less attractive to enter 
into a farmout agreement with Y in which X takes the risk of drilling to earn 
a restricted option to drill rather than an unrestricted working interest. The 
result appears to be that either properties that would have been drilled 
before the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 77-176 will not be drilled, or Y 
will have to give other incentives to induce X to enter into the agreement. 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 174. For a discussion of “completion” and similar terms, see infra text accompanying 
notes 189–95. 
 52. For example: 
If the test well is completed as a well capable of producing oil and/or gas in 
paying quantities, then, unless Farmoutee shall commence another well within 
one hundred twenty (120) days after completion of the test well, there shall be 
effective as of the date hereof, an automatic reversion to Assignor of the 
interest hereby assigned to all acreage in the farmout area that is not included in 
a governmentally prescribed proration or drilling and spacing unit for the test 
well. 
 Subsequent wells must also be commenced within one hundred twenty 
(120) days after completion of the preceding well. All such wells shall be 
drilled to a depth sufficient to test the same intervals or formations productive 
in the test well in which commercial production is established. Cumulative 
credit shall be given for faster drilling. Farmoutee shall not be required to drill 
any additional wells, but when Farmoutee fails to commence any well within 
the prescribed period, there shall be an automatic reversion to Assignor of the 
interest hereby assigned, effective as of the date hereof, except as to each tract 
(as described above) upon which there is located a well capable of producing 
oil or gas in paying quantities. 
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c) The Tax Partnership 
The most popular device to avoid Revenue Ruling 77-176 is the tax 
partnership. By forming a partnership for tax purposes, but not for state 
property law purposes because that would expose them to joint and several 
liability,53 Y and X can circumvent the revenue ruling’s conclusion that the 
outside acreage earned by X is a separate property.54 This is done by using 
IRC section 721—the same section of the tax code that categorizes 
contributions to the capital of a partnership as a nontaxable sharing 
arrangement—to designate both the well site acreage and the additional 
acreage as the “property” of the tax partnership.55 The parties accomplish 
this designation by using a typical farmout agreement with the special 
provision that the parties agree not to elect out of Subchapter K of the 
Internal Revenue Code56 and agree to allocate income and deductions 
specially on a partnership return.57 The economics of the farmout 
arrangement remain virtually the same as before Revenue Ruling 77-176; 
only the form is different. 
To the nontax lawyer, a tax partnership may sound like a classic example 
of form over substance, but it appears that the IRS has tacitly accepted its 
effect. Shelter from the ravages of the revenue ruling is not without cost, 
however. In order to establish a valid tax partnership, a partnership return 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 406–33. 
 54. For a definitive discussion of tax partnerships, see Gregg, supra note 36, at 627–39. 
Mr. Gregg, however, concludes that a formal partnership is the safest way around Rev. Rul. 
77-176. Gregg, supra note 36, at 632; see also Priestly, Tax Partnerships in the Oil and Gas 
Industry, THE LANDMAN, June 1983, at 9 (discusses formal tax partnerships); Wegher, 
Taxation of Earned Interests—The Impact of Revenue Ruling 77-176, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. 
L. INST. 521 (1978) (discusses tax partnerships). 
 55. I.R.C. § 721 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
 56. The following provision is from a tax partnership agreement attached to a farmout 
agreement: 
1. Notwithstanding any provisions of the above referred to Farmout Agreement 
or Operating Agreement to the contrary, the parties hereto have agreed not to 
elect to be excluded from the application of Subchapter K of Chapter 1 of 
Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and all amendments thereto 
(hereinafter called the “IRC”) and similar provisions of the State Income Tax 
Law. The parties further agree to the provisions hereof regarding the reporting 
of income, gains, losses, expenses, costs, and credits for Federal and State 
income tax purposes. 
 57. Taxpayers may allocate profits and losses without recognition of income, so long as 
these profits and losses cannot be valued immediately. Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 
286, 288–91 (7th Cir. 1974). A transfer of property, however, could result in income under 
Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1 (1956). 
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must be prepared and filed annually, so long as the partnership is in 
existence.58 Preparation of the partnership return requires substantial 
expenditures for legal, accounting, and administrative support that many 
companies begrudge. Furthermore, some are concerned that regulations 
recently issued under IRC section 704(b) will interact with section 613A 
and section 704(c) to undermine the economic attractiveness of a farmout 
where a tax partnership is used.59 
d) Conclusion 
Revenue Ruling 77-176 provides a classic example of bad tax policy. It 
has not raised substantial revenues. Indeed, it has probably cost the 
government taxes, because the major oil companies that are the focus of 
IRS compliance audits are well aware of its requirements. They have hired 
the necessary lawyers, accountants, and administrative personnel to analyze 
farmout proposals for Revenue Ruling 77-176 implications and to prepare 
the documents necessary to minimize or avoid it. As a result, major oil 
companies rarely violate the tenets of the ruling. In addition, they deduct 
the cost of the lawyers, accountants, administrative staff, and support 
facilities that they rely upon for compliance. Of course, the IRS must pay 
for the auditors and support facilities that it needs to audit for Revenue 
Ruling 77-176 compliance, as well. Though no figures are available, it is a 
fair bet that Revenue Ruling 77-176 has resulted in a net loss of tax dollars 
when compliance and auditing costs are considered. 
In addition, the IRS seemingly chooses to enforce the ruling selectively. 
Substantial numbers of tax assessments would result if the IRS would audit 
the little players, the thousands of “ma and pa” oil companies that have 
never heard of Revenue Ruling 77-176 to say nothing of the devices to 
avoid it. Such audits have not taken place, however, probably because the 
IRS has concluded that it would be politically unpopular and would throw 
many companies into bankruptcy while raising little revenue. 
                                                                                                                 
 58. I.R.C. § 6031 (Supp. III 1985). Some lawyers and accountants that I have talked 
with believe that the partners can terminate a tax partnership in the tax year following its 
creation. Others are concerned that quick termination may throw into question the 
“substantial economic effect” required to make the tax partnership work in the first place. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2) (as amended 1985). 
 59. See Lofgren, supra note 41, at 12-27; see also Houghton, Braden & Harris, Housing 
Your Mineral Activities in the Right Structure, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 6-01, 6-03 to -
04 (1985) (discusses substantial economic effect of operation of tax partnerships). 
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In short, Revenue Ruling 77-176 should embarrass tax policy makers. As 
long as the ruling remains IRS policy, however, there is a major tax trap for 
the unwary in farmout transactions. 
B. The Purposes of the Parties 
Any one or a combination of several factors may motivate the parties to a 
farmout agreement. Because the goals of the parties profoundly affect the 
structure of the agreement, a brief consideration of the parties’ purposes is 
worthwhile. 
1. The Farmor’s Purposes in Entering an Agreement 
The management of an entity that owns an oil and gas lease may wish to 
farm out that lease for a variety of reasons. Any list of reasons must include 
(a) lease preservation, (b) lease salvage, (c) risk sharing, (d) exploration and 
evaluation, (e) access to market, (f) obtaining reserves, and (g) drilling an 
“obligation” well. In each case, the farmor gives up a portion of its interest 
in its lease or leases to another to further what it regards as its own interests. 
a) Lease Preservation 
Oil and gas leases are typically drafted to expire at the end of a primary 
term,60 and oil companies frequently find themselves holding leases that 
they evaluate as good risks, but that they cannot test or develop within their 
primary terms. The inability to act may result from cash or credit shortages, 
inadequate number or skills of personnel, corporate reorganizations, or even 
managerial inefficiency. Whatever the precise reason, the lessee’s rights 
under a typical oil and gas lease terminate automatically and completely at 
the end of the primary term unless the lessee or an assignee is conducting 
drilling operations. Automatic termination wipes out in an instant all of the 
money that the lessee may have spent acquiring and evaluating the 
prospect, and ends the lessee’s prospects of developing the resources 
covered by the lease. Though far more oil and gas leases terminate at the 
end of their primary terms than are drilled, lease termination is an anathema 
to oil companies. Drilling is considered the natural order of things both by 
potential farmors and potential farmees. A primary motivation of farmors in 
entering into farmout agreements, therefore, is to prevent lease termination. 
                                                                                                                 
 60. The lease primary term is an option period, during which the lessee can hold the 
leased property without obligation to drill. See E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. 
SMITH, supra note 5, at 127. 
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When lease preservation is a strong motivation, one may expect 
relatively liberal farmout terms. The object of the contract is to entice the 
farmee to drill. The farmor’s main goal is not achieved if that is not done. 
Thus, while drilling may be an obligation of the farmee, and completion of 
a well capable of production is certain to be a requirement,61 testing 
requirements are likely to be minimal, and the percentage of interest earned 
and the acreage earned by the well are likely to be high, though the farmor 
will try to retain deep rights. 
b) Lease Salvage 
Far more frequently than farmors admit, their motivation to farm out is 
to try to salvage something of value from a lease that the farmor’s 
geologists and geophysicists evaluate as a poor prospect. As one 
correspondent wrote me, “We are liberal with farmouts because our goal is 
to get anything done on an area we have condemned. If something is found, 
we are that much better off.” While this motivation may seem at first blush 
to be akin to P.T. Barnum’s “bigger fool” theory, oil and gas exploration is 
such an uncertain science that the farmor’s specialists are as likely to be 
wrong as to be right. The farmee is free to draw its own conclusions as to 
whether and how to proceed. When the farmee suspects that the farmor may 
be seeking to salvage its lease, the agreement should provide that the 
farmor make its geologic and geophysical information and evaluations 
available and, if drilling is an obligation, that the farmee will have a 
reasonable period of time after receiving the information to withdraw from 
the agreement.62 
A salvage motivation is closely related to a lease preservation 
motivation. The distinction is that when lease preservation is the 
motivation, the farmor would drill if it could, while when salvage is the 
motivation, the farmor has decided that it does not wish to drill. Both 
motivations are similar, however, in that the farmor hopes to end up with an 
interest in production without spending any more money. Where the 
farmor’s purpose in farming out is to salvage its lease, the terms of the 
farmout will be similar to those found when its goal is lease preservation, 
but may be even more liberal. The farmor’s focus is likely to be the size of 
                                                                                                                 
 61. To maintain the lease in its secondary term, a well capable of producing in paying 
quantities must exist, even if the lease savings provisions are to be relied upon to preserve it. 
See id. at 171–80, 187–98. Thus, a “drill to earn” farmout serves little purpose if lease 
preservation is the primary goal. 
 62. For a discussion of farmout clauses requiring the sharing of geological and 
geophysical information, see infra text accompanying notes 163–64. 
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its retained interest. In addition, drilling is likely to be an option rather than 
an obligation, because the farmor has relatively little to lose if the farmed-
out property is not drilled. 
c) Risk Sharing 
Modern oil and gas wells are tremendously expensive to drill in 
comparison to wells drilled in the earlier years of the United States oil and 
gas industry.63 When confronted with drilling costs that may reach tens of 
millions of dollars, few companies are so big that risk sharing is not an 
attractive option. While a lessee may prefer a sale of a portion of its lease 
coupled with a joint operating agreement, because it permits the lessee to 
remain in control of operations, the lessee may also consider farming out, 
particularly if the proposed farmee is considered to be a good operator. 
Where the farmor’s primary purpose in farming out is risk-sharing, the 
parties may structure the farmout agreement much like a joint operating 
agreement: drilling will be an obligation rather than an option, the farmee 
will earn its interest merely by drilling, the farmor may share a part of the 
costs, and the farmout may cover multiple wells. 
d) Exploration and Evaluation 
Sometimes the goal of a farmor’s management in farming out is to obtain 
geological information from its leases so that it can evaluate other leases 
that it holds in the same area. Although the farmor in this situation hopes 
that the farmee’s operations will yield production, the farmor’s primary 
purpose in entering the agreement is similar to its purpose in entering into 
an acreage contribution agreement. The farmor wants the information that 
drilling operations will produce, whether or not drilling operations locate 
hydrocarbons. 
When the farmor’s primary purpose in farming out is to develop 
exploratory information, the contract will emphasize the tests to be 
conducted in the course of drilling, the formations to be tested, and the 
depth to be drilled. The number and complexity of the tests that they require 
typically distinguish exploratory farmouts from other kinds of farmouts. 
Exploratory farmouts are also likely to contain area of mutual interest 
clauses,64 which obligate the farmor and the farmee to share leases on 
properties that may look attractive as a result of the exploratory drilling. 
Whether drilling is an option or an obligation, whether the farmee will earn 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See supra note 1. 
 64. See infra text accompanying notes 372–77. 
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by completing a well capable of production or merely by drilling to a 
specified depth and testing, and what percentage interest will be earned in 
what acreage are all matters that will depend upon the bargaining leverage 
of the parties. 
e) Access to Market 
A lessee is unlikely to drill even good geologic prospects if it lacks 
access to market. Though there is always a market for oil, logistical 
problems such as lack of manpower or transport in the area may make 
marketing impractical. When there is a surplus of natural gas, an operator 
may find it impossible to locate a buyer at any reasonable price. Thus, 
another possible motivation for a lessee to farm out leases is to acquire 
access to markets for the production anticipated from drilling. Giving an 
interest to an operator that has the capability to market may be the best deal 
available to a farmor. 
When access to market is the farmor’s motivation to offer the farmout, 
the parties will probably structure the agreement much like an agreement 
motivated by lease preservation. Terms are likely to be liberal, testing 
requirements are likely to be minimal, and production to earn will be 
required. The farmor will insist, however, upon placing the burden of 
marketing upon the farmee. The farmor will either retain an overriding 
royalty convertible at its option65 or require the farmee to agree to market 
the farmor’s share of production on the same terms and conditions that the 
farmee obtains for itself. 
f) Obtaining Reserves 
Yet another motivation for one who owns a lease to farmout is to obtain 
commitment of the reserves that may be discovered by drilling on the lease. 
Obtaining reserves is a common motivation for pipelines to farm out leases 
they hold, particularly in times of gas shortages. Pipelines have a legal 
obligation to make gas available to their customers. Their primary business 
is transporting and selling gas, not exploration and production. Therefore, 
pipelines often build up inventories of oil and gas leases with the intention 
of farming them out to producers who will drill on them and sell the gas 
back. Refining companies may follow a similar procedure. Pipelines and 
refiners sometimes establish their own exploration subsidiaries. 
When obtaining reserves is the farmor’s motivation, the key provision in 
the farmout agreement will be a “call” on production by the farmor or a 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 301–14. 
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commitment to a gas contract.66 The farmor will prefer a firm commitment 
to drill from the farmee, and if the farmor has the bargaining leverage, it 
may impose onerous testing requirements that will help it evaluate other 
leases that it may hold in the area. Commonly, however, the terms of a 
farmout agreement motivated by obtaining reserves will be very liberal 
except for the call or commitment provisions. 
g) To Drill an “Obligation” Well 
While oil and gas leases typically impose no express obligation upon the 
lessee to drill wells, drilling may be an implied obligation. Even during the 
primary lease term, the courts require the lessee to protect against drainage, 
if the lessee can do so profitably.67 When the lease is being held by 
production, and a reasonable, prudent operator would drill additional wells 
or explore further, the law implies an obligation upon the lessee to protect 
the interests of the lessor.68 When the appropriate means of protection, 
development or exploration is to drill, the industry refers to the drilling of 
an “obligation well.”69 
The hallmark of an obligation well farmout is that the farmee will have a 
binding legal obligation to drill on the farmed-out acreage. Since the 
farmor’s primary purpose in farming out is to relieve itself of legal liability 
to its lessor, an obligation to drill is essential. All other issues are 
negotiable. 
2. The Farmee’s Purposes in Entering into a Farmout 
The farmee’s purposes in entering into a farmout agreement often mirror 
the motivations of the farmor. The farmee may be interested in entering into 
                                                                                                                 
 66. See infra text accompanying notes 399–405. 
 67. In most states, this is true even though the lessor has accepted delay rental 
payments. Rentals waive the covenant to test, but not to protect against drainage. Texas Co. 
v. Ramsower, 7 S.W.2d 872, 875–77 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928, judgmt aff’d). But see. e.g., 
Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmaier, 161 Ark. 26, 255 S.W. 37, 38–39 (1923) (lessor 
not entitled to recover damages for lessee’s failure to explore and develop gas wells on 
leased premises when lessor accepted payments of annual rentals under oil and gas lease 
providing that payment thereof in lieu of drilling well should continue lease). 
 68. In Texas and Oklahoma, apparently no implied obligation to explore further exists 
separate from the implied covenant to develop. But see Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. 
Jackson, 715 S.W.2d 199, 201–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ granted) 
(lessee may be obligated to conduct further development operations on leased premises if 
further exploration would be beneficial to both lessee and lessor). For discussion of the issue 
and its significance see J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 292. 
 69. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 12, at 563. 
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a farmout because (1) the farmout is the quickest or cheapest way to obtain 
or expand an acreage position or to obtain reserves; (2) the farmee may 
have cash, or equipment and personnel that it wishes to keep busy; (3) the 
farmee may highly evaluate a property that the farmor has dismissed as a 
poor prospect; or (4) the farmee may want to become active in an area, but 
be unwilling or unable to take the risks alone. 
In addition, a farmee may be interested in a farmout proposal simply 
because it is available. Oil company landmen are inveterate deal makers. It 
is not uncommon to find a particular company involved in substantial 
numbers of farmouts both as a farmor and as a farmee without any clear-cut 
pattern to the trades. 
III. Preparing and Analyzing the Farmout Agreement 
The process of preparing a farmout agreement or analyzing a proposed or 
disputed agreement is very much the same. In each case, the drafter must 
scrutinize the essential provisions of the instrument both separately and in 
their relationship to the structure of the agreement. This section of this 
Article considers that process in relation to preliminary or background 
matters, the key characteristics of the farmout agreement, and issues that 
must be addressed. 
A. Preliminary Matters 
1. Reputation and Solvency 
Some deals should not be made. The best drafted contract cannot fully 
protect a party from another who is a knave or a fool. The farmor and the 
farmee must both confront the possibility of substantial losses if the 
farmout transaction proves unsuccessful. People in the oil industry 
sometimes forget this basic principle, particularly in the press of an attempt 
to maintain a lease about to expire. A review of a farmout agreement should 
begin by asking questions about the reputation and solvency of the 
proposed business partner. 
2. Reasonableness of the Proposal 
The second step in the review of a farmout proposal or agreement should 
be to consider what is reasonable for the parties to agree to do, given the 
circumstances of time and economics. How long until the leases to be 
farmed out will expire? Are drilling rigs readily available? How likely is it 
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that title curative will be required?70 Will it be necessary to obtain 
conservation orders71 or to comply with special conservation rules?72 A 
transaction that cannot be consummated is not a good business deal. 
3. Preliminary Negotiations 
Parties often negotiate farmout agreements through an exchange of 
letters. Disputes may arise over whether the parties have formed a binding 
contract, or whether they have merely engaged in preliminary 
negotiations.73  Smith v. Sabine Royalty Corp.74 illustrates the problem. In 
Sabine Royalty Corp. Sabine, a fractional mineral interest owner, wrote 
Smith, another mineral interest owner who had expressed an interest in 
acquiring the right to drill, proposing terms under which it “would be 
willing” to lease to Sabine’s subsidiary, which in turn would farm out to 
Smith.75 The letter concluded: “If you wish to pursue this arrangement, 
please let us know and the appropriate instruments will be forwarded for 
your review.”76 Without replying, Smith drilled on the premises and 
claimed the right to a farmout of Sabine’s interest. A Texas court of civil 
appeals rejected the claim on the ground that the parties had never agreed to 
be bound.77  
                                                                                                                 
 70. The farmout agreement should entitle the farmee to all of the farmor’s title informa-
tion. Often, the farmout agreement specifically provides for this right. See infra note 161 for 
an example of language that provides for title information to be delivered to the farmee. As a 
practical matter, however, title information may be made available to the farmee before the 
parties form the agreement so that the farmee can evaluate the feasibility of drilling within 
the time proposed. 
 71. In Oklahoma, for example, extensive title work prior to obtaining orders from the 
Corporation Commission spacing property for drilling is required. See Harry R. Carlile Trust 
v. Cotton Petroleum Corp., 732 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3871 (U.S. 
June 30, 1987). In Carlile the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that publication notice to those 
whose interests are affected by spacing is constitutionally insufficient if the applicant could 
ascertain their identity with due diligence, because establishment of spacing units is an 
adjudicative function of the Corporation Commission. Id. at 444. Locating those owners and 
giving them notice is time-consuming as well as expensive. 
 72. In Texas, for example, the Railroad Commission may require special proceedings if 
the farmout well is to be drilled on an exception tract under rule 37, or if sour gas may be 
anticipated under rule 36. 
 73. See generally Trower, Enforceability of Letters of Intent and Other Preliminary 
Agreements, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 347 (1978) (discusses whether parties have 
formed binding contract or have merely engaged in preliminary negotiations). 
 74. 556 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1977, no writ). 
 75. Id. at 367. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 368–69. 
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A more recent case on point is Getty Oil Co. v. Blevco Energy, Inc.78 
Blevco Energy requested a farmout of certain leases from Getty, and Getty 
replied that “Getty Oil will farmout to Blevco Energy, providing a mutually 
acceptable agreement can be resolved . . . .”79 Subsequently, however, 
Getty drilled upon the property itself and completed an excellent well. 
Blevco sued Getty, and the trial court awarded Blevco Energy $2 million in 
actual damages and $4 million in punitive damages. The appellate court 
reversed on the grounds that no contract existed; the parties had merely an 
agreement to agree.80 
These cases suggest that the best course is to state clearly in any letter 
exchange whether or not the parties intend to create a binding agreement.81 
In addition, an offer to farmout should be subject to a specific termination 
date.82 
At least two writers have urged that farmout agreements ought not be 
entered into in the form of “letter agreements,” an exchange of letters, or a 
letter signed by both of the parties.83 Letter agreements may be a perfectly 
adequate vehicle for a contract, of course, and they are appealing because of 
their apparent simplicity. The problem is that “the nature of a letter 
agreement makes it improbable that the parties have included detailed 
provisions which will apply in the event the transaction does not progress as 
expected.”84 The better practice is to take the extra step of preparing a 
formal farmout agreement.85 
                                                                                                                 
 78. 722 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1986, no writ). 
 79. Id at 53–54. 
 80. Id. at 54. 
 81. See Schaefer, supra note 3, at 18-1, -8; see also infra note 85 (illustrates language 
used in this type of farmout agreement). 
 82. The following clause limits the duration of the farmout offer: “9. EXECUTION. 
This Farmout Agreement shall be null and void at Farmor’s option if the duplicate original 
hereof enclosed herewith is not executed by Farmee and returned to Farmor within — days 
after the date shown below Farmor’s signature.” T. FAY, supra note 3, at 48. 
 83. Cage, supra note 3, at 156; Scott, supra note 3, at 65. 
 84. E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 618. Petroleum Fin. 
Corp. v. Cockburn, 241 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1957), exemplifies the complications that may 
occur with letter agreements. In Petroleum Pin. Corp. the parties disagreed, and the court 
found that the letters and telegrams exchanged were ambiguous as to whether the farmor 
warranted a present title subject to defeasance or merely agreed to transfer merchantable title 
in the future. Id. at 317–18. 
 85. The parties might include the following language, modeled upon language 
suggested by Schaefer, supra note 3, at 18-9, in routine proposal letters: 
 [insert if the parties intend to be bound] We agree that the copy of this letter 
executed by both of us shall constitute a binding agreement between us to all of 
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4. Satisfying the Statute of Frauds 
Virtually all United States jurisdictions have adopted the statute of frauds 
to minimize disputes and fraud. The rationale for the statute is that certain 
kinds of agreements are so prone to dispute and outright fraud that they 
should be unenforceable unless they are evidenced by a writing.86 
Farmout agreements fall within the scope of the statute of frauds if they 
are contracts for the transfer of an interest in land.87 Most states probably 
will so classify farmout agreements, whether the interest created by an oil 
and gas lease is viewed as an estate in land or as a profit à prendre,88 and 
whether the form of the contract is an agreement to convey or a conditional 
transfer. An oil and gas lease creates an interest in land whether it is 
classified as a fee simple determinable estate in the minerals or a profit à 
prendre. The lease’s subject matter is an interest in land89 whether the 
farmout agreement is in the form of a bilateral contract or a unilateral 
contract. Only in states that treat the oil and gas lease as a mere license can 
one argue that the farmout agreement need not comply with the statute of 
frauds. Courts will likely apply the statute even in those states, however.90 
                                                                                                                 
the terms and conditions set forth. We anticipate, however, that we will execute 
a formal farmout agreement at a later date, the provisions of which will replace 
and supersede this agreement in all respects. 
 [insert if the parties do not intend to be bound] We agree, however, that this 
is a preliminary letter of intent that shall not create any legally binding obliga-
tions between us until we have executed a formal farmout agreement. 
 86. The recital to the Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1677), stated that its object was 
the “prevention of many fraudulent Practices, which are commonly endeavored to be upheld 
by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury.” See also Willis, The Statute of Frauds—A Legal 
Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427 (1928) (discusses historical background of statute of frauds). 
 87. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §4 (West 1986). Interestingly, TEX. Bus. & 
COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(4) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1987) applies only to contracts for 
the “sale of real estate.” In any event, an oil and gas lease is “real estate” under Texas law, 
and a farmout agreement is subject to the statute of frauds. White v. McNeil, 294 S.W. 928, 
930–31 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1927, no writ). 
 88. See E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 109. 
 89. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 29. 
 90. Although Kansas, for example, has embraced the ownership-in-place theory of oil 
and gas rights, Kansas considers an oil and gas lease as personal property, a mere license. 
Nonetheless, Kansas courts have held oil and gas leases subject to the statute of frauds. For 
an excellent discussion, see D. PIERCE, KANSAS OIL AND GAS HANDBOOK § 4.11 (1986). See 
also Lohse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352 (N.D. 1986), holding that an oral 
agreement or bonus, royalty, and delay rentals did not create an enforceable contract even 
though the parties agreed to use a “standard form.” 
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Compliance with the statute of frauds does not require a formal contract. 
Compliance occurs if there is “some memorandum or note thereof . . . in 
writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith” or that party’s 
agent.91 On the other hand, it is not enough that there is a formal instru-
ment. To comply with the statute of frauds, a contract must identify the 
parties and the subject matter, and a bilateral contract requires 
consideration.92 
a) Authority of an Agent 
A common statute of frauds issue that arises in a variety of oil and gas 
contract contexts is the authority of the agent who executes the contract. 
Most oil and gas contracts are between corporations, partnerships, 
limited partnerships or other forms of business entities, rather than 
individuals, because of the magnitude of the financial obligations involved. 
The question of whether or not the individual who purports to act for a 
corporation or a limited partnership actually has the authority to act is 
always a potential problem. 
Representations in the agreement can minimize the problem. While 
representations of agency cannot create powers that do not exist, they may 
stimulate a disclosure of limited authority from the negotiator. Furthermore, 
if others in the negotiator’s organization who have authority to bind it are 
aware of the negotiator’s representations, a basis for a finding of apparent 
authority may be laid.93 The only certain way to ensure that the agent 
signing the agreement has authority is to require a properly executed power 
of attorney or a certified copy of evidence of authority. 
b) Designation of the Parties 
The statute of frauds requires that the parties to the agreement be 
identifiable.94 Failure to do so will cause the agreement to be 
unenforceable. Cohen v. McCutchen95 provides a good example. In Cohen 
the contributing party made and signed a support agreement proposal in a 
                                                                                                                 
 91. 8 Stat. 405, § 4, 24 Car. 2, ch. 3, § 4; Lynch v. Davis, 181 Conn. 434, 435 A.2d 977, 
980 (1980). 
 92. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 207 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 131 (1979). 
 93. Apparent authority is “[S]uch authority as a principal intentionally or by want of 
ordinary care causes or allows third person to believe that agent possesses.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 88 (5th ed. 1979); see also W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 
8(D) (1964) (similar definition of apparent authority). 
 94. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987). 
 95. 565 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1978). 
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form that failed either to state the name of the party to receive the 
contribution or to provide for his signature.96 The Texas Supreme Court 
upheld summary judgment against the administrator of the estate of the 
party who was to receive the contribution on the ground that the statute of 
frauds requires that both parties be identifiable from the written agreement 
or supporting memoranda.97 
The statute of frauds does not require that the parties to a contract for the 
transfer of an interest in land be named.98 Compliance with the statute 
occurs if they are described sufficiently to permit their identity to be 
established by parol evidence. Thus, a reference in a farmout agreement to a 
“farmor” who is the “owner” of specifically described leases should satisfy 
the statute.99 
There are important practical reasons, however, for specifically naming 
the parties to the farmout agreement and indicating addresses and telephone 
numbers of each in the agreement. Under the terms of the agreement or in 
the event of emergencies, notices may need to be given or communication 
established. Having the vital information ready at hand in the body of the 
agreement will save time and minimize confusion. A well-drafted farmout 
agreement will have no difficulty meeting the statute of frauds requirement 
that the parties be identifiable. 
c) Identification of the Land Covered 
The agreement must sufficiently describe the land subject to a farmout 
agreement to permit it to be located to meet the standard of the statute of 
frauds.100 This requirement can pose a problem, particularly in those 
farmout agreements that are in letter form and refer only generally to the 
leases and areas covered. Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil101 
illustrates the principles applicable. In Westland an area of mutual interest 
clause in an assignment of the farmee’s rights under a farmout agreement 
provided as follows: 
5. If any of the parties hereto, their representatives or assigns, 
acquire any additional leasehold interests affecting any of the 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 232. 
 97. F. & W. Grand Co. v. Eiseman, 160 Ga. 321, 127 S.E. 872, 876 (1925). 
 98. See id., 127 S.E. at 875 (reference to “lessor” as “owner” held sufficient). 
 99. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908–11 (Tex. 
1982). 
 100. Id. at 908. 
 101. 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982). 
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lands covered by said farmout agreement, or any additional 
interest from Mobil Oil Corporation under lands in the area of 
the farmout acreage, such shall be subject to the terms and 
provisions of this agreement.102 
The Texas Supreme Court held that the reference to “lands covered by said 
farmout agreement” satisfied the statute of frauds because the letter 
agreement specifically identified “said farmout,” and the farmout 
agreement identified contained a specific description of the land subject to 
the leases.103 The court deemed the reference to “lands in the area of the 
farmout acreage” insufficient to permit introduction of parol evidence to 
determine the intent, however.104 The court said that parol evidence “should 
be used only for the purpose of identifying the land with reasonable 
certainty from the data in the memorandum, and not for the purpose of 
supplying its location or description.”105  
A similar issue with a similar result arose in Stekoll Petroleum Co. v. 
Hamilton.106 In Hamilton the farmout arrangement extended to the farmee 
the right to choose 4000 acres from a 5000-acre block of land, leaving the 
farmors with 1000 acres “equitably checkerboarded in a fashion similar to 
the checkerboarding in” another block.107 The Texas Supreme Court held 
that the agreement failed to describe adequately the property in question 
because the agreement did not clearly define the checkerboard pattern and 
because the contract did “not contain the statement of data or means or a 
method by which . . . the land will be certainly and clearly identified.”108 
These two cases illustrate that the description of leases subject to the 
farmout agreement must be as detailed and explicit as possible. The parties 
should use a proper legal description, rather than a plat map.109 The 
description should include the legal description of the property, the source 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 905. 
 103. Id. at 909. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 910; see also Getty Oil Co. v. Blevco Energy, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tex. 
App.—Eastland 1986, no writ) (failure of any writing to identify property allegedly subject 
to farmout agreement provided court alternative ground for reversing trial court). 
 106. 152 Tex. 182, 255 S.W.2d 187 (1953). 
 107. Id. at 188–90, 255 S.W.2d at 191. 
 108. Id. at 190–92, 255 S.W.2d at 192. 
 109. In Heirs & Unknown Heirs of Barrow v. Champion Paper & Fibre Co., 327 S.W.2d 
338 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court of appeals held that a map 
of a subdivision drawn on a scale of one inch to 800 feet was too uncertain to fix the location 
because “even the width of a line drawn upon the map must represent several feet.” Id. at 
347. 
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of the legal description, the names of the lessor and lessee, and the 
recording information for the leases farmed out. The description may also 
refer to depth limitations or lease burdens. The information frequently will 
be so lengthy that it will be included in an exhibit attached to the farmout 
agreement.110 
d) Consideration 
The statute of frauds requires that consideration, expressly or impliedly 
stated in the agreement, must support a bilateral contract.111 Farmout 
agreements occasionally specifically recite that monetary consideration has 
been given,112 though whether it is actually paid is often doubtful. When the 
farmout agreement makes drilling an obligation of the farmee, however, 
one can find consideration in the promises that the parties make to one 
another. Consideration in the form of a promise for a promise is the essence 
of a farmout agreement in which drilling is mandatory. The more typical 
option-to-drill farmout agreement may be classified as a unilateral contract, 
which needs no consideration.113 
5. Coordination with Farmed-Out Leases 
It is axiomatic that the farmee can get no better rights under a farmout 
agreement than the farmor owns under the leases subject to the agreement. 
Often, however, the parties to a farmout agreement fail to examine the 
terms and the validity of the leases farmed out. Rarely are proposed farmout 
agreements presented with copies of the subject leases attached. The parties 
                                                                                                                 
 110. For example: 
EXHIBIT “A” 
Attached to and made a part of that certain Farmout Agreement dated (date), 
from (Name of Farmor) to (Name of Farmee) 
Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease dated ____, between ____, as Lessor, and ____, as 
Lessee, recorded in Volume ____, Page ____ of the Oil and Gas Records of 
____ County, Texas, covering the following described lands situated in said 
county and State: 
____ acres, more or less, being the ____ Survey, ____ of ____ County, Texas, 
and described in a Deed from ____ to ____ dated ____, and recorded in 
Volume ____, Page ____ of the Deed Records of ____ County, Texas. 
 111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 comment h (1979); see also Lynch v. 
Davis, 181 Conn. 434, 435 A.2d 977, 979 (1980); Briand v. Wild, 110 N.H. 373, 268 A.2d 
896, 897–98 (1970). 
 112. For example, one major oil company uses forms that begin, “For sufficient 
consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged . . . .” 
 113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 comment h (1979). Performance 
supplies consideration for a unilateral contract. Id. 
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will likely execute the farmout agreement without a close examination of 
the leases being farmed out since most farmout transactions make drilling 
an option rather than a firm obligation. 
The farmor and the farmee both take risks if they fail to examine the 
leases subject to the farmout. Isler v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.114 illustrates a 
risk to the farmee. In Isler TXO farmed out an oil and gas lease on federal 
lands in New Mexico to Isler. TXO made the farmout without warranty of 
title. The agreement provided that TXO would make delay rental payments 
or give Isler notice before ceasing to make them, but it specifically stated 
that TXO would have no responsibility to Isler for a failure to make the 
payments.115 TXO, through oversight, failed to make rental payments, and 
the lease expired. Isler completed two wells on the premises before learning 
that the lease had expired. Isler sued TXO, claiming damages both on a 
theory of breach of contract and on a theory of tort. A federal court jury 
awarded damages against TXO for negligence.116 The Tenth Circuit 
reversed, applying New Mexico law, on the ground that the farmout agree-
ment meant what it said: 
The effect of confusing the concept of contractual duties, which 
are voluntarily bargained for, with the concept of tort duties, 
which are largely imposed by law, would be to nullify a 
substantial part of what the parties expressly bargained for—
limited liability. Unless such bargains are against public policy 
(covered either by prohibitory statutes or well-defined, judge-
made rules such as unconscionability), there is no reason in fact 
or in law to undermine them. Indeed, it would be an unwarranted 
judicial intrusion into the marketplace.117 
The farmor may also hurt itself by failing to coordinate the terms of the 
farmout with the underlying leases. In Davis v. Zapata Petroleum Corp.118 
Davis farmed out to Zapata under a farmout agreement that required Zapata 
to commence drilling and continue either until Zapata achieved production 
or until thirty days after Zapata provided Davis notice of its intent to cease 
operations. Zapata commenced drilling three days before the end of the 
                                                                                                                 
 114. 749 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 115. This provision is typical in farmout agreements. The Isler case does not quote the 
applicable provisions, but many of the farmout agreements collected included formulations 
of similar effect. See infra text accompanying notes 352–53. 
 116. 749 F.2d at 22. 
 117. Id. at 23. 
 118. 351 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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primary term, but then gave Davis notice of its intent to cease. Davis 
accepted the notice, took over the well, and found another farmee. The 
lessor subsequently evicted the new farmee from the land on the grounds 
that the lease had terminated because operations had ceased for longer than 
the period permitted by the lease operations clause.119 Davis sued Zapata 
for damages it had incurred, but lost in a jury trial. A Texas court of civil 
appeals upheld the judgment on the basis that the farmout agreement set 
Zapata’s obligations rather than the lease.120 The court noted that “such 
requirements might well have been greater, or less, than those required to 
maintain the oil and gas lease in effect.”121 
These cases clearly and consistently apply the principle that a farmout 
agreement means what it says. The courts will not include by implication in 
the farmout agreement requirements of the leases that are farmed out or 
motivation of the parties. Thus, it is crucial that the parties to a farmout 
identify the important components of the leases being farmed out and 
incorporate them specifically in their agreement. 
6. Drafting Techniques 
Drafting is an art rather than a science. Every drafter has favorite 
techniques, and few agree as to what works best. Experts in the area do 
agree, however, that “if it may be ambiguous, it is ambiguous.”122 Clarity of 
meaning is the goal, and the following techniques may be helpful. 
a) Use of Prefatory Statements of Purpose 
When the primary purpose of the farmout can be identified—for 
example, to preserve a lease about to expire or to test a particular 
formation—one should include a prefatory statement of that purpose. The 
courts struggle to make sense of the instruments before them, as do 
managers in oil companies and their counsel. A clear statement of the 
purpose of an agreement may avoid disputes or lend support to the 
interpretation urged. 
                                                                                                                 
 119. A lease operations clause addresses the problem of drilling operations that are 
begun, but not completed by the end of the primary term. The clause defines drilling 
operations, generally deemed to be in progress when continuing for more than a 30-, 60-, or 
90-day period, as constructive production for purposes of the lease habendum clause. See E. 
KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 188–98. 
 120. 351 S.W.2d at 925. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See supra note 4. 
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Pasotex Petroleum Co. v. British American Oil Producing Co.123 
illustrates the usefulness of prefatory statements. In Pasotex Petroleum Co. 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a farmee abandoned performance of 
a farmout agreement when it failed to drill a well to test a deep formation, 
but completed a well in a shallower formation. The court reasoned that: 
Our examination of the record convinces us that the paramount 
idea and purpose on the part of defendant in negotiating and 
making the agreements with plaintiff was to secure a deep test 
well that would test the productivity of the Basal Oil Creek 
Sand. In addition to the value of a producing well from this sand 
there was also the important feature of the geological knowledge 
that defendant would acquire and the influence this would have 
on defendant in determining whether it would expend the large 
sums . . . necessary in securing renewals of a large number of 
leases that would soon expire. Such a test well was not drilled.124 
The result turned on the finding of the purpose of the agreement. Extrinsic 
evidence had to be introduced to prove the point, however. A prefatory 
statement might have avoided litigation, and made the result more certain. 
b) Use Appendices for Standard or Complex Provisions 
Many of the farmout agreements collected did not attempt to deal with 
standard or detailed provisions in the body of the agreement, but instead 
attached appendices containing these terms.125 This drafting technique 
offers a number of advantages. First, it makes possible an apparently 
simple, purpose-oriented farmout agreement. Second, it discourages those 
who negotiate the agreement from making changes in provisions that the 
lawyers may view as important boilerplate. Third, the technique minimizes 
the opportunities for ambiguity or conflict between the terms of the farmout 
agreement and related instruments, such as the assignment.126 
                                                                                                                 
 123. 431 P.2d 373 (Okla. 1966). 
 124. Id at 381. 
 125. See, e.g., Exhibit A to the agreements of Sun Exploration and Production Company 
discussed in T. FAY, supra note 3, at 55–58, which includes many of the substantive 
provisions addressed in this paper in four pages of fine print. 
 126. A nightmare for the lawyer or administrator working with farmouts is that the terms 
of an assignment made pursuant to a farmout agreement will be inconsistent with the terms 
of the farmout. Whether the terms of the assignment comport with the farmout is often a 
point of dispute between farmor and farmees. See, e.g., Holly Energy, Inc. v. Patrick, 239 
Kan. 528, 722 P.2d 1073, 1074–75 (1986). For a discussion of Holly Energy, see infra notes 
129–32 and accompanying text. An obvious problem of merger will arise if that occurs. One 
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Use of appendices has a single, but substantial, disadvantage. That 
disadvantage is the risk that those negotiating the agreement will regard the 
appendices as incidental to the transaction and thus not give them the 
attention that they deserve.127 Negotiators can easily fall into the trap of 
regarding appendices as unimportant. 
c) Define the Terms Used 
Persons active in the oil business often think of the industry as a 
monolithic whole, although the better view probably is as a group of 
regional industries. Both practices and terminology differ from place to 
place. Parties therefore must define carefully the terms used in a farmout 
agreement, either in the text of the contract as they are used or in a separate 
definitions section.128 
Even commonplace terms may be considered ambiguous. In Holly 
Energy, Inc. v. Patrick129 the farmout agreement provided that a well 
capable of producing in paying quantities would earn “that portion of the 
captioned quarter section situated within the production unit established 
for that well.”130 The farmor assigned its interest in two full quarter 
sections, though the spacing pattern for the two wells was only forty acres. 
The farmor later asserted that the farmee should have received only 
assignments of the forty-acre well sites. The Supreme Court of Kansas 
affirmed a trial court’s refusal to grant the farmor relief on a variety of 
claims, upholding the trial court’s finding that the term “production unit” 
was ambiguous.131 The court pointedly noted that “it would have been a 
simple matter for Holly to clearly state in the farmout agreement that only 
                                                                                                                 
correspondent who responded to my request for comments, Dean Eugene Kuntz, suggested 
that the parties might draft the farmout to refer to an assignment to be made “on the attached 
form of assignment covering the lands, leases and interests, and subject to the limitations set 
forth, in such form of assignment.” This suggestion would minimize the possibilities for 
conflict between the terms of the assignment and the terms of the farmout relating to the 
assignment. 
 127. See Lamb, supra note 3, at 141 (criticizing the “conglomerate mess” that may 
result). 
 128. One of the agreements collected devoted nearly two full pages to definition of 
terms, including contract lands, leases, earning well, subsequent well, drilling unit, contract 
depth, well costs, operating costs, leasehold costs, lease maintenance costs, casing point, 
working interest, working interest percentage, and operator. See also art. II of the short form 
farmout agreement attached to Bledsoe, supra note 3, ex. 1. 
 129. 239 Kan. 528, 722 P.2d 1073 (1986). 
 130. 722 P.2d at 1075 (emphasis in original). 
 131. Id. at 1079. 
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one well was contemplated and that if successful Patrick would receive an 
assignment as to forty acres only.”132 A complete definitions section, 
though rarely seen, is advisable. 
B. Key Characteristics of a Farmout 
When one shifts from preliminary matters to substantive analysis, it is 
important to determine the key characteristics of any farmout proposal or 
agreement. On these provisions may turn the likelihood of the transaction’s 
business success or failure. The key characteristics of a farmout agreement 
generally include the provisions relating to (1) the duty imposed, (2) the 
earning factor, (3) the interest earned, (4) the number of wells to be drilled, 
and (5) the form of the agreement. 
1. The Duty Imposed: Option or Obligation 
People in the industry frequently classify farmout agreements as “option 
farmouts” or “obligation farmouts.” An option farmout agreement provides 
that drilling is a condition of the farmee’s earning the agreed interest. An 
obligation farmout agreement is one in which drilling is a promise by the 
farmee.133 If drilling is an option, it is a condition of earning. If drilling is 
an obligation, it is a covenant—a legally binding promise. 
All things being equal, the farmor would probably always prefer to 
structure the farmout agreement so that the farmee covenants to drill. All 
things are rarely equal in negotiations, however, and the vast majority of 
farmout agreements make drilling an option rather than an obligation. This 
situation may indicate that lease salvage is a common motivation.134 It may 
also reflect the attitude of the farmors’ managements as to what is fair.135 
Perhaps most likely, drilling as an option results from simple economics. In 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. 
 133. An obligation farmout should not be confused with a farmout in which the farmor’s 
purpose is to have drilled an obligation well. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. The 
former refers to the structure of the agreement. The latter refers to the motivation of the 
farmor in entering the agreement. In fact, however, a farmout given because the farmor 
needs to have an “obligation well” drilled will almost certainly be structured as an 
“obligation farmout.” On the other hand, farmouts motivated by other purposes may also be 
so structured. 
 134. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 135. The vice president for land of a large independent oil company once told the author 
that his company, as a farmor, would never insist that a farmee covenant to drill because it 
was as often a farmee as a farmor. While that statement may have been an exaggeration, 
what the deal-makers regard as ethical or good business practice certainly may affect the 
structure of agreements. 
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the usual farmout situation, the farmee holds the bargaining leverage. The 
farmor wants to “move” the leases being fanned out and so the farmee, 
which is understandably reluctant to make a firm commitment to drill, can 
negotiate an option to drill. 
The primary significance of classifying a farmout agreement as an option 
farmout or an obligation farmout is the effect of failure to perform under 
the agreement. When the farmout is structured as an option to drill, failure 
to drill will cost the farmee the benefits it might have earned. When the 
farmee is obligated to drill, however, failure to drill may expose the farmee 
to very substantial liabilities.136 The classification of the agreement as an 
option farmout or obligation farmout may also affect the rights of the 
parties in the event of bankruptcy.137  
2. The Earning Factor: Produce to Earn or Drill to Earn 
A second way to categorize farmout agreements for analytical purposes 
is by reference to what will earn an interest for the farmee. A produce-to-
earn farmout agreement is drafted so that the farmee earns an interest in the 
property being farmed out by drilling and completing a well capable of 
producing in paying quantities. A drill-to-earn farmout agreement requires 
less. The farmee can earn its interest merely by drilling to a specified 
formation or formations and conducting agreed testing. 
Lansinger v. United Petroleum Corp.138 illustrates the importance of the 
distinction between produce-to-earn and drill-to-earn farmouts. In 
Lansinger the farmee drilled a well under a farmout requiring completion of 
a well capable of producing in paying quantities, but the farmee neither 
hydraulically fractured it nor equipped it to produce. The court quieted title 
in favor of the farmor, noting that it was not sufficient “to complete a well 
having some indications of oil, or a well which might be developed into a 
well producing oil in paying quantities,”139 and denied the farmee 
additional time to complete the well.140 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Thus, when drilling is an obligation rather than an option, the farmee must 
determine its ability to perform before entering into the agreement. In addition, the farmee 
must also have examined the title of the farmed-out properties before committing itself to an 
obligation to drill. In the alternative, the agreement may provide that the farmee has a 
specified period of time to review title and to reject it without liability. Lamb, supra note 3, 
at 160; see infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra text accompanying notes 859–72. 
 138. 14 Ohio App. 3d 398, 471 N.E.2d 869 (1984). 
 139. 471 N.E.2d at 871 (quoting Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 Ohio St. 514, 69 N.E. 
984, 985 (1904)). 
 140. Id. at 872. 
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The produce-to-earn farmout, which was the subject in Lansinger, is the 
more usual because the most common motivation for a farmor to farm out 
is to preserve a lease, and a party cannot maintain a lease without a well 
capable of producing in paying quantities. A drill-to-earn farmout structure 
is usually found in agreements where the farmor is motivated by a desire to 
explore. Conceptually, this structure is closely related to an acreage 
contribution agreement.141 Parties will likely use both as part of a 
coordinated exploratory program to evaluate an area. Drill-to-earn farmout 
agreements may also be used when the well to be drilled is an obligation 
well. A dry hole will satisfy the legal obligation as effectively as a 
producing well when the farmor farms out to satisfy an implied covenant to 
its lessor. 
3. The Interest Earned: Divided Interest, Undivided Interest, or 
Combination 
A divided interest farmout provides that the farmee and the farmor end 
up owning interests in separate tracts. A simple example is an agreement by 
which a farmee earns all of the farmor’s interest in a specified lease for 
drilling. Another example is a farmout, perhaps entered into to preserve a 
lease, that allows the farmee to earn the farmor’s interest in a drillsite tract 
for drilling and completing a well capable of producing in paying 
quantities, yet leaves the farmor with the full leasehold interest in the 
acreage outside the drillsite tract.142 A variation, called a “checkerboard” 
scheme, provides that the farmee earns the farmor’s interest in drillsite 
acreage plus the farmor’s interest in every other drillsite unit around the 
drillsite tract, leaving the farmor the interest in the remaining tracts.143 
An undivided interest farmout provides that the farmee earns an 
undivided portion of the farmor’s interest in a tract. For example, a farmee 
may earn 75% of the farmor’s interest in only the drillsite in return for 
paying 75% of drilling costs, so that the farmor and the farmee become 
tenants in common. Such arrangements frequently arise when a farmor’s 
primary reason for farming out is lack of cash. By assigning a part of its 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 142. For examples of well site only assignments, see infra notes 275–76. 
 143. For an example of a checkerboard assignment, see Stekol v. Hamilton, 152 Tex. 
182, 255 S.W.2d 187, 190–91 (1953). See also 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYER, supra note 12, 
at 119. 
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interest, the farmor gets a lease developed that it would not otherwise be 
able to drill, while maintaining a percentage interest.144 
Many farmouts are structured so that the farmee earns a combination of 
divided and undivided interests. The classic farmout structure gives the 
farmee a divided 100% interest in the drillsite acreage until payout and an 
undivided interest in acreage outside the drillsite.145 Parties frequently use 
combination farmouts when the object of the farmout agreement is to test 
large undeveloped tracts. 
Classification of a farmout as a divided interest farmout or an undivided 
interest farmout is of primary significance in determining how much 
emphasis analysis should place upon the ongoing relationship of the farmor 
and the farmee. If the farmout is of a divided interest, then once the farmee 
has earned its divided interest in a given tract, the relationship of the parties 
is no more complicated than that of any other two owners of adjacent 
properties. Analysis of a divided interest farmout thus should focus on what 
the farmee has to do to earn its interest. When the parties are to end up 
owning undivided interests, however, the ongoing relationship of cotenants 
will require that close attention be given to those provisions of the farmout 
and operating agreements that relate to the ongoing duty of the parties to 
one another and to their lessors, as well as to what has to be done to earn. 
4. The Number of Wells: Single or Multiple Well Farmouts 
In the classic farmout arrangement, the farmee earns an interest in the 
farmor’s acreage by drilling a single well. When large tracts of land are 
involved, however, farmout agreements frequently require that several 
wells be drilled. 
A multiple well farmout agreement is substantially more complicated 
than a single well agreement. The parties must carefully define the timing 
of drilling operations for wells after the first well to be certain that the 
farmee has adequate time to complete one operation before beginning 
another. The farmout’s testing provisions must be considered to determine 
whether the tests required in the drilling of the initial well must also be 
required in subsequent wells. The parties must include provisions to address 
what happens if the farmee completes some, but not all, of the multiple 
wells contemplated. Typically, multiple well farmout agreements will 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 22–25 for a discussion of the complete payout 
tax concept, which is apparently satisfied so long as the farmee maintains an interest in the 
well for the payout period equal to the percentage of the IDCs it pays. 
 145. See supra text following note 32; infra note 277. 
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provide that the farmee will keep producing wells that it has completed.146 
Such is not always the case, however; some multiple well farmouts punish 
the farmee for failure to perform fully.147 
                                                                                                                 
 146. For example: 
In addition to any other remedies which may be available to Farmor, its 
successors and assigns hereunder, this Agreement shall terminate and be of no 
further force and effect should Farmee fail to drill any of the Test Wells 
required by, and in the manner specified by, the terms and provisions of this 
Agreement. However, this provision shall not cover acreage which has been 
previously drilled and subleased in accordance with the terms and provisions 
of this Agreement. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 147. The following provision, for example, would give the farmee only half of the 
acreage it is to earn if it fails to drill all the wells promised: 
If Farmee, as Farmee may so do without breaching its obligations under this 
Agreement, shall fail to complete the drilling, testing and equipping of all of 
said six (6) net wells in the manner and within the time provided in this 
Agreement then Farmee shall have earned, and shall be entitled to receive an 
assignment from Farmor covering, the following leasehold interests, to-wit: 
(i) As to each of said test wells completed by Farmee for production, an 
undivided one-half of Farmor’s right, title and interest (subject to the 
proportionate share of presently-existing burdens and obligations) in the 
leases set forth in Exhibit “A” insofar as said leases cover the 
government-surveyed section of land on which each of such wells is 
located, but only insofar as said leases cover the interval from the 
surfaceto the base of the ____ Formation; such well, the equipment and 
material therein and thereon and the production therefrom shall be owned 
equally by the parties hereto and shall be operated in accordance with the 
Operating Agreement attached hereto; 
(ii) as to each of said test wells completed as a dry hole by either Farmee or 
Farmor, Farmee shall be entitled to assignments covering an undivided 
one-half of Farmor’s right, title and interest (subject to a proportionate 
share of presently existing burdens and obligations) in the leases set forth 
in Exhibit “A” insofar as said leases cover the government-surveyed 
section of land on which such well is located, and insofar as such leases 
cover the interval from the surface to the base of the ____ Formation. 
As to each such producing well, Farmee shall retain ownership of the material, 
equipment and supplies located therein and thereon; providing, however, 
Farmor shall have free use of each such property and the production from each 
such well shall be owned equally by Farmor and Farmee; it being understood 
that maintenance and operating costs shall be shared by Farmor and Farmee in 
accordance with the terms of the Operating Agreement, Exhibit “D” attached 
hereto. Should such property be transferred, sold, salvaged or otherwise 
disposed of, Farmor shall receive 50% of the proceeds or credits received 
therefrom. 
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5. The Form of the Agreement: Agreement to Transfer or Conditional 
Assignment 
Farmout agreements traditionally have taken the form either of an 
agreement to convey or a conditional assignment. The essential difference 
in the two is the point in time when the farmee acquires an interest in the 
farmed-out property. When the farmout is in the form of an agreement to 
convey, the farmee obtains its rights only if it performs the conditions made 
prerequisite by the contract.148 When the farmout is in the form of a 
conditional assignment, the farmee obtains an interest in the farmed-out 
property when the agreement is made, subject to an obligation to reconvey 
or to automatic termination if the conditions subsequent are not 
performed.149 
The farmout’s form may have enormous practical significance to the 
parties’ rights and liabilities. The farmor’s primary advantage in structuring 
a farmout as a contract to convey rather than a conditional assignment is 
that the farmor retains title to the property farmed out until after the farmee 
has performed. Administratively, this is simple for the farmor, and it saves 
the time and effort required to clear title in the event that the farmee does 
not perform. In addition, structuring a farmout as a contract to convey may 
mitigate the problems of liens being attached due to the farmee’s default or 
of claims as a result of the farmee’s bankruptcy.150 
The farmee’s interests virtually mirror the farmor’s. The farmee, under a 
conventional agreement to transfer farmout, may find the farmor slow to 
provide the earned assignment or inclined to quibble over whether it is 
really due. Further, the assignment when finally made may come burdened 
with liens attached while the farmee was drilling the earning well. If the 
farmor should go bankrupt before the assignment is made, the farmee may 
never get the assignment. 
                                                                                                                 
This provision would subject the farmee to the ravages of the complete payout limitation as 
well, because the farmee would not earn the full interest in the well site acreage and would 
lose a part of the IDC deduction. 
 148. See, e.g., Lansinger v. United Petroleum Corp., 14 Ohio App. 3d 398, 471 N.E.2d 
869, 871–72 (1984); Energy Reserves Group v. Tarina Oil Co., 664 S.W.2d 169, 172–73 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ). 
 149. See, e.g., Vickers v. Peaker, 227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29, 31–34 (1957) (automatic 
termination); Mengden v. Peninsula Prod. Co., 544 S.W.2d 643, 647–49 (Tex. 1976) 
(obligation to reassign). 
 150. For a discussion of bankruptcy and its effects on farmout agreements, see infra text 
accompanying notes 459–72. 
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IV. Essential Issues of Farmout Agreements 
Having considered preliminary matters and having noted the key 
characteristics of the agreement, the reviewer or draftsman is ready to 
analyze the essential issues that any farmout agreement must address. This 
section of the Article discusses the following issues: drilling the earning 
well, well information, what is earned, and administrative provisions. 
A. Drilling the Earning Well 
1. What Is Farmed Out 
Generally a farmout agreement covers leases owned by the farmor, but 
on occasion mineral rights may be farmed out as well. The leases and lands 
covered by the farmout may be described in the body of the farmout 
agreement. More often an appendix incorporated by reference contains this 
information. When the parties list leases subject to the farmout in an 
appendix, they may also include other information, such as existing burdens 
and lease terms. The obvious and easily avoidable problem is inaccuracies 
or discrepancies in description of the properties.151 
The agreement may also provide that the farmee’s rights will extend to 
extensions and renewals of the leases covered.152 Extension and renewal 
provisions are unnecessary in the farmout if the operating agreement 
becomes effective when the farmout is executed, in which case the 
provisions in the operating agreement probably supersede those of the 
farmout agreement. In any event, extension and renewal provisions of 
farmout agreements often parallel operating agreement provisions.153 
2. Costs and Expenses 
Almost by definition, a farmout is an agreement by which the farmee 
agrees to pay the costs of the operations contemplated. Generally that 
undertaking is explicitly stated in the farmout.154 As is discussed below, 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 100–10. 
 152. The following example is a concise renewal and extension provision: “The interests 
reserved herein, or in any assignment hereunder, to Farmor shall apply to any renewal, 
extension, or new lease covering any part or all of the Contract Acreage that may acquire, 
directly or indirectly, within two years after expiration of the Lease.” 
 153. Compare Art. VIII.B. of the 1982 AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement with 
the provisions of the clause quoted supra note 152. Application of extension and renewal 
provisions frequently provide a source of dispute between farmors and farmees. See Cage, 
supra note 3, at 169–73. 
 154. For example: “The entire cost, risk and expense of drilling, testing, completing, 
equipping and operating the well(s) or of plugging and abandoning the well(s) and restoring 
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however, a provision that the farmee will be responsible for all costs and 
expenses is not a perfect shield against liability for the farmor.155 
3. Failure of Title 
Failure of title is a risk that is customarily imposed upon the farmee in 
farmout agreements. While in principle the farmor and the farmee should 
negotiate covenants of title from the farmor, farmout agreements rarely 
contain a general warranty of title by the farmor. None of the farmout 
agreement examples collected included a general warranty, and only a few 
contained a special warranty156 or a specific representation.157 Indeed, most 
                                                                                                                 
the surface if a dry hole shall be borne by farmee.” Of course, the parties must appropriately 
modify this language if the farmee will earn less than 100% of the working interest in well-
site acreage and pay only the proportion of costs equal to the interest earned. 
 155. See infra notes 406–38 and accompanying text. 
 156. A farmout special warranty follows: 
Any assignment from farmor to farmee shall be without warranty except for a 
limited warranty as to the farmor’s own acts in favor of farmee, including an 
express representation and warranty by farmor that the interest assigned is not 
subject to any obligation or burdens by or through farmor, other than the 
lessor’s royalty. Also, farmor warrants that the interest to be assigned to farmee 
is free of any mortgage or any other encumbrance by or through farmor 
including indemnification of farmee from any loss or deficiency under such 
warranty or representation. 
 157. The following represents that the farmor holds title, but stops short of warranting it:  
Farmors represent to the Farmee that to their best knowledge after reasonable 
investigation they own the working interests and the net revenue interests in the 
land and depths covered by said leases described in Exhibit “B”; that the only 
Agreements to which Farmors’ interests in said leases are subject are the 
Agreements described in Exhibit “B”; that said leases are in full force and 
effect except for the following: ____; and that Farmors are free to assign their 
interests in said leases to Farmee on the terms of this Agreement without the 
consent of any third party. Farmors agree to use their best efforts to maintain 
said leases in full force and effect during the term of this Agreement prior to 
the commencement of the Initial Earning Well (as defined below) so that such 
leases remain in full force and effect during the term of this Agreement. 
The following representations focus on the burdens of the leases farmed out, as well as title: 
Farmor represents, but does not warrant that as of the date hereof, it owns an 
interest in the leasehold interest created by the lease at least equal to an undi-
vided ____ interest therein, and that other than the landowner’s royalties and 
one or more overriding royalty interests aggregating ____ percent of 8/8ths 
there are no other overriding royalty interests, production payments, net profits 
obligations, carried working interests and payments out of or with respect to 
production which are of record in the county and state identified on page 1 
hereof and with which the lease is burdened as of the date hereof (the “existing 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
312 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
of the contract examples included a disclaimer of any warranty,158 and a 
few specifically placed the farmee on notice of possible title defects.159 
Some states may imply title warranties from the use of words of grant,160 so 
the parties should be specific as to their agreement. 
4. Title Information 
Because the typical farmout agreement does not include a warranty of 
title, the farmee should satisfy itself that the farmor has title before 
conducting drilling operations. That task is made easier if the farmor will 
agree to share with the farmee title information that it may have, as is 
commonly done.161 One reviewing a farmout agreement for a farmee should 
alert the farmee to the importance of actually obtaining and reviewing title 
                                                                                                                 
burdens”) so that the existing burdens aggregate a total of ____ percent of 
8/8ths of production, and without regard to any non-consent provisions in the 
operating agreement and without making any provisions for operating costs, 
farmee will be entitled to receive ____ percent of ____ percent of the 
production attributable to its interests in the lease. 
 158. A specific disclaimer of warranty, for example, may state, “Farmor makes no repre-
sentation with the respect to the status of their title to the leasehold interests covered hereby, 
and it is understood that this farmout is being given without warranty of title, either 
expressed or implied.” 
 159. For example: 
Farmor hereby expressly advises farmee that there is currently litigation pend-
ing which may directly or indirectly raise certain questions concerning title to 
the farmed out lands, and hereby specifically refers farmee to the following 
cases: ____. It is understood and agreed that any operations undertaken by 
farmee pursuant to this agreement are done so at its sole risk and expense 
without any representations of any kind or character made by farmor as to title 
to the farmed out lands. 
 160. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.023 (Vernon 1984). 
 161. Bledsoe, supra note 3, at N-5. For example: 
Upon request by Farmee following execution of this Agreement, Farmors shall 
provide the Farmee copies of said leases and copies of all title documentation 
material to the acreage subject to this Agreement in Farmor’s files relating 
thereto, including without limitation copies of all title opinions and reports, 
rental receipts, and title curative documents. Such title documentation shall be 
provided without warranty by Farmors as to accuracy. Any title examination 
performed by Farmee with respect to the Initial Earning Well referred to below 
to be drilled on said leases shall be performed at the sole cost of Farmee and the 
Farmee shall deliver copies to Farmors of any title opinions or reports acquired 
by Farmee with respect to such well. 
Id. For a discussion of Isler v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 749 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1984), which 
illustrates the risk to the farmee of an inadequate title examination, see supra text 
accompanying notes 114–17. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/4
2017]        Farmout Agreements 313 
 
 
documents relating to the leases farmed out. Particularly when the farmout 
agreement obligates the farmee to drill, rather than merely giving it an 
option, the agreement should provide that the farmee can withdraw from the 
agreement if it is not satisfied with title.162 
5. Geologic Information 
The farmor will frequently agree to provide the farmee with whatever 
geologic and geophysical information and interpretations it has developed. 
The farmout agreement should specifically provide for the sharing of such 
information,163 subject to disclaimers of accuracy and requirements of 
confidentiality. In the alternative, the agreement should specifically indicate 
that the farmor will not share geologic and geophysical information.164 
  
                                                                                                                 
 162. An example of a clause giving the farmee a right to avoid the agreement in the event 
of defects is: 
Farmor has furnished to farmee all material in farmor’s possession relevant to 
the determination of farmor’s title to the leases subject to this agreement. If 
farmee does not object to farmor’s title of the leases in the manner described 
below by ____ farmee will be deemed to have accepted farmor’s title to the 
leases. If farmee raises reasonable objections to farmor’s title to the leases by a 
writing delivered to farmor by ____, farmor will have until ____ to cure any 
title objections to the reasonable satisfaction of farmee. Should farmor fail in 
this respect, this agreement shall become null and void. 
 163. For example: 
Upon request of Farmee, Farmors shall provide Farmee with reproducible 
copies of any geological, geophysical or other information which Farmors have 
acquired with respect to said leases and which Farmors have the right to 
provide. Such information will include, but will not be limited to, maps, cross 
sections, and geological interpretations; field tapes and associated support data, 
final record sections (processed using standard processing techniques), shot 
point location maps and other materials related to any seismic operations 
conducted by Farmor; and well information, such as logs, drilling and 
completion reports, and engineering information. 
The farmor would probably prefer to make geologic information supplied by the farmor 
specifically subject to a continuing confidentiality obligation of the farmee. See infra text 
accompanying notes 271–72. 
 164. An example of a clause specifically disclaiming any obligation of the farmor to 
provide geological or geophysical information follows: 
Farmor shall not be required to provide farmee with any geophysical or 
geological information that farmor may have, and farmee shall likewise not be 
required to provide farmor with any such information except the information 
specifically set forth in § — hereof, whether such information is presently in 
the possession of farmor or farmee or is hereafter acquired. 
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6. Location of the Well 
If a farmor’s purpose in entering into the farmout agreement is to save its 
lease, it may be willing to let the farmee drill at a location of its choice.165 
If, however, the farmor’s purpose is to obtain geologic information or to 
satisfy an express or implied covenant of a lease, the farmor may designate 
the location precisely. Moncrief v. Martin Oil Service, Inc.166 illustrates the 
importance of clearly designating the location of the well if a specific 
location is important to the parties. In Moncrief Martin farmed out to 
Moncrief in a farmout agreement that provided that “the interest earned by 
operator [Moncrief] hereunder shall be in consideration for the drilling of 
the well on lands belonging only to Martin.”167 The agreement also 
contained a proportionate reduction clause that provided that the interest 
earned by Moncrief in the Martin acreage would be reduced to the 
proportion that the amount of the Martin acreage within the participating 
area for the test well bore to the total acreage within the participating area. 
After Martin and Moncrief executed the agreement, Martin agreed to 
amend it so that “if our acreage on the first Test Well does not earn your 
Company its full interest under the Agreement, . . . the drilling of 
subsequent tests can earn the interest agreed to.”168 Moncrief then drilled 
several wells, spending between $13 and $14 million dollars in the process. 
Martin refused to assign the interest that Moncrief claimed he had earned 
because the additional wells drilled were not located “on lands belonging 
only to Martin.”169 The trial court found in favor of Moncrief, the farmee, 
because the amending letter did not specifically embrace the requirement of 
the initial contract.170 The appellate court upheld this position on the ground 
that the agreement did not require positively that subsequent tests be 
located on Martin’s acreage, so that the trial court’s decision was not plain 
error.171 
                                                                                                                 
 165. An example of a clause permitting the farmee to select the location of the earning 
well follows: “Farmee’s Choice: Farmee shall have the right, but not the obligation, to 
commence on or before ____, operations for the drilling of well (the “Initial Earning Well”) 
at a location of Farmee’s choice on the ____ of Section ____, Township ____, Range ____, 
____  . . . .” The discretion given the farmee will be illusory if the tract identified is small. 
 166. 658 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 167. Id. at 769–71. 
 168. Id. at 771. 
 169. Id at 773. 
 170. Id at 770. 
 171. Id. 
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Even when the farmor and the farmee can agree that the location of the 
well is an essential part of their agreement, they may encounter practical 
problems in formulating the designation. Exact locations are hard for the 
farmee to satisfy and will lead to dispute. A mathematically determinable 
point (e.g., “the center of the SE/4 of the NW/4”) may be difficult to locate 
when it comes time to spud the drilling rig. A general location (e.g., “within 
330 feet of the center of the NW/4” or “in the NW/4”) will generally be 
adequate to protect the interests of both parties. The farmee must satisfy 
itself, however, that it can meet lease restrictions and conservation agency 
rules by drilling in the general area identified. 
Farmout agreements often provide for the initial well’s location “at a 
legal location of farmee’s choice.”172 This language is appropriate where 
the farmor’s purpose is to extend the farmed-out lease. If the geological 
information obtained from drilling is important to the farmor, however, this 
language may not accomplish the farmor’s goals, particularly if the tract is 
large. Geological information from a well drilled near the edge of the tract 
may not be as valuable as that from its center. A risk likewise arises that 
describing the location as “a legal location of the farmee’s choice” will 
permit the farmee to earn its interest by obtaining an exception tract drilling 
permit173 to drill close to the edge of the farmed-out acreage near a 
producing well outside the farmout area.174 
In farmout agreements as in other contracts, a drafter should never use 
the phrase “at a mutually agreeable location.” If the parties cannot 
subsequently agree upon a location, the courts will probably hold the 
farmout agreement to be an unenforceable agreement to agree.175 
  
                                                                                                                 
 172. See T. FAY, supra note 3, at 7. 
 173. State oil and gas conservation agencies generally issue exception tract drilling 
permits either to protect correlative rights, when strict adherence to the rules would result in 
drainage, or to prevent waste when strict adherence would result in oil or gas never being 
produced. E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 79. Whether 
either rationale would justify issuance of a permit in the circumstance described is 
problematic. 
 174. T. FAY, supra note 3, at 6. Fay suggests the language used should read “at a legal 
location as required under the spacing requirements in effect at the time of the execution of 
the farmout agreement.” Id. at 7. 
 175. Cf. the discussion of Getty OH Co. v. Blevco Energy, Inc., supra notes 78–80; see 
also Klein & Burke, supra note 3, at 494. For a discussion of the Statute of Frauds, see supra 
text accompanying notes 86–113. 
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7. Choice of Contractors 
Farmout agreements usually make drilling an option or obligation of the 
farmee. Since few farmees own their own drilling rigs, the parties must 
ordinarily contemplate that the farmee will subcontract the drilling 
operations. The agreement’s language needs to reflect this intention by 
providing that the farmee “will commence or cause to be commenced actual 
drilling.” When read with the restrictions on assignment usually included in 
farmout agreements, the reference to “cause to be commenced” will permit 
the farmee to subcontract. 
At least three alternatives exist to a general agreement to permit the 
farmee to subcontract. First, the farmor may choose the subcontractor. A 
farmee will rarely accept this option, however, because it will give the 
farmor control of a crucial provision of the agreement. Second, the farmee 
may select the contractor subject to certain articulated standards that the 
chosen contractor must meet. Third, the farmor and farmee may agree on a 
contractor; for example, the farmee may be given the right to choose the 
contractor, subject to approval by the farmor. This last alternative is 
acceptable only if the parties avoid the agreement to agree problem by 
providing that the farmor can withhold approval only for reasonable cause. 
8. Commencement of the Well 
Most farmout agreements specify a date by which the farmee must 
commence drilling in order to satisfy the agreement. If the parties anticipate 
title problems or if equipment appears to be in short supply, the agreement 
may provide for an extension of the commencement date.176 
Commencement provisions vary in their terminology. Such provisions 
sometimes parallel those usually found in oil and gas leases and merely 
require that the farmee commence “operations”177 or “drilling.”178 The 
requirement more frequently is that the farmee “commence the actual drill-
ing” of a well.179 
                                                                                                                 
 176. An example of a clause permitting extension of the commencement date follows: 
Provided, however, that the commencement date shall be extended for any 
period reasonably necessary for farmee to satisfy itself that title to the proposed 
drill site for the initial well is safe for drilling purposes and for up to thirty days 
in the event a suitable drilling rig is not available by the commencement date. 
 177. See supra note 165. 
 178. For example: “On or before ____, Farmee agrees to commence the drilling of a test 
well in accordance with all of the terms and provisions of the Agreement . . . .” 
 179. For example: “On or before ____, Farmee shall commence the actual drilling of a 
test well (Initial Well) at the following location: . . . .” 
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a) Commencement of Operations 
When the farmee is required merely to commence operations, all that is 
likely to be required of the farmee is that before the date specified it do 
something on the farmed-out land that directly relates to or is preparatory to 
actual drilling.180 In addition, those activities must be pursued diligently and 
in good faith until a well is actually spudded181 and completed. This is the 
usual interpretation of the meaning of “commencement of operations” in an 
oil and gas lease.182 One of the classic cases cited to support that rule 
involved a farmout. In Vickers v. Peaker183 deep rights under a lease were 
assigned to the farmee. The assignment required that the assignee 
“cornmence the drilling of a well” before a specified date.184 The farmee, 
before that date, entered into a drilling contract, surveyed and cleared the 
location, constructed a road to the location, obtained a drilling permit, and 
moved material to the drill site. The drill bit did not actually pierce the earth 
until nearly a month after the date specified, however. The Arkansas 
Supreme Court held that the time of spudding was immaterial, asking the 
now famous rhetorical question: “Does ‘baking a cake’ begin with the 
preparation of the dough, or only with the actual placing of the dough in the 
oven?”185 By this analysis, virtually any activity of the farmee on the land 
will be sufficient to commence the well properly, extend the lease, and 
satisfy the farmout agreement.186 
b) Commencement of Actual Drilling 
When the farmout agreement provides that the farmee must commence 
the “actual drilling” of a well, however, something more is probably 
required. Reference to commencement of “actual drilling” is likely to 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See E. KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 157–62. 
 181. “Spudding” refers to the first boring of the hole in drilling a well. 8 H. WILLIAMS & 
C. MEYERS, supra note 12, at 843. 
 182. Id. 
 183. 227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29 (1957). 
 184. 300 S.W.2d at 30–32. 
 185. Id. at 32. 
 186. Professor Williams summarizes the law as follows: 
 In brief, drilling operations may be described as any work or actual 
operations undertaken or commenced in good faith for the purpose of carrying 
out any of the rights, privileges or duties of the lessee under a lease, followed 
diligently and in due course by the construction of a derrick and other 
necessary structures for the drilling of an oil and gas well, and by the actual 
operation of drilling in the ground. 
3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 618.1, at 323–24 (1986). 
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require that a drill bit have pierced the ground.187 A more certain variation 
requires that the well be “spudded” by a particular date.188 
9. Completion of the Well 
Farmout agreements often specify, in addition to a commencement date, 
a date by which the earning well must be completed. The primary reason 
for specifying a completion date is to insure that the farmor will possess the 
information obtained from drilling so that it can evaluate other leases that it 
may have in the area. Like “commencement,” the term “completion” may 
lead to dispute, particularly when the farmout agreement provides for the 
drilling of several wells, or when the farmee seeks to drill a substitute well. 
Two cases illustrate the point well. In Seale v. Major Oil Co.189 a farmout 
agreement obligated Seale to drill two wells, the second within 45 days 
after “completion” of the first. Seale drilled the first well to the objective 
depth and abandoned it as a dry hole. He then refused to drill the second 
well, contending that he was unable to “complete” the first well since it was 
a dry hole, and that therefore he had no obligation to drill the second. The 
court held that the contract as a whole did not use “completion” to mean 
completion as a producing well, however, but to mean “completion of the 
required work on the well whether it became a producer or not.”190 In a 
recent case, Modern Exploration, Inc. v. Maddison,191 the court interpreted 
a lease provision requiring the lessee to drill a well within 270 days of 
“completion of drilling on the first well” or lose its rights to all undrilled 
acreage.192 The court held that “completion of drilling” was unambiguous 
and meant “when the well’s total depth [was] reached, not when the 
operator [chose] to perforate the cement plug that he chose to insert into the 
well.”193 
                                                                                                                 
 187. For a discussion of the federal regulations and cases interpreting “actual drilling 
operations,” see 1 LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES § 14.05[2] (1986). 
 188. See T. FAY, supra note 3, § 2.1(b) of the farmout agreement. 
 189. 428 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1968, no writ). 
 190. Id. at 869. 
 191. 708 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no writ). 
 192. Id at 876–77. 
 193. Id. at 876. The reasoning of the court is unclear because the words just before the 
quoted phrase read “‘[c]ompletion of drilling’ logically imports the time when no further 
drilling is needed, when oil or gas has been reached and the well is capable of 
producing . . . .” Id. The reference to “the well is capable of producing” is not the equivalent 
of “when no further drilling is needed.” 
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The parties to a farmout agreement will probably have different expecta-
tions of the meaning of “completion” in different contexts.194 When the 
farmout agreement requires the farmee to complete a well capable of 
producing in paying quantities in order to satisfy the agreement, as in cases 
when the primary purpose of the farmout agreement is to maintain a lease 
about to expire, “completion” probably means drilling to total depth, 
testing, fracturing or acidizing, and equipping the well for production. Until 
those steps have all been taken, the well is not capable of producing. 
Conversely, when the farmee can earn by merely drilling and testing, as is 
often the case when the primary purpose of the farmout agreement is to 
obtain geologic information, “completion” likely requires only that the 
farmee has drilled the well and performed the agreed tests. 
Farmout agreements obviously should define “completion.” Surprisingly, 
only a few of the example agreements collected do so. A draft AAPL Form 
provided the following definition: “A ‘completed well’ is a well which has 
been fully equipped for the taking of production, through and including the 
tanks for an oil well and through and including the Christmas tree for a gas 
well, or plugged and abandoned, as a dry hole.”195 
10. Time Measurement 
The farmout agreement’s commencement and completion provisions are 
susceptible to disputes over the point from which time is to be measured. 
This appears particularly true when time is measured by reference to some 
other event. For example, if completion is required within “90 days after 
commencement of drilling,” the parties may not agree either when 
particular actions were taken or whether those actions were sufficient to 
commence drilling. Provisions that the farmee must commence actual 
drilling “90 days after acceptance of this offer” or exercise its option for a 
substitute well “within 60 days after release of the drilling rig” may also 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Cf. Edwards v. Hardwick, 350 P.2d 495, 500 (Okla. 1960) (court concluded that 
term “completion” means well drilled to specified sand or depth, and such well so prepared 
for use of various methods of treatment to obtain production of oil and gas). 
 195. AAPL draft Form 635, § 2(a) (Kraftbilt, Tulsa 1987). The quoted provision is 
appropriate for a “produce to earn” farmout. Another phrasing of the provision could read: “ 
‘Completion’ means the point at which testing is completed as required in order to receive a 
production allowable from the Texas Railroad Commission.” For a “drill to earn” farmout, 
the following phrasing might be appropriate: “ ‘Completion’ of a well for the purposes of 
this Agreement shall be defined as the release of the completion rig, if the well is completed 
for production, or release of the drilling rig, if the well is plugged and abandoned.” 
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lead to factual disputes as to when acceptance occurred or the rig was 
released. 
Measuring time by reference to events may lead to disputes as to how the 
parties are to count days. An accepted principle of general contract law 
holds that the day a contract is executed is not counted in measuring time, 
while the party required to perform has until the end of the last day to 
perform.196 Only a few cases apply that principle to oil and gas leases, 
however.197 In the interests of certainty, a specific calendar date is 
preferable, whether the parties are referring to commencement or 
completion of the well. If the farmout agreement specifies a calendar date, 
the farmee must be careful that the date inserted is reasonable. By the time 
negotiations are completed, the date provided for, even if reasonable when 
the parties began negotiating, may no longer provide the farmee adequate 
time to perform. 
Farmout time measurement issues are made more important by “time is 
of the essence” provisions found in most farmout agreements. In Texas one 
court has held that commencement of drilling operations in a timely manner 
under an operating agreement was not essential to maintaining the 
agreement because nothing in the agreement indicated that the parties 
intended it should be.198 A different result probably would be reached under 
most farmout agreements, however, either because time is specifically 
made of the essence199 or because the agreement requires absolute 
performance of all of the terms and conditions of the agreement for the 
farmee to earn.200 All but a small percentage of the example agreements 
collected contained one or the other of these clauses, and some contained 
both. An alternative to providing for specific time periods is to require 
“diligent operations” or “diligent and continuous operations.” The 
opportunities for disagreement as to the meaning of those terms are 
obvious, however. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 196. See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 26 Cal. 2d 753, 161 P.2d 217, 220 (1945); 
Pitcock v. Johns, 326 S.W.2d 563, 565–66 (Tex. App.—Austin 1959, writ ref’d). 
 197. See, e.g., Winn v. Nilsen, 670 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1983). 
 198. Argos Resources, Inc. v. May Petroleum, Inc., 693 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. App.— 
Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). But see United Carbon Co. v. Monroe, 92 F. Supp. 460, 465 
(W.D. La. 1950), holding that time is implicitly of the essence in drilling contracts, 
presumably including farmout agreements. 
 199. An example of a “time is of the essence” clause is: “Time is of the essence to this 
agreement and to all its terms and conditions.” 
 200. See infra note 261. 
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11. Objective Depth 
a) Footage vs. Formation 
The “objective depth,” or the “contract depth” as it is sometimes called, 
is the depth that the farmee must drill under the terms of the farmout 
agreement in order to earn its interest under the farmout agreement. 
Objective depth usually is described either by reference to the number of 
feet to be drilled or by description of the formation to be explored. Either 
may cause interpretive difficulties. 
(1) Footage 
The farmout agreement sometimes will describe the objective depth by 
the feet to be drilled. For example, the farmor and the farmee may agree 
that the farmee will drill the test well to 5,000 feet. A footage description of 
objective depth is inherently flawed, however, unless the agreement also 
addresses how footage is to be measured. No industry custom or usage 
exists. The intention of the parties may be that the reference be to measured 
depth, the distance down the hole actually drilled, which can be determined 
by measuring the drill pipe utilized. This method is probably the easiest. 
The reference to footage, however, may also refer to the vertical depth. 
Vertical depth will be different from measured depth, because inevitably 
the hole drilled will deviate somewhat from the perpendicular. 
Even if the parties plainly intended the footage reference to refer to 
measured depth or to vertical depth, ambiguities remain as to how to 
determine those depths. Is the reference to objective depth, the deepest 
point reached by drilling, or to completion depth, the depth to which the 
well is plugged back for testing and a completion attempt? Furthermore, 
from where is the depth to be measured? It will make a difference whether 
the starting point for measurement is the kelly bushing,201 the surface, or 
sea level. 
There are relatively few disagreements over how to measure footage. 
The farmor and the farmee usually have an unspoken or oral understanding 
as to how to make the measurement. The lawyer drafting or reviewing a 
farmout agreement should not rely upon the innate desire of the parties to 
get along, however. The agreement itself should define how to measure the 
footage. 
                                                                                                                 
 201. The kelly bushing is a device fitted to the floor of the drilling platform through 
which passes the steel pipe that transmits torque from the rotary table to the drill string and 
rotates the drill bit. S. PALMER, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY GLOSSARY 109 (1st ed. 1982). 
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A second method of describing the objective depth in a farmout 
agreement is to refer to a formation that the farmee will test or to one in 
which a well is to be completed. A common formulation states that “farmee 
agrees to drill . . . to a depth sufficient to adequately test the ____ 
formation . . . .”202 An objective depth described by reference to the 
formation to be tested is more common than one described by footage. The 
farmor may not be certain that the information or production that it wants 
can be developed within a footage limitation, since geologic formations are 
often tilted or broken. On the other hand, the farmee will not want to be 
obligated to waste money by drilling deeper than is necessary to test or to 
obtain production. Therefore, unless the farmor and farmee are certain that 
the farmee will find their objective at a particular depth, description of the 
objective depth by reference to the formation to be tested will be the 
favored method. 
Description of the objective depth by formation may also lead to 
misunderstandings. There may be ambiguity as to what the formation is 
called. The same formation may have different names even in the same 
general area. Similar names may describe very different formations. Even if 
there is no ambiguity as to the formation to be tested, recognizing it when it 
is found may be difficult. The same formation may have different 
lithological characteristics in different areas.203 In addition, a formation 
may be broken or overthrust, so that it is found at several widely separated 
depths in the same area. 
The solution to these problems again is precise drafting. A drafter may 
minimize problems in recognizing the formation by referring (1) to a 
“control well,” another well that has tested the formation sought,204 or (2) to 
a description of the formation published by a state or federal geological 
surveyor or bureau of mines. A description of the formation to be drilled 
and tested may also be combined with footage limitations. This device 
avoids dispute and limits the farmee’s obligation in case the formation is 
                                                                                                                 
 202. When drilling in an unexplored area, the reference may be “to the basement rock,” if 
a specific objective formation cannot be identified. 
 203. Lithology is the study of rocks. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
698 (9th ed. 1985). Geologists often describe rocks by their overall physical characteristics, 
which they refer to as their “lithological characteristics.” 
 204. Note, however, that if the control well is a substantial distance from the well to be 
drilled, the farmout earning well may not encounter the formation tested by the control well. 
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encountered at substantially different depths.205 Such a combination is 
probably the most frequently used method of describing the objective 
depth. 
b) Standard of Testing 
The farmout agreement’s clause describing the objective depth often re-
quires that the objective depth be tested “to the farmor’s satisfaction.”206 
The courts would impose a standard of reasonableness upon the farmor.207 
The farmee would clearly prefer, however, that the agreement express the 
standard of testing by what the reasonable, prudent operator would do under 
the circumstances or “to the farmee’s satisfaction.” 
c) What About Shallow Production? 
A recurring problem in farmout agreements is determining the rights of 
the parties if the farmee encounters production in a formation at less than 
the objective depth. There are at least three possible solutions. The 
agreement may require the farmee to drill to and test the objective depth 
notwithstanding the shallow discovery. Completion of a shallow well, 
perhaps with limitations imposed upon the depth earned, may satisfy the 
objective depth provision.208 Finally, production from the shallower depth 
may satisfy the objective depth of the requirement if the farmee tests the 
objective depth or drills a substitute well. 
d) What About Drilling Deeper? 
Farmout agreements less frequently address whether the farmee can drill 
deeper than the objective depth. The farmee may want to drill deeper 
                                                                                                                 
 205. A provision in the farmout agreement may state, for example, that “[t]he Test Well 
will be spudded by Farmee on or before ____ and will be drilled to a true vertical depth of 
____ feet below the surface or ____ feet below the bottom of the ____ formation, whichever 
is less . . . .” 
 206. See infra note 261. 
 207. A fundamental principle of contract interpretation applied by courts is the standard 
of reasonableness. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 492 (1982). 
 208. An example of a clause permitting the farmee to complete in a shallower formation 
than the objective depth is: 
If during the drilling of the Earning Well, operator shall encounter what it be-
lieves to be potential production in a zone encountered at a depth shallower 
than Contract Depth, then if operator elects not to drill deeper, operator may 
test and/or make a completion attempt in such shallower zone. For the purposes 
hereof, such shallower zone shall be deemed to be a Contract Depth and 
thereby fulfill the drilling commitment created hereby. 
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because geological information obtained in drilling the well suggests that 
the productive formations will not be found where they were expected. 
Geologic information may indicate that deeper drilling will result in better 
production. 
Again, there are at least three options. The farmor, which is entitled to all 
drilling information, may prefer to keep deeper rights. Second, the farmor 
may allow the farmee to drill deeper only if the farmee tests the objective 
depth as well as the deeper formation,209 or if the farmee later drills a 
substitute well to test the objective formation. Finally, the agreement may 
give the farmee an option to drill a deeper well after a test of the objective 
formation.210 Whatever is the intent of the parties, the agreement should be 
specific. 
12. Produce to Earn or Drill to Earn 
What the farmee has to do to earn its interest under the farmout 
agreement is a key characteristic of the agreement,211 as has been discussed 
above. The farmee’s obligations also present substantial interpretative and 
drafting problems. These problems are somewhat different in produce to 
earn farmouts than in drill to earn farmouts. 
a) Produce to Earn Farmouts 
The primary problem with produce to earn farmouts is in the choice of 
language used to express the production requirement. Some farmouts 
                                                                                                                 
 209. For example, the following language specifically permits the farmee to drill beyond 
the objective depth. 
Farmee shall drill the Earning Test Well to a depth sufficient to thoroughly test 
the ____ formation, or to a maximum depth of seven thousand three hundred 
(7,300) feet below the surface, whichever is the lesser depth; provided that 
nothing contained in the foregoing shall prevent Farmee from drilling to such 
deeper depth below the provided depths as Farmee may elect. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 210. An example of a clause giving the farmee an option to drill a deeper well after 
completing a well in the objective formation is: 
Farmee shall have the option for a period of ____ days after the release of the 
drilling rig from the initial well to drill any well on the subject lands to any 
depth deeper than the depth drilled in the initial well. In the event that farmee 
exercises its option and drills a well to such deeper depth, farmor shall, subject 
to the other provisions of this agreement, grant to farmee the leasehold interest 
in the lands subject to this agreement to a depth of 100 feet below the 
stratigraphic equivalent of the total depth reached in such deeper drilling. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 138–41. 
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require merely a capability of “production.”212 Others require capability of 
“production in paying quantities”213 or “production in commercial 
quantities.”214 
The meaning of such terminology is not precise. In the context of oil and 
gas leases, courts have reached a variety of interpretations of similar terms. 
For example, courts have held that the term “commercial quantities” 
requires that operating revenues be greater than operating costs,215 that 
there be production merely “of sufficiently large amount to be sold by the 
owner to a buyer for transport elsewhere,”216 or that there be a probability 
that the revenues of offset wells will pay back the cost of their drilling plus 
a profit.217 “Paying quantities” is also a term that may have different 
meanings in different contexts. When the issue is whether a lease is 
maintained by marginal production, “paying quantities” generally requires 
merely that the revenues from production exceed operating costs.218 When 
the issue is whether the lessee owes the lessor a duty to develop or to 
protect against drainage, the term generally requires that the probable 
revenues from drilling pay the costs of drilling, completing, and operating, 
and return a reasonable profit.219 
                                                                                                                 
 212. For example: “If the Test Well is commenced and thereafter drilled to Contract 
Depth and completed and equipped for production in accordance herewith, Farmor will 
assign to Farmee . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 
 213. For example: 
In the event you are successful in completing a well or wells capable of 
producing oil or gas in paying quantities on said land and in compliance with 
all of the terms and conditions hereof, then farmor, upon your written request, 
shall execute and deliver to you an assignment of its rights, title, and interest in 
and to all of the oil and gas held under said lease in and to each governmental 
proration unit of said land upon which you finally complete a well capable of 
producing oil or gas in paying quantities . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
 214. See Landauer v. Huey, 143 Colo. 76, 352 P.2d 302, 308 (Colo. 1960); see also U 2 
of the farmout agreement attached at Scott, supra note 3, at 84. 
 215. Texaco, Inc. v. Fox, 228 Kan. 589, 618 P.2d 844, 847 (1980) (“commercial 
quantities” synonymous to “paying quantities” for purposes of maintaining lease in 
secondary term). 
 216. State v. Wallace, 52 Ohio App. 2d 261, 369 N.E.2d 781, 785 (1976) (issue was 
propriety of plugging order of state conservation agency). 
 217. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 455 P.2d 12, 14–17 (Alaska 1969) (issue 
was whether blowout constituted “discovery in commercial quantities” so that lessee of state 
lease became entitled to pay reduced royalty rate). 
 218. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 90–92, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690–92 (1959). 
 219. See 5 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 58.3 (1964) (discusses 
appropriate cases). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
326 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
Each of these definitions may be appropriate in a produce to earn 
farmout. The meaning of the terms may differ according to the 
circumstances in which they are used. When the farmout’s purpose is lease 
maintenance, the agreement serves that purpose so long as operating 
revenues are greater than operating expenses over a reasonable time.220 
When the purpose of the farmout is to satisfy an obligation of the farmor to 
drill an offset, development, or exploratory well, drilling and attempting to 
complete satisfy the obligation, so that any production should be sufficient 
to earn. When the purpose of the farmout is to obtain exploration of its 
leases, discovery of a formation that will permit the drilling and profitable 
operation of additional wells may well be the intent of the parties. In 
addition, a case can be made that the parties intend that rights will be 
earned under a produce to earn farmout only when a well is drilled and 
completed capable of producing enough to pay costs of drilling, 
completing, and operating, plus a reasonable profit; this makes sense, for 
example, when joint development of a field or dedication of reserves is the 
business purpose of the farmout agreement. 
The first definition of production is the one most likely to be intended by 
farmor and farmee, because it is the definition generally used in leases. It 
therefore comes to mind first. In addition, the most common reason for a 
farmout agreement is lease maintenance. Often, however, the terms of the 
agreement suggest nothing about the intent of the parties. To avoid 
ambiguity and dispute, the parties should carefully define whatever term is 
used to describe “produce to earn.” 
b) Drill to Earn Farmouts 
Parallel interpretative problems arise with drill to earn farmout 
agreements. The term “drill,” whether couched as a covenant or a condition, 
may require drilling to an objective depth and testing the formation found. 
For example, that may be the parties’ intent when the farmout’s purpose is 
to drill a court-ordered “obligation” well to satisfy an implied covenant to 
develop or to protect against drainage. The same term may require only 
drilling to the objective depth, with a decision at the casing point221 to test 
                                                                                                                 
 220. As long as operating revenues are greater than operating expenses, the underlying 
lease is maintained. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 176. 
 221. The casing point is the point where “a well has been drilled to the objective depth 
stated in the initial notice, appropriate tests have been made” and a decision is to be made 
whether to complete it and equip it for production. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 
12, at 109. 
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or not,222 when the purpose of drilling is to satisfy an implied covenant to 
drill an exploratory well. A case may even be made that the farmor and the 
farmee intend that the drill to earn farmout be satisfied when the farmee has 
timely commenced in good faith and diligently pursued drilling operations, 
even though the objective depth is never reached. Such a definition would 
be appropriate, for example, when a court order is satisfied if impenetrable 
substances or conditions are encountered that make abandonment 
necessary. Again, specificity is the watchword for the drafter. 
13. Performance as an Option or Obligation 
As discussed above, whether performance of the farmout provisions is 
the farmee’s option or obligation is one of the key characteristics of the 
farmout agreement.223 In addition, that choice presents significant problems 
for the lawyer drafting or reviewing the agreement. The problems begin 
with classification of language in farmout agreements. 
a) Classification Problems 
Classification of farmout language as making drilling a covenant to 
perform or a condition of earning may be difficult. Many drafters word 
farmout provisions relating to commencement of initial drilling as a 
covenant, but then follow with language that transforms the obligation to 
drill into a mere condition of earning.224 One must read the agreement as a 
                                                                                                                 
 222. For an example of the type of agreement, see Modern Exploration, Inc. v. 
Maddison, 708 S.W.2d 872, 875–76 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no writ), discussed 
supra text accompanying notes 191–93. 
 223. See supra text accompanying notes 133–37. 
 224. Lamb, supra note 3, at 154. One example agreement provides: 
 2. Initial Test Well. On or before ____, Farmee shall commence or cause to 
be commenced the actual drilling with suitable rotary equipment of a well . . . 
and shall thereafter continuously prosecute such drilling operations in a diligent 
and workmanlike manner until the well reaches a depth sufficient in Farmor’s 
judgment to test ____. 
* * * 
 12. Failure to Drill. Farmee shall not be liable in damages to Farmor for 
failure to commence, drill, test, complete or equip the Initial Test Well as 
herein provided, but any such failure shall result in the loss to Farmee of all 
rights under this agreement. The foregoing shall not be construed to preclude or 
limit any rights Farmor may have in law or in equity, by virtue of Farmee’s 
negligence or willful misconduct, or for any breach by Farmee of any other 
obligation under this agreement (including, without limitations, the obligations 
to provide information to Farmor and to indemnify Farmor as hereinafter 
provided). 
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whole to determine whether drilling is an option, an obligation, or a bit of 
both.225 
b) Option to Drill 
When the farmout agreement gives the farmee an option to drill, difficult 
practical and conceptual problems arise. For the farmor, one problem is 
whether the farmee that has commenced drilling may choose to forfeit its 
right to earn under the farmout agreement in order to avoid sharing valuable 
information obtained in its drilling operations.226 If drilling truly is an 
option, the farmee presumably may choose to abandon operations at any 
time and for any reason.227 The abandonment provisions of the farmout, 
which typically give the farmor the right to take over drilling operations, 
                                                                                                                 
Scott, supra note 3, at 83, 87. The last sentence of the quoted ¶ 12 makes that paragraph 
something less than a complete release of the farmee from liability, however. The farmee 
does not have to drill under the example language, but if the farmee does drill, it must 
comply with the contractual provisions or face liability. See infra text accompanying note 
229. 
 225. For example, the language following makes drilling a clear-cut obligation: 
Farmee shall drill a well, hereinafter called the Earning Well, strictly in accord-
ance with the following well specifications: 
(a) Location: ____ 
(b) Spudding Deadline: ____  
(c) Required Depth: ____ 
(d) Completion/Plugging Deadline: ____ 
The obligations of Farmee hereunder are firm obligations and covenants as well 
as conditions to earning the assignment(s) provided for. 
In contrast, the following language indicates that drilling is a condition for earning, and that 
a failure to drill will not result in liability: 
“Farmee shall have the option, but not the obligation, to drill a well at the 
location designated below and thereby earn the rights set forth below to the 
leases described at Exhibit ____, all subject to the terms, limitations and 
conditions set forth below.” 
The possibility exists to make commencement of drilling an option, but to make completion 
of a well commenced an obligation. For example: 
If the test well is commenced, farmee agrees to drill the test well to a depth at 
which the ____ formation has been properly tested therein or to a depth of ____ 
feet, whichever is first reached (objective depth) and to complete the test well 
for production or plug and abandon the well as a dry hole, in full compliance 
with the terms and provisions of section ____ below. 
 226. Hardwick, Operational Agreements in the Shadow of Bankruptcy—What Can Be 
Done to Structure Agreements in Order to Minimize the Problems of a Party that Later Goes 
Bankrupt, 1986 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. SPEC. INST, ON PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES DURING 
HARD TIMES IN THE MINERALS INDUSTRY 6-1, 6-2. 
 227. Id. 
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may minimize this problem.228 Releasing the farmee from liability for not 
drilling, but specifically providing for liability for failure to provide 
promised information, may also solve the problem.229 
c) Obligation to Drill 
When dealing with a farmout agreement that makes drilling the farmee’s 
legal obligation, the issue of liability for failure to perform is of crucial 
importance to both farmor and farmee. There is a split of authority as to the 
measure of damages for breach of an express promise to drill. In a majority 
of states, including Oklahoma and Louisiana, the remedy is apparently the 
cost of drilling the promised well.230 In a minority of states, including 
Texas, the remedy is the benefit that the one party would have received had 
the other drilled the well as promised.231 That remedy may be the “lost 
royalty,” which is defined as the royalty that would have resulted had the 
well been drilled as promised.232 Other available measures of damages 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See infra note 357. 
 229. See supra note 224. 
 230. Fite v. Miller, 196 La. 876, 200 So. 285, 286 (1940); Ardizonne v. Archer, 72 Okla. 
70, 178 P. 263, 265–66 (1919). These cases, like most of those cited in this article, deal with 
breach of a drilling covenant in a lease. Professors Williams and Meyers have asserted, 
however, that the problems are the same in the context of breach of a farmout as they are in 
breach of a lease, so that the rules should be the same. See 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, 
OIL AND GAS LAW § 432.2 (1985). Professors Williams and Meyers also cite cases from the 
federal courts, as well as courts in Colorado, Kansas, and Montana, as adopting the cost of 
drilling rule. 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 885.1 (1985). 
 231. See Guardian Trust v. Brothers, 59 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 
1933, writ ref’d). Professors Williams and Meyers cite cases from the federal courts, as well 
as from courts in California, Alberta, and Kentucky, as adopting the lost royalty rule. See 5 
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 230, § 885.2. See also Stinnett v. Damson Oil Corp., 
813 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (a recent case applying the rule). 
 232. For an excellent analysis and collection of the cases dealing with the measure of 
damages, see Annotation, Right and Measure of Recovery for Breach of Obligation to Drill 
Exploratory Oil or Gas Wells, 4 A.L.R.3D 284 (1965). In Guardian Trust a Texas court of 
civil appeals reasoned, “The true and ultimate purpose of all parties to the lease was ‘the 
mutually profitable production of oil, gas or other valuable mineral.’” 59 S.W.2d at 345 
(citation omitted). The court concluded, therefore, that the lost royalty was the appropriate 
measure of damages, noting that the cost of drilling would be inappropriate because such a 
measure is not the value of performance to the obligee but “the cost of performance by the 
obligor.” Id. at 346. The “lost royalty” rule is not rigidly applied, however: 
After an early adoption of the cost of drilling as the measure of damages, the 
Texas courts have apparently rejected any mechanical application of that rule 
and have now adopted a flexible test under which the plaintiff is entitled to 
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include the value of the retained interest233 or the value of the information 
that drilling would have developed.234 
The Texas rule that the remedy for the breach of an express promise to 
drill is the value of the performance to the obligee is better law than the 
majority rule.235 The Texas rule places a heavy burden of proof upon the 
farmor whose farmee has failed to perform, however. Martin v. Darcy is a 
case in point.236 In that case Martin promised to drill a well under an 
assignment of a farmout from Darcy but failed to do so, though the well 
was later drilled and completed as a dry hole by another. Darcy sued and 
recovered $3000 on the theory that the interest that he had retained had 
possessed a market value of $6000 and that he would have sold half of it 
before completion of the well had Martin drilled it. The appellate court 
reversed the award on the basis that to recover Darcy would have had to 
have shown (1) that the profits he claimed had been contemplated by the 
parties when the agreement was made and (2) that he actually would have 
sold his interest.237 The problem, as the court in Martin v. Darcy noted, is 
that at the time the farmout is negotiated no one knows what the farmor will 
do with its interest, including the farmor. Therefore, at least the second 
element of proof required to establish a basis for recovery of damages can 
rarely be proved.238 
Because of the difficulty in a state like Texas of proving actual damages 
for breach of a farmout agreement obligating the farmee to drill, the parties 
                                                                                                                 
recover the value of the performance of the contract to him, such value to be 
determined in the light of the peculiar facts of each case. 
Annotation, supra, at 299 (footnotes omitted). 
 233. See Martin v. Darcy, 357 S.W.2d 457, 459–60 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1962, 
writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 230, § 885 (discusses 
other measures of damages). A value of retained interest measure would be particularly 
appropriate, in the author’s view, in a “lease salvage” type farmout. 
 234. See Atlantic Oil Prod. Co. v. Masterson, 30 F.2d 481, 482 (5th Cir. 1929). Using the 
value of the information that was to have been obtained would be particularly appropriate in 
what the author calls an “exploration and evaluation” farmout. 
 235. The Texas rule is “better” law because it is the usual rule for recovery of damages 
for breach of contract. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 26 Eng. L. & E. 398 (1854). In 
fact, Hadley v. Baxendale formed the basis of the decision in Whiteside v. Trentman, 146 
Tex. 46, 170 S.W.2d 195 (1943). 
 236. 357 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 237. Id. at 460. 
 238. Id. A detailed statement of the purpose of the farmor in entering into the farmout 
would help significantly in meeting the burden of proof. See supra text accompanying notes 
123–24. 
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may include a stipulation of liquidated damages in the agreement.239 It is 
difficult to draft a liquidated damages clause with certainty that it will be 
enforced, however.240 Of particular concern in drafting liquidated damages 
provisions in farmout agreements is the need when setting damages to take 
into account the extent of performance. The extent of performance would 
be important in determining actual damages, and stipulated damages might 
not be awarded if they grossly exceed actual damages.241 An agreement to 
pay the estimated cost of drilling an obligation well, therefore, probably 
would be classified as an unenforceable penalty when the breach occurs 
after drilling to the casing point. 
Other alternatives for the farmor worried that a farmee will fail to 
perform a farmout agreement drafted as a covenant to drill include 
obtaining security for performance, escrow of drilling funds, and requiring 
a performance bond.242 However, negotiating any of these is likely to 
                                                                                                                 
 239. An example of a liquidated damages clause is: “FAILURE TO DRILL; DAM-
AGES. If farmee fails to drill the test well as required by § ____, farmee shall pay to farmor 
on or before ____, ____ dollars ($    ) which shall be deemed farmor’s liquidated damages 
arising out of farmee’s failure to perform.” In the author’s opinion, the more detail included, 
the better the agreement. 
 240. Agreements for stipulated damages are enforceable if courts determine such 
damages to be estimated compensation for injuries, but not if courts classify them as 
penalties. Courts have often said that the distinction between a penalty and liquidated 
damages is that a penalty is not a measure of compensation for breach, but a security for 
actual damages. See, e.g., Gregory v. Nelson, 147 Kan. 682, 78 P.2d 889, 892 (1938); Jones 
v. Mays, 248 S.W. 129, 130–32 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1923, writ dism’d); Bourland v. 
Huffhines, 244 S.W. 847, 848–52 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1922, writ dism’d). To be 
enforceable, a liquidated damages provision must meet two requirements. First, the court 
must find that the amount of damages to be reasonably anticipated would be difficult to 
ascertain because of uncertainty or indefiniteness. The contract provision should contain a 
specific statement of agreement of the parties to this effect. Second, the stipulated amount 
must be either a reasonable estimate of probable damages or reasonably proportionate to 
actual damages. 
 241. Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1952) (“The universal rule 
for measuring damages for the breach of a contract is just compensation for the loss or 
damage actually sustained. . . . A party has no right to have a court enforce a stipulation 
which violates the principle underlying that rule.”). 
 242. An example of a clause requiring a surety bond to guarantee performance of farmout 
agreements follows: 
You agree to deliver to farmor a bonded form attached hereto as Exhibit — 
executed by you as Principal and by a corporate surety acceptable to farmor. In 
the event you should fail to comply with the obligations contained in this 
farmout agreement to pay all persons who furnish labor or material for use in or 
in connection with the drilling of the initial or any subsequent test well hereun-
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complicate forming the agreement. Furthermore, it is an axiom of the 
industry that when performance guarantees are necessary, they are 
unobtainable. 
14. The Substitute Well Clause 
Another axiom of the oil and gas industry is that “if something can go 
wrong, it will go wrong.” That maxim particularly applies to well drilling, 
especially drilling exploratory wells. Mechanical breakdowns are almost 
inevitable. No matter how thorough and professional the geologic and 
geophysical analysis, there is always a risk of encountering unexpected 
conditions or impenetrable formations. Farmout agreements, therefore, 
almost always contain a substitute well clause that sets forth circumstances 
that excuse the farmee from drilling the earning well and give it the right to 
drill another earning well. 
a) Escape Provisions 
When the agreement obligates the farmee to drill the well, both parties 
will be vitally concerned with the escape provisions—the terms of the 
substitute well clause that set out the circumstances in which the farmee 
may abandon its drilling operations.243 Without such provisions, the farmee 
                                                                                                                 
der, or fail to prevent the filing of liens against the leasehold estate subject 
hereto, then you and the surety on your bond shall be jointly and severally 
liable to farmor in the amount of ____ payable forthwith upon such default at 
____. Upon your completion of the initial test well and all subsequent test 
wells, if any, at the location, within the time, in the manner and to the depth 
specified and upon your furnishing to farmor evidence, satisfactory to it, that all 
persons have been paid for labor performed or material furnished in connection 
with or in the actual drilling of such well(s) and that there are no other claims 
for damages or liens of whatsoever nature against the above described leases 
resulting from the drilling of such well(s), you and your surety shall be 
discharged from any obligation thereunder. 
 243. The escape provisions of the substitute well clause must be read in conjunction with 
the force majeure clause, if any, in the farmout agreement. A force majeure clause may 
broaden the circumstances under which a party may excuse a failure to perform. For 
example, the following clause is substantially broader than most substitute well clause 
escape provisions: 
 If Farmee is rendered unable, wholly or in part, by force majeure to carry 
out its obligations or to meet its deadlines under this agreement, other than the 
obligation to make money payments, it will give to Farmors prompt written 
notice of the force majeure with reasonably full particulars concerning it; 
thereupon, the obligations or deadlines of Farmee, insofar as they are affected 
by the force majeure, shall be suspended during, but no longer than, the 
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that fails to perform covenanted drilling operations may be liable. Even if 
drilling under the farmout is merely an option of the farmee, the escape 
provisions of the substitute well clause are important. The farmee that fails 
to drill an option well will lose its rights to earn under the farmout, unless 
the escape provisions provide for a right to drill a substitute well. 
Escape provisions vary widely. Some farmouts excuse performance 
where “igneous rock or other impenetrable substances are encountered at a 
lesser [than the objective] depth.”244 Others let the farmee escape its 
obligations when it encounters “a formation or other physical condition in 
the well which renders further drilling impracticable.”245 The agreement 
sometimes spells out what will render the drilling impracticable.246 
                                                                                                                 
continuation of the force majeure. Farmee shall use all reasonable diligence to 
remove the force majeure as quickly as possible. 
 The requirement that any force majeure shall be remedied with all 
reasonable dispatch shall not require the settlement of strikes, lockouts or other 
labor difficulty by Farmee contrary to its wishes; how all such difficulties shall 
be handled shall be entirely within the sole discretion of Farmee. 
 The term “force majeure” as employed herein shall mean an act of God, 
strike, lockout or other industrial disturbance, act of the public enemy, war, 
blockade, public riot, lightening, fire, storm, flood, explosion, governmental 
restraint, governmental inaction, nonavailability of drilling equipment or other 
equipment or personnel, and any other cause whether of the kind specifically 
enumerated or otherwise, which is not reasonably within the control of Farmee. 
The following is a farmout force majeure clause keyed to the force majeure clause of the 
underlying oil and gas lease: 
Force Majeure—any obligation of a party to this Agreement shall be 
suspended, and any time deadline provided in this Agreement shall be 
extended, for any period during which performance of such obligation or the 
meeting of such deadline shall be prevented by the occurrence of any force 
majeure circumstance. For purposes of this paragraph, a “force majeure 
circumstance” shall mean any of the events described in paragraph ____ of the 
Oil and Gas Lease attached hereto as Exhibit ____. The party affected by a 
force majeure circumstance shall give notice to the other party the occurrence 
of such circumstance and shall take all reasonable action to remove such force 
majeure circumstance. 
 244. R. Olsen Oil Co. v. Fidler, 199 F.2d 868, 869 (10th Cir. 1952). 
 245. See Scott, supra note 3, at 83. One commentator has described any language that 
refers to impracticality or defines impracticality as a “Gulf Coast Clause.” See Glass, supra 
note 3, at 6. “Impractical” and “impracticable” are apparently used interchangeably in such 
clauses. It is not clear to me that they have precisely the same meaning; they do not in plain 
English. 
 246. For example: 
loss of circulation, partial loss of circulation, water flow, domal formation, ab-
normal pressures, heaving shale, or similar formation, salt or other similar con-
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Farmout escape provisions are often vague and ill-defined because the 
parties are attempting to provide for the unknown. Strictly speaking, for 
example, no substance is “impenetrable.”247 One should note, however, that 
the focus of most formulations is upon physical conditions in the hole248 or 
mechanical difficulties not caused by the farmee’s negligence. The cost of 
conducting operations, the farmee’s economic circumstances, or market 
conditions do not generally provide a basis for escape from a drilling 
obligation.249 
The parties may negotiate broad escape provisions to relieve the farmee 
from a drilling obligation or to preserve its right to drill substitute option 
wells. Escape provisions may take into account the costs of drilling,250 time 
expended,251 technology,252 or make reference to what the reasonable, 
prudent operator would do in the circumstance.253 Indeed, it is common for 
                                                                                                                 
dition, is encountered which makes drilling abnormally difficult or hazardous, 
causes sticking of drill pipe or casing, or other similar difficulty which 
precludes drilling ahead under reasonably normal procedures . . . . 
Another example makes drilling impracticable when drilling gets “to such lesser depths at 
which pressures are encountered which would cause a reasonable prudent operator to require 
the utilization of a mud weight of 16.0 pounds per gallon or greater . . . .” 
 247. At least one commentator has said flatly of “impenetrable substances” that “I am 
uncertain as to its meaning.” Lamb, supra note 3, at 157. 
 248. In R. Olsen Oil Co. v. Fidler, 199 F.2d at 870, the court defined the phrase “igneous 
rock and other impenetrable substances” as used in farmout agreements in New Mexico and 
Oklahoma to mean “to reach a geological formation . . . which, in the business of production 
of such minerals, it is recognized will reasonably preclude the probability of finding oil or 
gas in or below such formation.” (Emphasis in original.) 
 249. John Scott, however, notes that drafters of escape provisions often do not refer to 
physical conditions in the hole and that such formulations may arguably be stretched into 
broad force majeure clauses. Scott, supra note 3, at 83 n.33. 
 250. For example: “If in drilling . . . a condition or formation is encountered which 
renders further drilling impracticable for the reason that the cost per foot of such further 
drilling would be in excess of 150 percent of the cost per foot anticipated in the AFE . . . , 
Farmee may cease drilling operations . . . .” 
 251. What some have called a “72 hour continuous efforts” clause will permit the farmee 
to cease operations if it has made a good faith continuous effort for 72 hours to solve the 
problem. L. MOSBURG, supra note 3, § 3.03. 
 252. For example: 
Operator shall use its best efforts to drill or cause to be drilled the earning well 
to be situated on a drilling unit comprising a portion of the contract lands, and 
which well shall be drilled to (i) Contract Depth or (ii) a depth where there is 
encountered a practically impenetrable substance making further drilling in 
light of existing technology impossible or impracticable. 
 253. For example: 
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option farmouts to provide that the farmee can abandon drilling of the 
initial well “for any reason.”254 
While the use of general terms in drafting escape provisions is probably 
unavoidable because of the uncertainties inherent in drilling, the parties 
should be as specific as possible. When the farmor and the farmee have 
established a working relationship in prior dealings, the farmor may agree 
to escape provisions that give the farmee substantial discretion. When the 
parties have no prior relationship, or when the farmor’s experience with the 
farmee suggests that the farmee is inefficient or untrustworthy, the parties 
should state objective criteria. Both the drafter and his client must 
recognize, however, that even specifically enumerating the circumstances 
that will excuse the farmee from drilling will not preclude factual disputes 
over whether or not the enumerated circumstances have occurred. 
b) Substitute Well Provisions 
(1) Option or Obligation 
The initial issue in any substitute well clause is whether drilling a 
substitute well is an option or an obligation. If the initial well is an 
obligation of the farmee, the farmor will probably wish to make the 
substitute well an obligation. The factors that led the farmor to bargain for a 
covenant to drill are likely still to apply if the farmee abandons the initial 
attempt. The farmee, on the other hand is likely to want an option to walk 
away from the deal if its efforts and expenditures have been unsuccessful, 
at least unless it has reason to believe that the same circumstances will not 
arise in drilling a second well. 
Most farmout agreements make a substitute well an option, even though 
the parties structure the drilling of the earning well as a covenant of the 
farmee. An alternative is to make drilling the substitute well an obligation 
of the farmee unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that conditions 
similar to those that caused abandonment of the earning well will also arise 
in drilling the substitute well.255 
                                                                                                                 
If, in the drilling of the initial test well, operator encounters a drilling condition 
or substance before reaching the above specified depth or formation which 
cannot be overcome by means or methods customarily used by prudent 
operators in the area, then and in such event, the test well may be plugged and 
abandoned at the depth at which the substance or condition is encountered and 
operator is hereby granted and given an option to commence and drill a 
substitute well for said well. 
 254. Glass, supra note 3, at 6. 
 255. L. MOSBURG, supra note 3, at 186–88. 
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(2) Well Details 
The agreement should also address the requirements of drilling 
operations for a substitute well. In providing for a substitute well’s 
commencement date, the parties must take into account the termination date 
of the lease farmed out. They must also allow for the practical problems of 
arranging to drill; typically farmors and farmees agree to allow 60 to 90 
days. If the agreement provided a completion deadline for the earning well, 
the parties will need to modify that date appropriately for a substitute well. 
The location of the substitute well is likely to be a troublesome matter. If 
adverse conditions encountered in drilling were the farmor’s reason for 
abandoning the initial well, it is likely that similar conditions will be 
encountered in any substitute well drilled close by. On the other hand, if the 
farmor’s geologic information suggests that hydrocarbons are most likely to 
be found at the location of the initial well, or if the farmor particularly 
wants information from that location, the farmor will not want to give the 
farmee discretion to drill elsewhere.256 
One way to break an impasse either as to the location of the substitute 
well or as to whether the farmee is to be obligated to drill it, is to provide 
the farmee an incentive in the form of a larger percentage, deeper depth, or 
more acreage in the earning provisions. If the farmee that has tried in vain 
to drill an initial well in a location tries a second time and succeeds, it may 
make sense to the parties that the farmee should earn more than it would 
have had the initial well been successful. 
15. The Performance Standard 
a) Conduct of Operations 
Since a farmout agreement is a business transaction similar to a 
construction contract, a “good and workmanlike” standard of performance 
may be implicit.257 Many agreements specifically define the standard to 
which the farmee must work, however, usually by reference to due 
                                                                                                                 
 256. A formulation that farmees should avoid is what one may call an “illusory” 
substitute well right, such as would be created by a substitute well provision that called for 
the farmee to have the right to drill a substitute well “at a location acceptable to farmor.” 
Such a provision may not be enforceable at all. If enforceable, it gives the farmor complete 
control of the substitute well. 
 257. Cf. True Oil v. Gibson, 392 P.2d 795, 797–800 (Wyo. 1964) (drilling not “com-
menced” under terms of lease when preliminary activities not performed with good faith 
intention of completing performance). 
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diligence and good and workmanlike conduct.258 Obviously the standard set 
may affect substantially the farmee’s potential liabilities and chances of 
earning. 
b) The Earning Standard 
The farmee has the burden of proving that it has met the standard set by 
the farmout to earn its interest.259 Absolute performance will be the 
presumed requirement. It has been held that substantial compliance is 
inappropriate for farmout agreements.260 Most farmout agreements 
specifically require absolute performance by the farmee to earn its 
interest.261 On occasion, however, the farmor will accept the farmee’s 
substantial performance.262 A farmee’s representative should certainly 
negotiate the issue. 
                                                                                                                 
 258. A typical example of a clause defining the standard of performance in the conduct 
of operations is: 
All test well and substitute well operations will be conducted with due 
diligence, in a good and workmanlike manner, in compliance with all laws, 
rules, regulations and orders of governmental authorities asserting jurisdiction, 
with the terms and provisions of the leases affected and with the provisions of 
all third party agreements relating to such operations, including any agreements 
with other parties in the chain of leasehold title, and without cost, risk, liability 
or obligation to farmor, expressly or by implication. Farmee will pay all bills 
before delinquency and will keep and preserve the lease free of all liens, 
charges and encumbrances arising out of their acts and operations thereon . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
 259. See Inexco Oil Co. v. Crutcher-Tufts Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (W.D. La. 
1975); see also Klein & Burke, supra note 3, at 494–95 (discusses Inexco Oil and the 
parties’ interest in depth as substance of farmout agreement). But see Vickers v. Peakers, 
227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29, 32 (1957) (court found “unless” assignment pursuant to 
farmout had not terminated although drilling never reached objective depth).   
 260. Inexco Oil Co. v. Crutcher-Tufts Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (W.D. La. 1975). 
 261. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 3, at 84 (requires assignment by farmor only “If 
Farmee . . . complies fully with all the provisions of this agreement to Farmor’s 
satisfaction.”). 
 262. For example: 
In drilling all wells under this Agreement, Farmee shall conduct all operations 
connected therewith in accordance with the standards of a reasonably prudent 
operator. Farmee shall employ such practices as are consistent with sound engi-
neering, effective geological exploration, and oil field safety. Farmee shall sub-
stantially comply with all applicable laws and governmental rules and 
regulations. 
* * * 
For all wells drilled under this Agreement, Farmee shall substantially perform 
and comply with all of the material covenants, terms, and provisions contained 
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Farmees should avoid two performance standards occasionally found in 
farmout agreements. One requires that the farmee perform “to the farmor’s 
satisfaction” in order to earn the interest.263 Though a standard designated 
by reference to the discretion of one of the parties will probably be limited 
by reasonableness,264 such a standard is an invitation to litigation. A second 
pernicious performance standard requires that the farmee must request 
assignment of its earned interest in writing within a specified period and 
that it forfeits the interest if it fails to do so.265 Such a provision may well 
be enforceable on the theory that a court’s function is to give effect to the 
agreement that the parties have made, rather than to write the contract that 
the parties should have written.266 
B. Well Information 
The second major group of important issues addressed in farmout 
agreements relates to the information that the parties develop in the course 
of drilling the well. What tests are to be conducted? What information is to 
be shared by the farmee with the farmor? When and under what conditions 
is the sharing to take place? These issues fundamentally affect the farmee’s 
cost of performance. They also affect the value of the farmout transaction to 
both the farmor and the farmee. 
1. Tests to be Conducted 
The parties often list tests that the farmee must perform in the course of 
drilling in an appendix attached to the farmout agreement. Because of their 
physical location and because the lawyers who draft or review farmout 
                                                                                                                 
in Exhibit “B”, entitled “Provisions Applicable to Test Wells”, attached hereto 
and made a part hereof by reference. 
* * * 
Upon substantial compliance with each of the material covenants, terms, and 
conditions set forth in this Agreement, each Farmor shall upon written demand 
by Farmee, assign or cause to be assigned to Farmee . . . the following: 
(Emphasis added.) 
 263. See, e.g, supra note 261. 
 264. Supra note 207. 
 265. See Scott, supra note 3, at 84. For example: “Farmee shall request any assignment 
earned hereunder in writing within 30 days from completion of the earning well. If such 
timely request is not made, all rights and interests which farmee may then have under or by 
virtue of this agreement shall automatically terminate.” Id. Several of the agreements col-
lected contained similar language. 
 266. Cf. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 755 F.2d 1151, 1154–55 (5th Cir. 
1985); Royal Bank of Canada v. Joffre Resources Ltd., [1985] 5 W.W.R. 75, 80–81 (Alberta 
Q.B.). 
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agreements often do not understand the technical terms that are used to 
describe the tests, the testing provisions tend to get little attention. That 
oversight can be very expensive for both the farmor and the farmee. 
The tests required under the farmout are important to the farmee because 
the farmee is obligated to pay the costs of testing. If the farmout requires 
extensive and expensive testing, the burden of drilling increases greatly. An 
attorney drafting or reviewing a farmout agreement on behalf of a farmee, 
therefore, must either understand the necessity for and the probable costs of 
the tests required or specifically defer to the business judgment of the client 
on these matters. 
A “blank check” requirement that the farmee test “to the farmor’s 
satisfaction” should be avoided. When possible, the contract should set out 
the specific tests to be conducted. When that is not possible because the 
parties cannot agree or cannot foresee what will be necessary, reference to 
the prudent operator standard may be advisable.267 
The farmor is equally concerned about what tests are to be conducted. 
Even if the farmor’s primary purpose in farming out is to get a well drilled 
to preserve its lease, the testing information is likely to be important for 
what it may tell the farmor about other leases that it may own in the area. 
Where the farmor’s goal in farming out is to get leases explored, the 
information developed from testing may prove more important to the 
farmor than whether or not the drilled wells produce in paying quantities. 
One drafting or reviewing a farmout agreement for a farmor, therefore, 
needs to understand equally as much as any counterpart working for the 
farmee what the various kinds of tests that the agreement may specifically 
require and what kind of information they may develop. 
Farmout agreements commonly provide that the farmor’s representatives 
will have “the freedom of the rig floor,” which in the trade means that the 
farmor has the right to all information derived from testing in the course of 
drilling.268 In addition, many agreements will specifically require the 
farmee to provide testing information.269 
                                                                                                                 
 267. For example: “In the course of drilling the initial well or any substitute well 
provided for herein, farmee agrees to do such evaluation and to have made such electric, 
radiation and porosity surveys as a prudent operator would do, or have made, under the 
same or similar circumstances . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It may also be advisable, at least 
from the farmee’s view, to provide specifically that testing need not be done if there are no 
commercially viable “shows” of hydrocarbons. 
 268. Cage, supra note 3, at 165; Klein & Burke, supra note 3, at 502. 
 269. For example: 
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As a practical matter, the importance of testing to both the farmee and 
the farmor means that the attorneys representing the parties cannot work in 
a vacuum. They must consult with their clients’ scientific personnel. They 
must ask the hard questions. Is there a clear understanding as to what the 
terminology used to describe the testing means? What will it cost? Will the 
information produced be worth the cost? When and under what conditions 
is information to be supplied? 
2. When Must the Farmee Supply Testing Information? 
When the farmee must supply information derived from testing may be 
crucially important to the farmor. The farmor may have leases in the area 
that it needs to evaluate before their primary terms expire. The farmee may 
“steal a march” on the farmor by withholding testing information until the 
farmee can use it in evaluating its leases or formulating its lease acquisition 
program for the area. Farmout agreements, therefore, commonly set time 
limits for the farmee to provide testing information.270 When the agreement 
                                                                                                                 
Farmees shall afford the duly authorized representatives of farmor, at their sole 
risk, access to the Test Well on all operations incident thereto and shall furnish 
farmor all information pertaining to or obtained from all operations conducted 
in connection therewith, including daily drilling reports, copies of any sample 
analyses made, all reports to government agencies, all test results and copies of 
all logs (including casing logs) and surveys (including velocity surveys) made, 
together with such other notices and information as are customarily furnished 
by the operator to a non-operator working interest owner. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 270. For example: 
The party drilling any well provided for in the Agreement to which this exhibit 
is attached, agrees and binds itself to observe and comply with the provisions 
hereinafter contained; failure to comply with such provisions shall release 
Farmor from its obligations and covenants contained in said agreement. 
* * * 
2. During the drilling of any well: 
* * * 
c. As soon as available, furnish Farmor with records and representative sam-
ples of all cores taken; copies of the results of cores. 
d. Furnish Farmor daily progress reports by telephone or telecopy giving the 
nature of all work done and depth and formation penetrated beginning with the 
date actual work is commenced at the location and continuing until drilling, 
logging, testing, completing and equipping is completed or if a dry hole, the 
well has been plugged and abandoned. 
* * * 
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requires absolute performance to earn, the farmee should give careful 
consideration to these time limits. 
3. Confidentiality 
The parties may also want to bar or limit the dissemination of the infor-
mation developed in testing by including confidentiality provisions.271 
While damages may be difficult to prove, confidentiality clauses should be 
enforceable if damages are proved.272 In addition, their very presence is 
likely to avoid disputes. 
C. What Is Earned? 
There are four dimensions to what is earned by drilling under a farmout 
agreement: the surface area earned, the depth limitations, substances 
covered, and the percentage of interest earned by drilling. In addition, both 
                                                                                                                 
f. Notify Farmor immediately when a show of oil or gas has been encountered 
in drilling or coring, and before any formation is tested or electrical surveys are 
run, notify Farmor in sufficient time for farmor to have representatives present. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 271. For example, the following confidentiality provision is from an offshore farmout 
agreement: 
A. The seismic data acquired pursuant to this farmout agreement will be the 
sole property of farmee and its participants, although black line copies of 
display sections and a map showing the location of shot points used shall be 
furnished to farmor for its information and use only. 
B. Except as provided in subsection A immediately above, the parties hereto 
agree that all geophysical, geological, engineering, technical, production tests 
or other data obtained from all wells drilled under this agreement shall be the 
property of farmor and farmee and shall be maintained as confidential informa-
tion for a period of five (5) years from the date hereof, or until such information 
is made public by the Minerals Management Service, unless both parties agree 
in writing to a lesser period of time. It is understood that the filing of reports by 
farmee which are required by governmental agencies shall not constitute a 
breach hereof. It is also agreed and understood that farmee will be permitted to 
provide each participant named in Section X below, with a copy of the informa-
tion and data referred to in this paragraph, subject to the confidentiality 
provisions of this paragraph. 
C. It is understood and agreed that in the event that farmee agrees to relinquish 
all of its rights under this agreement, the provisions of this section shall not 
apply to farmor and farmor shall be able to use such data in such attempt or 
attempts to further farmout this lease. 
 272. Cf. Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner, 12 S.W.2d 847, 848–49 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Austin 1929, writ ref’d) (covenant to reassign held enforceable); see infra text 
accompanying notes 362–65. 
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the farmor and the farmee must concern themselves with the farmor’s 
overriding royalty, the “carried” costs, pooling provisions, conversion 
rights, the payout definition, and proportionate reduction provisions. 
1. Area Earned 
In principle, the farmor’s and the farmee’s interests under a farmout 
agreement will always conflict with respect to the acreage that is to be 
earned. In practice, however, the parties negotiate the area to be earned by 
the farmee so that it bears a fair relationship to the risks that must be taken. 
As a general rule, the greater the risks that the farmee must take, the greater 
the area earned by drilling under the farmout agreement. 
The most narrow assignment that may be earned under a farmout agree-
ment may be called a “borehole assignment.” A borehole assignment con-
veys to the farmee only the area actually drained by the borehole drilled.273 
The farmee does not earn the right to participate in infill drilling.274  
A second form of limited assignment, and one very commonly seen in 
the industry, is a “drill site assignment.” A drill site assignment provides 
that the farmee earns the rights to a specified amount of acreage that is 
designated as the drill site. Generally, the drill site includes the acreage 
dedicated to the drilling or spacing unit that is approved by the state agency 
with jurisdiction. When there is no state designated drilling or spacing unit, 
                                                                                                                 
 273. An example of a borehole assignment is: 
Assignor . . . does, subject to the terms and provisions herein contained, hereby 
transfer, sell, assign and convey unto the said Assignee, its successors or 
assigns, without warranty of title, express or implied, all of Assignor’s right, 
title and interest in and to the oil and gas rights only as covered by the oil, gas 
and mineral lease described in Exhibit “A”, attached hereto and by reference 
made a part hereof . . . insofar and only insofar as such lease covers rights 
specifically limited to the well bore of the ____ well located in Section ____, 
____ County, ____ together with such interest’s part of all the production, if 
any, produced under such oil, gas and mineral lease from such well bore and a 
like interest in all personal property, fixtures and equipment located on the 
lands described in Exhibit “A” or used or obtained in connection with such 
well bore of the ____ well. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 274. An unresolved question is whether the assignee of a borehole assignment under a 
farmout agreement acquires any right to prevent the farmor from drilling an infill well or to 
recover damages as a result of the drilling of an infill well that will cause substantial 
drainage. There may also be question about whether a borehole assignment meets the 
complete payout test. See supra text accompanying notes 22–25. 
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the parties may describe a drill site assignment as a square275 or a circle276 
around the top of the borehole. 
Finally, the farmor may assign the farmee not only the drill site acreage, 
but acreage outside of the drill site.277 Assignment of outside acreage is 
particularly common when the farmout is primarily for exploratory 
purposes. As discussed above, the practice presents special tax problems.278 
  
                                                                                                                 
 275. The following describes the assigned tract as a square: 
If Farmee [drills] . . . then Farmee shall have acquired all of Farmor’s undi-
vided right, title and interests to an undivided ____ leasehold interest in and to 
the Lease and the Lands, insofar and only insofar as the Lease and Lands cover 
and affect the proration unit established for the Test Well, which proration unit 
shall be established in accordance with the rules prescribed or permitted by the 
Railroad Commission of Texas. In the absence of a designation of a proration 
unit by the Railroad Commission of Texas, then if the Test Well is classified as 
an oil well, then the acreage assigned thereto shall be 80 acres; if the Test Well 
is classified as a gas well, the acreage assigned thereto shall be 320 acres. In 
either case, the acreage assigned to a well shall be in the shape of a square, as 
nearly as practicable, with a Test Well in the center thereof. For the purposes 
of determining whether the Test Well is an oil well or a gas well, the 
classification thereof in any form filed in respect thereto with the Railroad 
Commission of Texas shall be conclusive. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 276. The following describes the tract assigned as a circle: 
[After drilling the earning well] you will upon written request to the farmor be 
provided with an assignment with farmor’s interest in its lease(s) or portion of 
lease(s) under that portion of the Farmout Area included in the unit established 
for the earning well. Should a unit not be established, said assignment shall 
cover farmor’s interest under that portion of the Farmout Area included in an 
area having a radius of 300 feet around the earning well. 
 277. An example of an earning provision that would give the farmee acreage outside of 
the drill unit, which might be appropriate for use in an exploratory “drill to earn” agreement, 
follows: 
If [the farmee earns] . . . the farmor will assign to farmee: 
(a) an undivided 50 percent of the operating rights and working interests of 
farmor in the leases subject to this agreement; (b) if, and only if, the test 
well is completed for production of oil and/or gas, 100 percent of the 
remaining operating rights and working interests of farmor in the land 
within the designated drilling and spacing unit established by the ____ 
Commission for the test well, excepting and reserving to farmor [an 
overriding royalty interest convertible upon payout] . . . . 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 30–34. 
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2. Depth Limitations 
Just as oil and gas leases may be subdivided into separate surface tracts, 
they can be subdivided into deep and shallow rights. Farmout agreements 
often sever leases by placing depth limitations upon what the farmee earns 
by drilling. Depth limitations may be stated on a footage basis; for example, 
“6000 feet” or “the total depth drilled.”279 In the alternative, earned rights 
may be limited by reference to a described formation, generally either the 
deepest penetrated by drilling operations280 or the deepest actually 
producing.281 The strictest limitation, rarely seen but often discussed, limits 
the farmee’s rights to those formations actually producing. Yet another 
alternative limits what the farmee earns to the stratigraphic equivalent of 
the well drilled.282 Finally, the parties may use some combination of 
limitations. 
                                                                                                                 
 279. An example of a total depth drilled limitation is: “All acreages assigned shall be 
limited to a depth equal to one hundred feet (100') below the total depth penetrated by the 
test well drilled on the drilling unit acreage.” (Emphasis added.) The reason for reference to 
a specified depth below that actually penetrated is to give the farmee a right to drill deeper, if 
need be, in order to maintain the production on its well. Sometimes, agreements will grant a 
specific easement for such purposes: 
[The assignment shall] reserve to Farmor all rights below the stratigraphic 
equivalent of the base of the deepest producing sand as defined in the well 
completion form filed with the Texas Railroad Commission, except for a 
vertical easement which shall be assigned to Farmee for operational purposes 
only in the upper one-hundred feet (100') of those reserved depths. 
 280. An example of a deepest formation penetrated limitation is: 
If Farmee timely commences the drilling of the Initial Test Well, drills it to the 
contract depth and fully and completely complies with all the other terms, 
conditions and requirements of this Agreement, upon the completion of the 
Initial Test Well or Substitute Well as a well capable of producing oil and/or 
gas in paying quantities, Farmee will have earned an assignment of 100% of 
Farmor’s interest in 160 acres around the drill site tract, being the ____ quarter 
of section ____, township ____, range ____, ____ County, ____ and limited 
from the surface to the base of the deepest formation penetrated. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 281. An example of a deepest producing formation limitation, taken from a draft AAPL 
Form 635 farmout agreement, is “if an assignment is earned, the rights earned will be as 
follows: “limited to the interval from the surface down to and including, but not below, the 
base of the deepest producing formation in the earning well.” This approach appears more 
limited than a deepest penetrated formation limitation because it is quite likely that a well 
drilled will be produced from a shallower depth than the deepest depth penetrated. 
 282. An example of a stratigraphic equivalent limitation follows: 
If the Earning Test Well is drilled and completed as a well capable of 
producing oil or gas in paying quantities, each Farmor shall assign to Farmee 
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All of these limited assignments present potential problems. All are sus-
ceptible to interpretative disputes similar to those that arise in describing 
the objective depth.283 When what is earned is limited to a specified depth 
expressed in feet, the method used to measure the depth may be ambiguous. 
The drafter should take care to describe the limitation by reference to 
vertical depth or measured depth and to define precisely how to measure 
depth.284 
If the depth limitation is stated by reference to a formation, the identity 
and location of the formation may be open to question. In addition, a 
special problem is likely to be confronted. When the agreement limits the 
assignment to the base of a specified formation or to some specified number 
of feet below the base of the formation, the formation must be identified 
and located, and its base must be clearly discernible. That task may be 
relatively easy, particularly in areas in which many wells have been drilled 
or where the lithology at the base of the formation changes abruptly and 
distinctly. In exploratory areas or in geologically complex areas, however, 
stating a depth limitation by reference to a formation may be an invitation 
for geologists to disagree. 
A similar problem arises when the description of the assignment refers to 
the “stratigraphic equivalent” of the depth drilled or of the formation 
penetrated. The term “stratigraphic equivalent” is used frequently in areas 
in which noncontiguous parts of the same formation may be found at 
substantially different depths because of overthrusting or faulting. The 
general effect of a reference to stratigraphic equivalent is to give the farmee 
the right to the benefits of its risk-taking by giving it the right to 
sedimentary strata it drilled, wherever found. 
The specific effect of limiting the depth earned to the stratigraphic 
equivalent may not be clear, however. There are several potential problems. 
First, the term has a deceptively reassuring sound; it suggests a 
                                                                                                                 
one hundred percent (100%) of the right, title and interest of such Farmor in 
those portions of the oil and gas leaseholds described in Exhibit “A” (down to 
and only down to the stratigraphic equivalent of the total depth drilled in the 
Earning Test Well) which are included within the spacing unit for the Earning 
Test Well as established by the applicable state oil and gas regulatory agency or 
by statute . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 201–05 (discusses objective depth); see also 
Niblack, Some Consequences of Horizontal Division of Oil and Gas Leaseholds, 8 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1963) (discusses how segregation is effected and rights and duties 
incident to operations of segregated estate). 
 284. See supra text accompanying note 201. 
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straightforward scientific test that in fact does not exist in every case. 
Reasonable geologists may disagree as to whether particular formations or 
zones are stratigraphic equivalents, and even articulate geologists may have 
difficulty explaining its application to judges and jurors in terms that they 
can understand.285 Second, the term stratigraphic equivalent is potentially 
ambiguous because it has at least three different meanings. Geologists 
recognize time-stratigraphic,286 biostratigraphic,287 and rock-stratigraphic 
equivalents.288 The parties to a farmout generally wish to refer to rock-
                                                                                                                 
 285. As I have worked as a consultant, arbitrator, and expert witness, I have formulated 
(with tongue only partly in cheek) what I call the “reasonable prudent law professor rule of 
complexity.” I am a reasonable, prudent law professor, of better than average intelligence 
and education, and if I cannot easily understand a concept or its application, neither will a 
judge or jury. “Stratigraphic equivalent” fails my test. 
This is not to say that “stratigraphic equivalent” should not be used as a limitation. One 
lawyer who replied to my request for comment said: 
Obviously, the term “stratigraphic equivalent” is less definite than a fixed 
measured depth, but it is no more indefinite than naming a particular formation 
(e.g., the ‘Upper Morrow Formation’) as the objective to be tested by the earn-
ing well—which, of course, is a common way to describe how deep the farmee 
must drill. In either case, geologists could (but usually do not) disagree. 
 286.  Time-stratigraphic equivalents are the sediments deposited and the rocks formed 
during a specific time; i.e., in a given era, epoch, or age. North American Commission on 
Stratigraphic Nomenclature, North American Stratigraphic Code, arts. 80, 81, in 67 AM. A. 
PETR. GEOL. BULL. 841, 869 (1983) [hereinafter Strat. Code]. The Stratigraphic Code uses 
the term “chronostratigraphic” rather than “time-stratigraphic.” Petroleum geologists 
generally use the latter term, however. For a comprehensive, practical discussion of 
terminology, see Owen, Commentary: Usage of Stratigraphic Terminology in Papers, 
Illustrations, and Talks, 57 J. SEDIMENTARY PETROLOGY 363 (1987). For example, 
geologists refer to sands deposited during the Pennsylvania Era, a time interval, as 
Pennsylvanian sandstones, a time-stratigraphic interval measured by thickness. Strat. Code, 
supra, arts. 66 and 67, at 868. Time-stratigraphic intervals are generally thicker than 
individual rock-stratigraphic intervals, which form most petroleum reservoirs. Consequently, 
they are not of immediate importance to petroleum geologists. A time-stratigraphic interval, 
therefore, will rarely be what the parties intend when they refer to “stratigraphic equivalent” 
in a farmout agreement; their reference is more likely to be to the potentially petroleum 
bearing rock layers themselves. 
 287. Bio-stratigraphic equivalents are rocks that contain similar fossils. WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 218 (3d ed. 1981). See also Strat. Code, supra note 
286, arts. 48 and 49, at 862. “Zones” are examples of bio-stratigraphic units. Id. art. 53, at 
863. Geologists frequently use zones as references. 
 288. Rock-stratigraphic equivalents are mappable rock layers with distinctive top and 
bottom boundaries. Strat. Code, supra note 286, arts. 22 and 23, at 855–58. (The 
Stratigraphic Code uses the term “lithostratigraphic,” but geologists generally use the term 
“rock-stratigraphic.”) The “formation” is the primary rock-stratigraphic unit. For example, 
the “Caseyville formation” is described in H. WILLMAN, E. ATHERTON, T. BUSCHBACH, C. 
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stratigraphic equivalency, and the way they identify the objective depth 
may suggest their intention.289  The parties should specifically define the 
term “stratigraphic equivalent,” however, as biostratigraphic or rock-
stratigraphic and, where possible, refer to well-defined “marker 
formations.”290 Third, a stratigraphic equivalent may not exist. A limit on 
depth earned to the “stratigraphic equivalent,” therefore, may not be a limit 
at all.291 To avoid this possibility, the farmout agreement should state a 
maximum depth to be earned.292 
                                                                                                                 
COLLINSON, J. FREY, M. HOPKINS, J. LINEBACK & J. SIMON, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS 
STRATIGRAPHY 163–83 (Illinois Geological Survey Bulletin No. 95, 1975). Formations may 
contain smaller rock-stratigraphic intervals that are designated as “members.” Strat. Code, 
supra note 286, art. 25, at 858. For example, in southern Illinois, the Pennsylvania-age 
Caseyville formation comprises four separate members. From top to bottom they are the 
Pounds Sandstone Member, the Drury Shale Member, the Battery Rock Sandstone Member, 
and the Lusk Shale Member. Stratigraphic sequence, or position, is the primary criterion 
used to distinguish between the sandstone members and the shale members. The distinctions 
are difficult to make; they cannot be made with only a short core sample, a hand specimen, 
or a small outcrop of the formation. Furthermore, none of the sandstone members is 
comprised only of sandstone or even one type of sandstone. For a discussion of local 
variability within the Pounds Sandstone and the Battery Rock Sandstone over a distance of 
eleven miles, see Koeninger & Mansfield, Earliest Pennsylvanian Depositional 
Environments in Central Southern Illinois, in DEPOSITIONAL AND STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF 
THE PENNSYLVANIAN SYSTEM OF THE ILLINOIS BASIN, PART 2; INVITED PAPERS; NINTH 
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CARBONIFEROUS STRATIGRAPHY AND GEOLOGY 76–81 (J. 
Palmer & R. Dutcher eds. 1979). Alternatively, geologists may describe rock-stratigraphic 
equivalents by reference to the type of sedimentary rock they constitute; e.g. the Caseyville 
Sandstone or the Battery Rock Sandstone. 
 289.  The most common way to designate an objective depth in a farmout is by naming 
an objective rock-stratigraphic unit, whether it is a formally designated formation or member 
(formally designated rock-stratigraphic units are listed in G. KEROHER, LEXICON OF 
GEOLOGIC NAMES OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 1936-1960 (United States Geological Survey 
Bulletin No. 1200 (1966)) or some other informally designated but locally recognized unit, 
such as the Red Fork Sandstone in Oklahoma. (The Red Fork Sandstone is informally, but 
effectively described in L. JORDAN, SUBSURFACE STRATIGRAPHIC NAMES OF OKLAHOMA 165 
(Oklahoma Geological Survey Guidebook No. 6, 1957)). As indicated above, a formation is 
a rock-stratigraphic unit. See supra note 288. This suggests that the parties intend that 
“stratigraphic equivalent” in the portion of the agreement limiting what is earned is meant to 
be “rock-stratigraphic equivalent.” If the objective depth is defined as a zone, the inference 
is that “stratigraphic equivalent” means “bio-stratigraphic equivalent.” No inference arises if 
the objective depth is stated in feet. 
 290. See supra note 289. 
 291. For example, a formation that has been broken by faulting may also have been 
pushed laterally a substantial distance so that an offset well drilled may never encounter the 
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An assignment of interest in a lease under a farmout agreement may 
cover all substances covered by the lease. A farmout that is not specifically 
limited will have this effect.293 Sometimes, however, an assignment of 
interest under a farmout specifically limits the substances covered to oil and 
gas, or to one or the other.294 The special circumstances of the parties will 
determine what substances a farmout covers. For example, the owner of a 
lease in a known oil producing area may be willing to farm out gas rights, 
but not oil rights.295 
                                                                                                                 
“stratigraphic equivalent” of the formation or zone in the earning well in any of the three 
senses discussed above. 
 292. For example: “In no event will Farmee earn any rights below a depth of
 feet.” 
 293. The rule of construction that a description that is not limited by reference to a 
fractional interest or to minerals or surface will be construed to be without limitation has 
been called the “100% rule.” See Ellis, Rethinking the Duhig Doctrine, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. 
L. INST. 947, 954 (1982). 
 294. For example, the following assignment is for gas rights alone: 
RIGHTS ASSIGNED: Subject to the terms and conditions set out herein, Owner 
hereby grants to Operator the exclusive right and privilege of exploring, testing, 
and developing the Operating Area for gas and, in connection therewith 
Operator shall be entitled to exercise all the rights and privileges granted the 
Lessee under the terms of said oil and gas lease as concerns gas and all of the 
gas production from the Operating Area as shall be owned by Operator subject 
to the following [royalties reserved]. 
(Emphasis added.) The following language conveys oil rights only: 
It is expressly provided that this farmout agreement only covers “oil and oil 
rights” and all rights, titles and interest ancillary or pertinent thereto, including 
without limitation all right, title and interest of farmor in and to casinghead gas. 
“Casinghead gas” as used herein is hereby defined as the same defined in the 
statutes, regulations and judicial decisions of the State of Texas to which 
reference is here made. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 295. Severing oil rights from gas rights can lead to dispute between the parties as to 
whether production is “oil” or “gas.” A precise chemical or scientific definition is difficult 
because variations in temperature and pressure both in the reservoir and at the wellhead 
determine whether hydrocarbons will be produced in liquid or gaseous state. The distinction 
can have enormous economic consequences, however. An example is the “white oil” dispute 
in the Texas Panhandle, in which owners of oil rights have argued that overproduction of gas 
has caused lighter components of oil to vaporize, and owners of gas rights have argued that 
gas was being produced as oil after artificial cooling. For general discussion, see Cartwright, 
Texas Tea on Ice, TEX. MONTHLY, Mar. 1985, at 98. Owners of oil rights appear to be 
winning that particular dispute. See Hufo Oils v. Railroad Comm’n, 717 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. 
App.—Austin 1986, no writ) (white oil was not oil for well classification purposes); Hufo 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/4
2017]        Farmout Agreements 349 
 
 
When the interest earned by the farmee is limited to gas or to oil, the 
agreement should address the definition of the substances covered. A 
simple way is by reference to the classification of the farmout well by the 
conservation authority; e.g., anything produced from a well classified as a 
gas well is considered to be “gas” for purposes of the farmout.296 If this 
approach is chosen, the agreement should also deal with what will happen if 
the conservation authority changes the classification of the well. An 
approach that protects the interests of both the farmor and the farmee is to 
continue the farmee’s rights to production from the well drilled, but to 
modify the acreage earned to conform to the spacing approved for the new 
classification of the well.297 
A farmout that covers oil but not gas, or gas but not oil, is an invitation 
to controversy. Because the meaning of “oil” and “gas” and “oil well” and 
                                                                                                                 
Oils v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 802 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1986) (white oil production may 
not be used to classify a well as an oil well under an operating agreement). 
 296. For example: 
the term “gas” as used herein shall mean gas, including all liquid hydrocarbons 
and other constituent elements produced from a gas well or gas pool, and the 
classification of a well as a “gas well” or a pool as a “gas pool” by the Oil 
Conservation Division of the Energy and Minerals Department of the State of 
New Mexico, or other governmental agency exercising like jurisdiction, shall 
be conclusive. 
 297. For example: 
 It is specifically agreed that if the [name of well] located in [description] is 
hereafter reclassified by the [conservation agency] as an oil well or if the pool 
from which said well is producing is hereafter reclassified by the [conservation 
agency] as an oil pool, then, and in that event, this Contract and Operating 
Agreement shall be automatically contracted and modified as of the date of 
such reclassification to cover an Operating Area consisting only of the 
[description] containing 40 acres, more or less, as concerns oil rights from the 
surface to the subsurface depth of 2,900 feet, but in no event below the base of 
the Formation. 
 The term “oil” as used herein shall mean any petroleum hydrocarbon pro-
duced from a well in the liquid phase and which existed in a liquid phase in the 
reservoir and any gas or vapor or both gas and vapor indigenous to and 
produced from a pool classified as an oil pool by the [conservation agency]. 
 If this Contract and Operating Agreement is contracted and modified in 
accordance with this Article X, at every place where the term “gas” or “gas 
rights” is used in this Contract and Operating Agreement, the term “oil” or “oil 
rights” shall be substituted therefor on and from the date of such contraction 
and modification. Except as expressly stated in this Article X, this Contract and 
Operating Agreement shall remain otherwise unchanged and unamended by the 
operation of the provisions of this Article X. 
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“gas well” is unclear in many states, a drafter should avoid the distinction 
unless the business deal requires it.298 
4. Percentage Earned 
The percentage earned by the farmee in the leases assigned is also of 
obvious importance to the parties. The higher the percentage, the better for 
the farmee. As discussed elsewhere, the working interest earned by the 
farmee in the well site acreage must at least equal the percentage of the 
drilling costs paid by the farmee if the farmee is to claim the intangible 
drilling cost deduction.299 Only rarely do farmout agreements fail to meet 
this standard.300 
The size of the percentage interest earned by the farmee in farmed-out 
acreage outside of the drill site unit, as well as the interest retained by the 
farmee after the farmor’s “back-in,” is subject to negotiation. One general-
ization that can be made, however, is that the interest earned by the farmee 
in drilling tends to be greater in times of economic downturn. When mar-
keting conditions make drilling less attractive, the farmor must sweeten the 
pot to entice the farmee to take the risk. On the other hand, the better the 
prospect being farmed out, the more attractive drilling becomes to the 
farmee, even for a smaller percentage of interest. Farmees must evaluate 
offers with common sense and an eye upon the market in the area. 
5. Nonoperating Interest Reserved 
Most farmout agreements provide that the farmor reserves a 
nonoperating interest in production from the earning well or wells during 
the payout period. Usually, the interest reserved is in the form of an 
overriding royalty interest,301 but other types of nonoperating interests may 
also be encountered. One author has suggested that the interests of the 
farmor may be better served in some circumstances by reserving a net 
profits interest rather than an overriding royalty.302 
                                                                                                                 
 298. See Cage, supra note 3, at 160. 
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 17–25. 
 300. The intangible drilling cost deduction is of great importance to the farmee. 
Depriving the farmee of this deduction is worth nothing to the farmor, since the farmor 
cannot claim the deduction unless it pays the costs. See id. 
 301. An overriding royalty is a royalty interest, an interest in production or proceeds free 
of the costs of production, carved out of the lessee’s interest in an oil and gas lease. E. 
KUNTZ, J. LOWE, O. ANDERSON & E. SMITH, supra note 5, at 427–28. 
 302. L. MOSBURG, supra note 3, at 283–84. Net profits interests frequently are reserved 
in California farmouts. See Himebaugh, supra note 3, at 23–24. 
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The reason for the retained nonoperating interest is the complete payout 
tax rule; the farmee must hold a working interest in the earning well until 
payout in order to obtain the full benefit of intangible drilling cost 
deduction.303 The farmor, on the other hand, will want to realize a cash flow 
from the farmout. Since the tax rules effectively bar the farmor from 
owning a portion of the working interest until payout, the farmor generally 
will reserve an overriding royalty interest. Thus, the interests of the farmee 
in obtaining full tax benefits and the interest of the farmor in obtaining a 
cash flow are both served when the farmor reserves a nonoperating interest. 
The economic impact of the nonoperating interest reserved by the farmor 
is extremely important to the parties’ business deal. In this respect the 
interests of the farmor and the farmee are in direct contradiction. The 
farmor will invariably seek a larger retained nonoperating interest rather 
than a smaller one. In boom times, the farmor commonly retains a l/8th 
overriding royalty. The farmee generally seeks to minimize the size of the 
nonoperating interest retained by the farmor. When the industry is in 
recession, farmees are usually more successful than when the industry 
enjoys prosperity. 
One commentator has suggested compromising the interests of the 
farmor and the farmee by providing for a sliding scale overriding royalty 
interest keyed to production.304 Another has noted that sliding scale 
overriding royalties do not work well in practice because “part of the 
incentive to improve production was taken away, there was an open 
invitation to questionable, if not fraudulent production control methods, and 
the accounting headaches were multiplied.”305 Today, the more common 
approach is an overriding royalty that increases after payout.306 
Drafting for a retained nonoperating interest presents interesting 
problems. One of the most important is whether the retained interest is to be 
inclusive or exclusive of existing burdens. A retained interest that is 
inclusive of existing burdens, typically the landowner’s royalty and 
overriding royalties created for landmen or geologists, places the risk of 
                                                                                                                 
 303. For a discussion of the complete payout principle, see supra text accompanying 
notes 22–25. 
 304. Hemingway, supra note 6, at 3, 5. 
 305. Cage, supra note 3, at 164. 
 306. For example, the following clause would increase the farmor’s retained overriding 
royalty after payout: “At payout (i.e., after such Well has paid to you from the working 
interest 100 percent of your expenses of drilling, completing, equipping and operating said 
well) farmor’s overriding royalty interest will increase to the difference between 30 percent 
(30%) and the royalties, overriding royalties, and/or other leasehold burdens.” 
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excess burdens upon the farmor, at least in part.307 Consider for example, 
the farmor that reserves an overriding royalty equal to the difference 
between existing burdens and 25% of total production because it believes 
that the lease is subject only to a 3/16th landowner’s royalty, when in fact 
the lease is also subject to a 1/16 overriding royalty reserved by the lease 
broker who originally took the lease. The overlooked “excess” overriding 
royalty will consume the farmor’s retained interest.308 In contrast, a retained 
interest that is exclusive of existing burdens places the risk of excess 
burdens upon the farmee from the start; the interest reserved is in addition 
to other burdens upon production.309 
A second problem relates to the possibility that the farmee will want to 
drill an additional well on the farmed-out acreage before the earning well 
has paid out. Will the farmor have the right to participate in the drilling of a 
second well, or should the farmor be limited to its nonoperating interest? 
The farmor and the farmee are likely to have conflicting economic interests 
at stake. If a farmor reserves a nonoperating interest convertible at payout 
to a working interest, the agreement should address what the rights of the 
farmor in a subsequent well drilled before payout will be.310 
                                                                                                                 
 307. An example of a retained nonparticipating interest that is inclusive of existing 
burdens is: “The assignment shall reserve to farmor an overriding royalty equal to the 
difference between existing lease burdens of record as of the date of this agreement and 
____ percent.” Another version states: 
Until farmee has recovered out of the proceeds from the sale of production 
from the Initial Test Well or Substitute Well all of the costs and expenses 
farmee incurs in the drilling, testing, completing, equipping and operating the 
Initial Test Well or Substitute Well, farmor will retain and reserve 6.25 percent 
overriding royalty interest, inclusive of all other overriding royalty interest and 
lease burdens above the normal 12.5 percent land owners royalty interest. 
 308. Of course, if known and unknown burdens exceed 25%, the excess burden will fall 
upon the farmee, unless there has been a warranty of title by the farmor. 
 309. An example of a retained interest exclusive of outstanding burdens is: 
Assignor reserves unto itself, its successors and assigns over, above and in 
addition to all royalties, overriding royalties and other burdens, if any, against 
the production from said leases, an overriding royalty of ____ of all of the oil 
and ____ of all of the gas, casinghead gas, condensate and other liquid or 
gaseous hydrocarbons produced and saved from or attributable to said leases 
during the terms thereof, including any extension or renewals taken within six 
months of termination of said leases . . . . 
 310. An example of a farmout provision reserving to the farmor the maximum flexibility 
with respect to additional wells drilled before payout is: 
If farmee decides to drill an additional well on any assigned acreage prior to 
payout of the earning well, farmor shall have the option to either (1) participate 
in the well or (2) be carried in the well while reserving the overriding royalty 
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Third, is the problem of pooling. The farmout agreement should make it 
clear that the farmee has the right to pool the farmor’s retained interest.311 
Otherwise, a question arises as to whether the farmee may pool and bind the 
farmor, particularly in Texas.312 
Finally, the clause providing for the retained nonparticipating interest 
should specify what costs, if any, the retained interest must bear. Overriding 
royalty interests are generally free of costs of production, but may be 
                                                                                                                 
and option to convert to a working interest as provided in [reference to 
reservation provision]. Should farmee choose (1) above, this choice shall be 
effective with respect to all of the assigned acreage, but farmor shall continue 
to be carried to payout on any well previously spudded. Should farmor choose 
(2) above, farmor’s election at payout shall be effective with respect to all of 
the assigned acreage when the first well to payout on the assigned acreage pays 
out, but farmor shall continue to be carried to payout on any well previously 
spudded. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 311. For example: 
[Pooling] Assignor grants Assignee, insofar as Assignor has the right to do so 
and subject always to the terms and conditions of the Leases herein assigned, 
the right to pool or combine said Leases with other leases or lands so as to 
establish units containing not more than 640 surface acres (plus 10% tolerance) 
for the production of gas well gas. In the event any Lease or Leases assigned 
herein is (are) pooled or unitized with other leases or lands for production of 
gas as hereinabove provided, the overriding royalty reserved herein shall, as to 
the lands covered by this Partial Assignment which are so pooled, be paid to 
Assignor in the proportion that the number of acres assigned herein and so 
pooled bears to the total number of acres in such pooled unit. 
It would be preferable for the clause to provide specifically that pooling by the farmee would 
bind the farmor’s reserved nonparticipating interest. 
 312. In Texas a pooling or unitization agreement does not bind the owner of a prior out-
standing royalty interest. MCZ Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 49, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Brown v. Getty Reserve Oil Co., 626 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex. 
App.—Amarillo 1982, writ dism’d). Contra 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 230, 
§ 221.1(7); Williams, Stare Decisis and the Pooling of Nonexecutive Interests in Oil and 
Gas, 46 TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1015–27 (1968). This doctrine originated in Brown v. Smith, 
141 Tex. 425, 431–32, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46–47 (1943). The court in Brown noted that an 
overriding royalty owner’s interest is real property under Texas law and that a pooling 
agreement involves a cross-conveyance of the joining parties interests. Id. Proceeding from 
this basis, the court held that absent any showing of intent on the part of the reserved royalty 
owner, the conferring of a mineral leasehold did not confer the right to dispose of the royalty 
owner’s property. Id. at 47. See Jones, Non-Participating Royalty, 26 TEX. L. REV. 569, 571, 
598–606 (1948) (discusses implications of Brown case). 
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subject to costs subsequent to production.313 The law on the issue is not so 
clear as to make specific drafting unnecessary, however. The meaning of 
the terms net profit interests, production payments, and carried interests is 
even less clear. Use of such terms invites litigation unless they are 
specifically defined.314 
6. Conversion 
The conversion provision of a farmout agreement addresses whether the 
retained nonoperating interest that the farmor retains to provide a cash flow 
will be converted at some point in time to a share of the working interest. 
There are three possibilities: no conversion, mandatory conversion, and 
optional conversion. Which of these the farmor or the farmee may prefer 
will depend upon circumstances and the goals of each. 
When the agreement lacks any conversion provision, the nonoperating 
interest retained by the farmor will continue as long as production from the 
well continues. That may be attractive to a farmor needing additional cash 
flow or commitment of reserves, or to one distrustful of the business 
acumen of the farmee, or anticipating marginal production. Omitting a 
conversion provision may also be attractive to a farmee expecting prolific 
production. A nonoperating interest (for example, a 1/16th overriding 
royalty) will be less of an economic burden if production is prolific than if 
it is marginal. Generally, however, the parties to farmout agreements are 
actively involved in the oil business and have a predilection in favor of full 
participation. Relatively few farmouts omit conversion provisions for the 
nonoperating interest retained by the farmor.315 
If the nonoperating interest retained is convertible to a working interest, 
the farmee generally prefers mandatory conversion.316 Mandatory 
                                                                                                                 
 313. See Cline v. Angle, 216 Kan. 328, 532 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1975). Often, a farmout 
clause that reserves an interest in the farmor will specifically state that the interest is free of 
all production costs. For example: “This overriding royalty shall be free and clear of all costs 
of production, gathering, completion, dehydration, trucking, transportation, marketing, 
treating, and taxes except applicable windfall profit, excise, ad valorem, gross production 
and severance taxes.” 
 314. See Aminoil USA, Inc. v. OKC Corp., 629 F. Supp. 647, 650–54 (E.D. La. 1986). In 
Aminoil the farmor and the farmee disagreed over whether actual or imputed interest and 
legal expenses were properly chargeable against the net profits account. Id. at 648. The jury 
was permitted to consider expert accounting testimony, since the agreement was not explicit. 
Id. at 650. 
 315. If the farmor does not have the right to convert its overriding royalty, the agreement 
may provide to increase it after payout. See supra note 306. 
 316. An example of a mandatory conversion provision follows: 
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conversion, or no conversion, gives the farmee additional certainty. The 
farmor, in contrast, generally prefers to maintain flexibility by retaining an 
option either to retain its overriding royalty or to “back in” to a working 
interest.317 The structure adopted usually reflects nothing more than the 
bargaining leverage of the parties. 
The conversion structure adopted may present some special drafting 
problems. One is whether the farmor that either elects not to convert its 
nonoperating interest into a working interest or is barred from doing so, has 
a right to participate in in-fill drilling. This is similar to the problem 
discussed above of whether the farmor should participate in drilling before 
payout, and similar drafting devices will deal with this situation.318 Another 
problem is the effective date of the conversion, whether mandatory or 
optional. Farmout agreements often make the conversion effective on the 
                                                                                                                 
If and only if, the test well is completed for the production of oil and/or gas, 
farmor shall assign to farmee 100 percent of its operating rights and working 
interest in the acreage within the designated drilling and spacing unit 
established by the Commission for the test well, excepting and reserving to 
farmor, in addition to any other overriding royalties or nonoperating burdens on 
production, an overriding royalty of 1/16th of an 8/8ths of all oil, gas and 
associated substances produced and saved from the test well until payout of the 
well, at which time the reserved overriding royalty of farmor shall terminate 
and 50 percent of the operating rights and working interest of farmor assigned 
under this subsection will automatically revert to farmor, and the test well, the 
material and equipment therein and thereon, and all production thereafter 
recovered therefrom and the operating rights and working interest in the farmed 
out lands in the drilling and spacing unit will be earned thereafter by farmor 
and farmee in equal 50 percent shares. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 317. An example of a conversion option is: 
If the Initial Well or any Subsequent Earning Well reaches the Objective Depth 
and is completed as a commercial well, and if it has been drilled in accordance 
with all of the terms and conditions of this agreement, farmee shall have 
earned, and farmor will deliver upon farmee’s written request an assignment of 
the oil and gas rights as defined in this Article. The assignment shall: 
* * * 
6. Reserve to farmor the option after payout to convert its overriding royalty to 
a ____ percent (____%) working interest in the assigned acreage and in all 
leasehold equipment, materials, and production. 
See also Scott, supra note 3, at 84–85 (¶ 6(d) of example agreement). 
 318. See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
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first day of the month following payout.319 While that approach may be 
administratively convenient, the delay may cost the farmor a substantial 
amount. The farmor with an option to convert will prefer to have its 
election effective immediately.320 
7. Payout 
As discussed above, the payout definition in a farmout agreement is of 
crucial importance if the farmee is to obtain the benefits of the intangible 
drilling cost deduction.321 For the farmee to obtain the full benefit of the 
deduction, it must own a share of the working interest of the well drilled 
equal to the percentage of the intangible drilling costs claimed until 
recovery of all of the costs of drilling, completing, equipping, and operating 
attributable to that interest.322 Conversion of the farmor’s retained interest 
must not occur before complete payout. Drafters have devised no “magic” 
language to express the complete payout definition.323 No tax problem 
should arise, however, so long as it is apparent that the complete payout test 
is satisfied.324 
Whatever the definition of payout adopted, the parties face the practical 
problem of determining whether payout has occurred. Most farmout agree-
                                                                                                                 
 319. For example: “Any such exchange [of an overriding royalty interest for a working 
interest] shall be effective as of 7:00 a.m. on the first day of the month after the month in 
which payout occurred.” See Cage, supra note 3, at 165. 
 320. See supra note 310, in which the quoted optional conversion provision continues: 
“The party shall promptly execute a recordable instrument setting forth farmor’s election, 
which shall be effective as of 7:00 a.m. on the first day following payout.” 
 321. See supra text accompanying notes 17–25. 
 322. For the language of the revenue rulings’ definition of complete payout, see supra 
note 22. 
 323. Some definitions do not even mention the term “payout”: 
At such time as Farmee has recovered out of its share of production from the 
Earning Test Well an amount equal to all costs to Farmee for all services and 
material necessary for developing, equipping, operating, and maintaining the 
Earning Test Well, including all drilling, testing and completion costs of said 
Earning Test Well, and for ad valorem, severance, and other taxes upon or 
measured by production and applicable to Farmee’s working interest share of 
production, each Farmor shall have the separate right to convert its reserved 1 
/16th of 8/8ths overriding royalty, as proportionately reduced pursuant to the 
provisions of Section ____ above, into a like proportion of an undivided fifty 
percent (50%) share of the working interest in the Earning Test Well site or 
portion thereof to which its said overriding royalty applied . . . . 
 324. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of “Payout” for tax purposes, see P. 
MAXFIELD & J. HOUGHTON, supra note 27, U 9.04[5], 
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ments provide for periodic reports from the farmee to the farmor.325 In ad-
dition many agreements give the farmor specific audit rights for an agreed 
time.326  Still, interpretive disputes frequently arise. In Humble Exploration 
Co. v. Amcap Petroleum Associates—1977327 the parties disagreed over 
whether the Windfall Profit Tax should be included with “production, 
severance or other similar taxes” in calculating payout.328 The court of 
appeals held that it should because for the farmee the tax was a liability that 
reduced the proceeds of production it actually received.329 In Continental 
Oil Co. v. American Quasar Petroleum Co. of New Mexico, Inc.330 the issue 
was whether expenses incurred by a farmee as the result of a blowout were 
to be taken into account even though they were covered by insurance.331 
The Tenth Circuit held that they were, because the farmout agreement did 
not require the farmee to obtain insurance, and the farmee could not claim 
the premiums paid as a cost in computing payout.332 In Mengden v. 
Peninsula Production Co.333 the dispute was whether production from 
pooled units was to be allocated wholly to payout of the farmout upon 
which the wells were located or apportioned between the farmouts in 
proportion to the acreage that each contributed to the units.334 The Texas 
Supreme Court held that apportionment was required on the basis of a 
labored interpretation of the agreement.335 These cases clearly suggest that 
payout should be defined as fully as the parties can agree. 
                                                                                                                 
 325. See Scott, supra note 3, at 85: 
Each calendar month following each assignment requested hereunder, and until 
the final notice of payout, Farmee will furnish Farmor a report showing in 
reasonable detail the monthly and cumulative status of payout and the 
supporting data therefor. Promptly after payout occurs, Farmee shall so notify 
Farmor and advise that the option is exercisable. 
* * * 
Id. 
 326. The agreement attached at Scott, supra note 3, at 85 continues, “For two years 
following each payout, Farmee shall maintain, and Farmor shall have the right to audit, all 
records pertaining thereto.” 
 327. 658 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 328. Id at 862. 
 329. Id. at 863. 
 330. 599 F.2d 363 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 331. Id. at 364. 
 332. Id at 365. 
 333. 544 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 1976). 
 334. Id. at 644. 
 335. Id at 648. 
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Another problem is how to handle money contributions that may be 
received by the farmee. Most farmouts are silent on this issue. When the 
farmout does address the issue, generally the parties will agree that the 
farmor and the farmee will share money contributions proportionately to 
their ultimate interests in the farmed-out acreage.336 The farmee would 
prefer to reserve contributions for itself, and that is sometimes done, 
particularly in agreements in which the farmor retains only a nonoperating 
interest without right of conversion.337 Of course, if the operating 
agreement is made effective upon the execution of the farmout agreement, 
the provisions of the operating agreement will govern.338 
  
                                                                                                                 
 336. The most common way of accomplishing this is to credit the amount of cash 
contributions to payout. For example: 
Farmoutor hereby relinquishes to farmoutee all of farmoutor’s working interest 
in said well and the production therefrom until such time, hereafter called the 
“payout”, as the gross revenue from said production (or market value, if taken 
or sold by farmoutee) equals the cost of drilling, testing, completing, equipping 
and operating said well, plus the cost of marketing production therefrom, but 
less any cash contribution for or on account of the drilling of said well. 
(Emphasis added.) Note, however, that the language does not address acreage contributions. 
 337. The parties probably assume that the farmee is entitled to keep contributions if the 
agreement does not address the issue. They should explicitly address this issue, however, to 
avoid argument as to whether an implied obligation to share contributions exists. Cf. Smith, 
Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest 
Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1 (1986) (discuss implied duties). 
 338. See art. VIII.C. of the AAPL 1977-610 Model Form Operating Agreement. This 
model provision provides: 
While this agreement is in force, if any party contracts for a contribution of 
cash toward the drilling of a well or any other operation on the Contract Area, 
such contribution shall be paid to the party who conducted the drilling or other 
operation and shall be applied by it against the cost of such drilling or other 
operation. If the contribution be in the form of acreage, the party to whom the 
contribution is made shall promptly tender an assignment of the acreage, 
without warranty of title, to the Drilling Parties in the proportions said Drilling 
Parties shared the cost of drilling the well. If all parties hereto are Drilling 
Parties and accept such tender, such acreage shall become a part of the Contract 
Area and be governed by the provisions of this agreement. If less than all 
parties hereto are Drilling Parties and accept such tender, such acreage shall not 
become a part of the Contract Area. Each party shall promptly notify all other 
parties of all acreage or money contributions it may obtain in support of any 
well or any other operation on the Contract Area. 
Id. The AAPL 1982-610 Model Form Operating Agreement contains a similar agreement. 
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a) Requiring More Than the Tax Rule 
Often the farmee and the farmor negotiate a variation on the payout 
concept. Depending upon the adversaries’ respective bargaining powers, 
they may define payment more liberally or more restrictively. 
So long as the complete payout tax rule is satisfied, the farmee is entitled 
to the full intangible drilling cost deduction. Thus, a farmout agreement 
drafted so that the event that will permit the farmor to convert its 
nonoperating interest to a working interest is some multiple of the cost of 
drilling, completing, equipping, and operating the earning well, will result 
in no adverse tax effect upon the parties. 
One circumstance in which the parties may agree that the payout 
definition should include expenses not required by the tax rules is when a 
substitute well has been drilled. So long as the substitute well is not 
considered to be a continuation of the initial well,339 tax law does not 
appear to require that the initial well’s costs be considered in computing 
payout. The farmee will certainly want them to be considered, however. 
Surprisingly, farmout definitions of payout rarely focus upon this issue. A 
farmout that contains a substitute well clause should specifically address 
whether the costs of drilling an unsuccessful initial well are to be taken into 
account in computing payout of the successful substitute well. 
b) Requiring Less Than the Tax Rule 
If the parties choose a definition of payout not as restrictive as that of the 
Internal Revenue Service, the farmee may lose a portion of the intangible 
drilling cost deduction. A classic example, called the “basket payout” 
problem,340 arises in the context of the multiple well farmout. In Revenue 
Ruling 80-109, the IRS denied deduction of 25% of IDCs incurred by a 
farmee who entered into a farmout agreement to drill wells on two 
noncontiguous tracts in exchange for 100% of the working interest in each 
tract until the aggregate income from both tracts equaled payout, after 
                                                                                                                 
 339. One could conceivably view a substitute well as a continuation of initial drilling 
operations, however, particularly when the farmee is obligated to drill the substitute well. 
See, e.g., Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 780–81 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(sidetracking operation part of drilling of initial well under art. VI.A. of 1977 Model Form 
Operating Agreement). Article VI.B.4 of the 1982 Model Form Operating Agreement 
attempts to clarify the ambiguity. 
 340. The term “basket payout” is used to describe the situation where the revenues from 
more than one well are used to compute payout. Brand, Acreage Contribution Trades, 
LANDMAN, May 1982, at 16. 
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which the farmee was entitled to a 75% working interest in each tract.341 
The IRS reasoned that because it was possible that one of the properties 
would pay out for the other, the complete payout principle was not 
satisfied.342 The basket payout problem can be avoided by drafting the 
payout provision of the multiple well farmout agreement so that payout is 
determined on an individual well basis.343 
8. Proportionate Reduction 
Farmout agreements generally contain proportionate reduction clauses 
for the same reason that they are found in oil and gas leases. In leases, the 
proportionate reduction clause protects the lessee against having to pay 
more than the percentage of royalty and the amount of other lease payments 
bargained for.344 If the lessor owns less than 100% of the mineral interest, 
the clause will proportionately lessen his royalty. In a farmout agreement, 
the proportionate reduction clause works to reduce the farmor’s retained 
nonoperating interest and the working interest to which it may be converted 
if the farmor owns less than the percentage lease interest that it purportedly 
has farmed out. 
Proportionate reduction clauses in leases and farmout agreements also 
involve much the same interpretative problems. The most common dispute 
is whether the parties intended that the proportionate reduction clause 
should apply in a particular situation. A farmout agreement typically deals 
with three “blocks” of property interests of different sizes and types 
belonging to the farmor. One block is the interest farmed out to the farmee. 
The second block is the nonparticipating interest reserved. The third is the 
                                                                                                                 
 341. Rev. Rul. 80-109, 1980-1 C.B. 129. 
 342. Id. 
 343. The following is a well-by-well payout provision: 
For these purposes, “payout” shall be deemed to occur when proceeds or 
market value of production from any well completed on the above described 
lands, (after deducting production taxes, royalty, overriding royalty and like 
burdens) shall equal 100% of Second Party’s actual cost of drilling, testing, 
equipping and completing the well, including the actual cost of any reworking, 
deepening or plugging back, plus 100% of the actual cost of operation of the 
well; the proceeds of production and the cost of such development and 
operation to be attributable only to the undivided interest subject hereto if less 
than the full interest in the oil and gas. Payout shall be determined and the 
option shall be exercised separately as to the proration unit around each well 
drilled on the above described land. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 344. J. LOWE, supra note 9, at 251. 
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interest to which the nonparticipating interest reserved converts after 
payout. An agreement can define all of these blocks as “net” percentages, 
without proportionate reduction, or it can state them as “gross” numbers, 
subject to proportionate reduction. Disputes arise when the parties mix 
these situations. 
Consider a situation in which a farmor signs a farmout agreement pur-
porting to farm out 100% of the working interest, subject to a 6.25% 
overriding royalty interest convertible to 50% of the working interest after 
payout, but the farmor only owns a 25% working interest. The stage is set 
for trouble if proportionate reduction provisions do not specifically apply to 
all three interests. If the proportionate reduction provision does not apply 
specifically either to the overriding royalty reserved or to the after-payout 
conversion right of the farmor, the farmee may find the economics of its 
deal substantially less attractive than it originally anticipated. If 
proportionate reduction does not apply to the interest farmed out, and the 
farmor has warranted title, the farmor may be liable. 
The drafting technique is easy to state, but difficult to apply consistently. 
The technique requires either that the farmout state all three of the farmor’s 
interests, the leases farmed out, the nonoperating interest reserved, and the 
after-payout conversion, in gross and then proportionately reduce them, or 
that all three interests be stated as “net” and none be reduced.345 
D. Administration 
Farmout agreements may include a variety of administrative provisions. 
Administrative provisions are not generally essential to the structure of the 
contract; the parties could perform under a farmout agreement if they were 
omitted entirely. Properly drafted administrative provisions make the 
parties’ relationship under the agreement smoother, however, and may be 
crucial to the business success of the agreement. Administrative provisions 
may be as important in particular situations as any of the essential issues of 
farmout agreements. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 345. The most common way of stating proportionate reduction provisions in farmout 
agreements is to provide that the farmout covers, and the farmee can earn, “all of Farmor’s 
right, title and interests” in operating rights and working interests in specified leases, and 
then to provide for proportionate reduction of the overriding royalty reserved and the 
working interest to which it may be converted in separate provisions. “Cleaner” 
draftsmanship would include a single proportionate reduction provision applicable to all 
three blocks of property interests. 
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1. Operating Agreement 
Because the farmor and the farmee are likely to end up owning working 
interests in a producing well or in leases that they may jointly develop, 
operating agreements accompany most farmout agreements.346 The parties 
often attach an operating agreement as an exhibit to a farmout agreement.347 
The parties may also incorporate the operating agreement by reference or 
refer to it in an agreement to agree.348 
An issue that the parties must address is when the operating agreement 
should become effective. The more common approach makes the operating 
agreement effective at the time that the farmor and the farmee become 
cotenants of the working interest. That may be after drilling of the earning 
                                                                                                                 
 346. Of course, if the farmor retains only a nonconvertible nonparticipating interest such 
as an overriding royalty, an operating agreement is not necessary. 
 347. For example: 
Farmor and Farmee agree to execute an Operating Agreement, in the same 
form as the instrument attached hereto as Exhibit B, which shall govern the 
conduct of operations pertaining to the Earning Well. Except as otherwise 
expressly provided in this Agreement, the terms and provisions of the 
Operating Agreement shall apply to and govern the rights and obligations of the 
parties with respect to all of the land included in the Drilling Unit for such well, 
the Leases included in such Unit, the Earning Well drilled thereon, the 
production therefrom, and the rights and obligations of the parties relating 
thereto, and shall be effective as of the date of commencement of operations for 
drilling the well with respect to which the Operating Agreement is executed. In 
the event of a conflict between the terms and provisions of the Operating 
Agreement and this Agreement, then the terms and provisions of this 
Agreement shall prevail and control. Any delay in executing the applicable 
Operating Agreement shall not prevent it from controlling the rights and 
obligations of the parties, and in such event the parties shall have the same 
rights and obligations as if the applicable Operating Agreement had been 
timely executed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 348. For example: 
If Farmor elects to exchange its reserved overriding royalty interest for a lease-
hold interest as provided for in Paragraph ____ above, then from the effective 
date of such exchange any and all further operations on the lands covered by 
the assigned lease(s) shall be pursuant to the terms of a mutually acceptable 
operating agreement which shall (a) designate you as operator; (b) use an 
identical accounting procedure as that attached hereto as Exhibit ____, except 
that the adjustment of overhead rates provided for in said accounting procedure 
shall be adjusted from the date of this Agreement and (c) provide for a 300% 
cost recoupment provision for non-consent operations through the wellhead. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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well when the farmee earns an interest as a cotenant with the farmee in 
acreage outside the drill site. When the farmee earns no interest in outside 
acreage, the operating agreement may become effective only when the 
farmor’s retained nonparticipating interest in the well converts to a working 
interest.349 
Another approach makes the operating agreement effective from the 
execution of a farmout, insofar as it does not conflict with the farmout 
agreement.350 This approach is appropriate when the farmee pays less than 
all the costs of drilling in return for a proportionate part of the working 
interest or when a conditional transfer occurs at the time the farmor and the 
farmee sign the agreement. Even when the farmor and the farmee are not 
co-owners, this approach offers the advantage of applying to what is often a 
very informal agreement the very detailed provisions of the model form 
operating agreement. The detailed provisions may not fit, however, and the 
farmor and the farmee may disagree as to whether they apply. Moreover, 
making the operating agreement effective upon execution of the farmout 
increases the risk to the farmor of vicarious liability.351 
2. Handling Lease Payments 
An administrative problem that most farmout agreements address is 
whether the farmor or the farmee is to make payments that may come due 
under the farmed-out leases. The most common structure provides that the 
                                                                                                                 
 349. The following is an example of a clause providing that the operating agreement will 
become effective only when the farmee and the farmor become cotenants: 
The Joint Operating Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit “C” and by 
reference made a part hereof will become applicable to all the Subject Lands to 
the depth provided in the assignment as provided in this agreement as follows: 
A. As to the Earning Test Well Site in which a Farmor may elect to convert its 
reserved overriding royalty interest to a working interest as provided in § 
11.2(b) above, upon the election of such Farmor to so convert. 
B. Immediately upon Farmee receiving an assignment of interest as herein 
provided as to all other of the Subject Lands and Subject Leaseholds. 
 In the event of a conflict between the provisions of this Farmout Agreement 
and the Joint Operating Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit “C”, the 
provisions of this Farmout Agreement shall control; provided that the 
provisions of the Operating Agreement concerning payment of rents, royalties, 
expenses, construction costs, drilling and exploration costs, judgment claims, 
liabilities, and liens and defense of lawsuits, and any other costs or liabilities 
incurred in respect of operations conducted pursuant to such Operating 
Agreement shall control with respect to such operations. 
 350. See supra note 347. 
 351. See infra text accompanying notes 406–38. 
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farmor will make all payments until the earned interest is assigned, subject 
to total or partial reimbursement by the farmee.352 This structure makes 
administrative sense even when the farmor assigns the interest upon 
execution of the agreement rather than after the drilling of the earning well. 
The risk of losing a lease as a result of making improper payment of delay 
rentals or shut-in royalties is minimized by having the farmor, which 
already has the leases “set up” on its administrative records, continue to 
make payments. Of course, the parties may agree to the contrary, as for 
example when the farmor is farming out and withdrawing from the active 
conduct of business. 
A related issue is what liability, if any, the farmor has if loss of title 
results from the farmor’s failure to make lease payments properly. Farmout 
agreements usually disclaim any liability by the party handling the 
payments for loss of title as a result of a failure to make payments 
properly.353 The rationale for limiting liability is that administration is 
undertaken as an accommodation, rather than for a profit from the 
administrative activity. 
3. Compliance with Leases 
Farmout agreements typically include general language obligating the 
farmee to comply with all express or implied covenants of the leases farmed 
                                                                                                                 
 352. For example: 
Farmors shall continue to pay delay rentals or shut-in royalties coming due 
after the date of this Agreement required to maintain in force any of said leases, 
and until completion of the Initial Earning Well or the earlier termination of 
Farmee’s rights hereunder, Farmee shall within thirty (30) days after receipt of 
billing by Farmors reimburse them for 50 percent of any delay rentals or shut-
in royalties so paid. Farmors shall also make any and all shut-in royalty 
payments that may become due to perpetuate any of said leases on which the 
Initial Earning Well is drilled hereunder, and will furnish Farmee within thirty 
(30) days from the date thereof copies of receipts evidencing timely payment. 
Farmee will reimburse Farmors for 100 percent of such shut-in royalty 
payments made with respect to the Initial Earning Well. Delay rentals and shut-
in royalties payable with respect to said leases (other than those within the 
spacing unit containing the Initial Earning Well) following the completion of 
the Initial Earning Well shall be borne 50 percent by Farmors and 50 percent by 
Farmee and shall be paid as provided in the Operating Agreement. 
 353. Scott, supra note 3, at 86, ¶ 10. This provides that: “Farmor shall pay any delay 
rentals, shut-in royalties or minimum royalties which may become due . . . [but] Farmor 
shall never be liable as a result of any failure to make such payments, or portion thereof, in a 
proper and timely manner.” Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 114–17 (discusses 
case with similar clause). 
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out.354 The genesis of such language is probably the farmor’s concern that 
courts will classify the transaction as a sublease so that the farmor will 
remain liable to its lessors for breach.355 A farmee should be aware that 
such language may impose upon it a risk of loss of its rights under the 
farmout, especially when the agreement requires absolute performance in 
order to earn.356 
4. Abandonment and Takeover 
Most farmout agreements contain provisions requiring the farmee to give 
notice of its intention to abandon a well that it is drilling or operating, and 
allowing the farmor to elect to take over operations. The reason for aban-
donment and takeover provisions is that commencement of drilling 
operations or production is a substantial potential benefit to the farmor, 
which the farmor does not want to lose because of premature abandonment 
by the farmee. Abandonment and takeover provisions give the farmor a 
second chance to drill or operate the farmed-out property. 
The abandonment clause commonly provides that the farmee has the 
right to abandon, if the farmee gives notice of its intent to abandon.357 
                                                                                                                 
 354. For example: 
Assignee hereby assumes and agrees to comply with all obligations and 
covenants, express or implied, imposed upon the lessee in the herein above 
identified Leases or contained in any intermediate assignments thereof insofar 
as concerns the interests and premises included in this Partial Assignment, and 
agrees to indemnify and save harmless Assignor from any risk, liability or 
expense of whatsoever kind accruing thereunder from and after the effective 
date hereof. 
 355. A farmout may well be classified as a sublease because of the rights that the farmor 
retains. See Klein & Burke, supra note 3, at 486–88. If so, the farmor may remain liable to 
its original lessor for breach by the farmee on a theory of privity of estate despite the 
language found in most oil and gas leases relieving the lessee of liability to the lessor after 
assignment of its interest. 
 356. See supra text accompanying notes 259–62. 
 357. The following provisions of § 5.1 of the draft AAPL Form 635 farmout agreement 
are typical: 
In the event any farmout well is completed as non-productive of oil or gas, or 
as one not capable of producing oil and/or gas in paying quantities or ceases 
production, farmee shall immediately give farmor written notice of the 
proposed plugging and abandonment. Farmor shall have thirty (30) days after 
receipt of such written notice within which to elect to take over the well for the 
purpose of conducting additional operations as it desires; except that if a 
drilling rig is on location, notice to plug and abandon may be given by 
telephone and farmor’s response shall be limited to forty-eight (48) hours, 
exclusive of Saturday, Sunday and legal holidays. In the event farmor fails to 
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When this approach is taken, the clause usually gives the farmor a specific 
period of time after receipt of notice within which to express its consent or 
to elect to take over. Consent is implied after the time has run. 
The farmee should note carefully the timing and procedures set forth for 
notice, because failure to comply will likely result in liability.358 In 
addition, the farmee will prefer that the takeover provisions relieve it of 
liability for the cost of rig time and plugging. Also, the farmee will want 
payment for the value of salvageable equipment that it leaves in the hole or 
on the lease after a takeover by the farmor.359 The farmor must examine the 
notice provisions carefully to insure that it has adequate time to make a 
decision about taking over the well, and that it can man an operation it takes 
over within the time provided. 
  
                                                                                                                 
advise farmee of its respective election within the predescribed period of time, 
then such well shall be plugged and abandoned by farmee in accordance with 
the terms hereof. Farmor shall have the right to take over such well using so far 
as necessary, at farmor’s expense, the tools and workmen of farmee. Farmor 
shall pay reasonable salvage value of material and equipment in and on said 
well, less the cost of salvaging same and acquire said well for its own use and 
purposes. 
The preceding language might not give the farmor the right to take over a well that the 
farmee abandoned before completion, for example, a well that the farmee abandoned under 
the escape provisions of the farmout agreement. The following language would avoid that 
limitation: 
Neither the Earning Test Well nor any Substitute Well shall be abandoned 
without the prior written consent of farmor first had and obtained or without 
forty-eight (48) hours prior notice having been given by farmee to farmor. 
Farmor may elect within said forty-eight hour period to examine and make tests 
of said Earning Test Well or a Substitute Well at its sole cost and risk. Farmor 
may within said forty-eight hour period or prior to the conclusion of its tests, 
whichever occurs later, but in no event later than three days after its receipt of 
notice from farmee, elect to take over from the farmor, said Earning Test Well 
or a Substitute Well so examined . . . . 
 358. Cf. Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner, 12 S.W.2d 847, 848–49 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Austin 1929, writ ref’d) (oil company held liable for a failure to reassign lease as contract 
required).  See infra text accompanying notes 362–65. Proof of damages would be difficult, 
since a well that the farmee decides to abandon probably has little demonstrable market 
value. Arguably, however, a court might measure the damage as the cost of drilling a well to 
the depth at which the farmee abandoned operations. See Fite v. Miller, 196 La. 876, 200 So. 
285, 289–90 (1940); Ardizonne v. Archer, 72 Okla. 70, 178 P. 263, 265–66 (1919). 
 359. Glass, supra note 3, at 16. For appropriate language, see supra note 357. 
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5. Reassignment Provisions 
The obligation of the farmee to reassign the lease rights subject to the 
farmout agreement goes hand in hand with the right of the farmor to take 
over drilling operations and the right of the farmee to abandon drilling or 
operations. If the farmout is of the conditional assignment form, reassign-
ment provisions are necessary to clear title, even if the assignment is struc-
tured as a determinable interest that automatically terminates if the farmee 
does not perform.360 Reassignment is particularly important if the original 
assignment was recorded. Even if the farmout is of the agreement to 
transfer form, release and reassignment of rights that may have been earned 
are desirable to bar title claims at a later date. The reassignment clause may 
also become important when the lease farmed out has ceased to produce in 
paying quantities. If the farmee decides not to work over, recomplete, or 
redrill, the farmor may wish to get back its operating rights so that it may 
act, but may not feel safe in asserting the right to operate without formal 
reassignment.361 
Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner362 illustrates the role of the reassignment 
clause. In Gladys Belle the court held a company that failed its 
reassignment obligation liable for damages equal to the value of the leases 
that should have been reassigned.363 The farmout agreement provided that 
“if the [farmee] should desire . . . to surrender any of said leases or not to 
prosecute development . . . he will reassign said lease or leases . . . not less 
than ninety days before [they] will expire . . . .”364 Both the farmor and the 
                                                                                                                 
 360. The well takeover clause often includes reassignment provisions. For example: 
“Farmee shall, if requested to do so by Farmor, reassign said lease acreage insofar as it 
covers the portion being surrendered, expiring or abandoned to Farmor free of any 
encumbrances suffered by, through or under Farmee.” Or the clause may provide: 
We shall thereafter [after notice] have the portion for thirty (30) days to require 
you to make a reassignment of the assigned premises or that portion thereof 
that you wish to surrender or abandon. Such reassignment shall be free and 
clear of all lease burdens, overrides and payments out of production in excess 
of or in addition to those previously existing. 
 361. Of course, if the farmor and the farmee have operated the producing property as 
cotenants, the operating agreement reassignment provisions will apply. See, e.g., art. VIII.A. 
of the 1982 AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement. 
 362. 12 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1929, writ ref’d); see also McLaughlin v. 
Ball, 431 S.W.2d 305, 306–07 (Tex. 1968) (suit by assignor against assignee of oil and gas 
leases for failure of assignee to give assignor written notice of assignee’s election to 
surrender leases resulting in assignor being denied opportunity to reacquire leases). 
 363. 12 S.W.2d at 848–49. 
 364. Id. at 847. 
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farmee assigned their interests. Ultimately, the farmee’s assignee permitted 
one of the leases to expire, and the farmors’ assignees sued. The appellate 
court sustained damages awarded by the trial court, noting that though the 
parties to the suit were not in privity of contract, the rights and obligations 
created by the contract were independently assignable.365 The reassignment 
clause is not mere space filler. 
Generally, reassignment provisions require that the farmee represent that 
the leases reassigned are free of liens or warrant clear title except as to 
clouds that existed before the farmee took the property.366  This approach is 
consistent with the obligations typically imposed upon a farmee to “conduct 
operations at no cost to the farmor” and to indemnify the farmor against 
loss. Some farmout agreements have no reassignment provisions, however, 
relying upon the abandonment and takeover provisions alone. Specific 
reassignment provisions can be classified into at least three different 
general forms: (a) perpetual assignment with reassignment obligation, (b) 
automatic reversion, or (c) reversion by declaration. Each may present 
problems. 
a) Perpetual Assignment with Reassignment Obligation 
The most common reassignment form is a contractual obligation to reas-
sign, like that in Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner.367  The advantage of such a 
formulation, particularly when it is coupled with an assignment placed of 
record, is that it imposes upon the farmee the duty to plug an abandoned 
well and restore the premises.368 The disadvantage of a contractual 
obligation to reassign is that the farmor may have difficulty compelling the 
farmee to reassign, particularly if the farmee has subleased or assigned 
interests to others. 
b) Automatic Reversion 
A second common formulation is to draft the reassignment provision so 
that the farmed-out interests revert automatically to the farmor if the farmee 
abandons or ceases production.369 One problem with this approach is that 
                                                                                                                 
 365. Id at 849. 
 366. See supra note 360. 
 367. See supra text accompanying note 362. For the language of an example clause, see 
supra note 360. 
 368. Of course, the agreement of the farmor and the farmee as to responsibility for plug-
ging or restoration will not preclude the state from asserting its police powers to the 
contrary. See infra text accompanying notes 436–38. 
 369. For example: 
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terms like “abandonment” and “cessation of production” may not have clear 
meanings, and litigation may result. Furthermore, the right of reversion may 
expose the farmor to liability for plugging or restoration just as surely as 
owning a contractual right to reassignment.370 
c) Reversion upon Declaration 
A theoretical drafting alternative is to provide that after no production for 
some specific time, or after production has fallen to some agreed level for a 
specific time, the farmor can cause the farmed-out interest to revert to the 
farmor by filing a declaration of reversion. Language similar to that found 
in lease pooling clauses might be used.371 
6. Area of Mutual Interest Provisions 
Because the farmor and the farmee become “economic partners” under a 
farmout agreement, farmouts sometimes include “area of mutual interest” 
provisions, usually referred to as “AMI provisions.” An AMI provision 
gives the farmor and the farmee the right to share in interests acquired by 
the other in a designated contract area, which may be the same as or larger 
                                                                                                                 
[The assignment shall] [b]e effective as of the date of well completion and pro-
vide for reversion to Farmor of ail rights assigned upon the earlier of (a) thirty 
(30) days after cessation of all production from or allocated to the assigned 
premises unless production is restored or operations for restoration of 
production are commenced within the thirty (30) days and production is 
restored within a reasonable time after commencement of such operations, (b) 
forty-five (45) days prior to any lease termination, or (c) the shut-in of the last 
producing well on the assigned acreage for more than one (1) year. Farmee 
shall evidence the reversion by a reassignment to Farmor, free and clear of all 
liens, claims or encumbrances, except those existing at the date of this 
agreement; provided, however, the reversion shall be effective whether or not 
Farmee reassigns to Farmor. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 370. See infra text accompanying notes 434–38. 
 371. There are practical difficulties, however, with providing for reversion of the 
farmee’s interest upon the filing of a declaration by the farmor. First, since the procedure is 
not specifically authorized by statute, it may merely cloud title. Second, recording officers 
may refuse to accept such declarations or refuse to index them where they will appear in the 
chain of title. Perhaps the most workable method of obtaining reassignment at the will of the 
farmor is to have the reassignment executed and delivered to the farmor at the time of the 
initial assignment, subject to the understanding that it will be recorded only upon default. It 
is likely that few farmees will agree to this, however. 
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than the farmout contract area, upon agreed terms.372 AMI clauses are 
particularly common in exploratory farmouts. 
Area of mutual interest provisions are not peculiar to farmout 
agreements, and have been the subject of analysis elsewhere.373 Two 
particularly important problems should be noted in this discussion of 
farmout agreements, however. One is whether an AMI provision that is not 
limited in time violates the rule against perpetuities. A Kansas case holds 
                                                                                                                 
 372. An example of an area of mutual interest clause follows: 
Article X. (a) If either farmor or farmee acquire, during the period from 
execution of this agreement to the expiration of one year from the completion 
of the last earning well (i.e., either the initial earning well or a subsequent 
earning well) under this agreement, any oil and/or gas interest or right to 
acquire such interest in lands within the Area of Mutual Interest depicted on 
Exhibit “A” hereto and within a spacing unit containing a well drilled or 
proposed to be drilled under this agreement and containing a portion of Said 
Leases, the acquiring party shall offer the non-acquiring party, in the manner 
provided for in Article XV.F. of the operating agreement, an undivided 50 
percent so acquired to the extent contained within such spacing unit. All 
operations on any such interest in which the non-acquiring party elects to 
participate shall be governed by Exhibit “C” hereto and the operating 
agreement. 
(b) If during the period described in Article X.(a) above either farmors or 
farmee acquire any oil and/or gas interest or right to acquire such interest in 
lands within the boundaries of the area of mutual interest and outside all 
spacing units containing wells drilled or proposed to be drilled under this 
agreement, then (i) if the interest is acquired by purchase, the acquiring party 
shall offer the non-acquiring party an undivided 50 percent of the interest so 
acquired and (ii) if the interest is acquired by farming or other agreement 
requiring the drilling of a well or performance of other act besides the payment 
of money in order to earn or acquire the interest, the acquiring party shall offer 
the non-acquiring party an undivided percentage interest in the acquisition 
sufficient to vest 25 percent thereof in farmors and 75 percent thereof in 
farmee. Such offer shall be made and accepted in the manner provided in 
Article XV.F. of the operating agreement. All operations on any such interest in 
which the non-acquiring party elects to participate shall be governed by Exhibit 
“C” hereto [drilling, geological, and engineering requirements] and the 
operating agreement. 
In the absence of a specific AMI provision, the courts will not likely give either the farmee 
or the farmor the right to share in interests or leases acquired on adjacent acreage. See Opco 
v. Scott, 321 F.2d 471, 472–73 (10th Cir. 1963). But see Smith, Duties and Obligations 
Owed by an Operator to Nonoperators, Investors, and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY 
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, 12-49 to -57 (1986). 
 373. See Zarlengo, Area of Mutual Interest Clauses Regarding Oil and Gas Properties: 
Analysis, Drafting, and Procedure, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 837, 837–83 (1982) 
(checklist for analysis and drafting). 
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that an area of mutual interest agreement is purely contractual, that it is not 
subject to the rule against perpetuities because it creates no rights in real 
property.374 An AMI clause in a farmout may also be held to be within an 
exception to the rule for options to extend leases, if it is viewed as implied-
ly limited to the duration of the leases.375 However, it has been argued that a 
perpetual AMI might well violate the rule, so that the AMI provision should 
be specifically limited in time.376 
A second and more practical concern to one drafting or analyzing an 
AMI clause in a farmout agreement is what land or leases are to be subject 
to the AMI provision. The parties should specifically define the 
geographical area to which the AMI applies. In addition, the clause should 
address what kinds of interests are subject to the mutual interest provisions. 
Are surface interests, mineral interests, and royalty interests to be covered 
as well as leasehold interests? What about property acquired that may be 
partly within and partly outside of the contract area? Finally, the provision 
should address whether, if the farmor or the farmee acquires several 
properties at once, the election to acquire will apply to the package as a 
whole or permit the nonacquiring party to pick and choose among the 
properties.377 
7. Restrictions upon Assignment 
Farmout agreements often include restrictions upon assignment. From 
the farmor’s view, a restriction may be a practical necessity. The farmor, 
having located a farmee that it considers skilled, trustworthy, and solvent, 
wants to be certain that the rights given by the farmout are not transferred to 
a farmee that possesses none of those attributes. If the farmor wishes to 
                                                                                                                 
 374. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, 678 P.2d 118, 127 
(1984) (quoting Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 258 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 
Civ. App.—Galveston 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 298 
S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1957), modified, 158 Tex. 397, 312 S.W.2d 197 
(1958)). 
 375. See Zarlengo, supra note 373, at 850, discussing the exception of the RESTATEMENT 
OF PROPERTY § 395 (1944). 
 376. Id. Zarlengo, supra note 373, at 849–50. For specific language that limits the AMI 
agreement to one year after completion of the last earning well, see supra note 373. If the 
farmout agreement specifies a completion date for the earning well, such language almost 
certainly will comply with the rule against perpetuities. If there is no specific completion 
date, however, a well commenced possibly could not be completed within the perpetuities 
period. An interesting subissue of AMI clauses, if the clause violates the rule against 
perpetuities, is whether the clause is void or whether the whole farmout agreement is void. 
 377. Zarlengo, supra note 373, at 872–76. 
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restrict assignment of rights under the farmout, it must do so specifically 
and unambiguously.378 Courts will strictly interpret restrictions,379 and will 
not imply them from the terms of a reassignment clause in the farmout.380 
The farmor may pay a price for restricting assignment, however. Usually 
the farmor’s goal is to get a well drilled on the farmed-out acreage. To the 
extent that the restriction against assignment makes it difficult for a farmee 
                                                                                                                 
 378. Probably the most common formulation is a flat proscription. For example: “This 
Agreement shall not be assigned in whole or in part by Farmee without the prior written 
consent of Farmor.” Some proscriptions of assignment are more specific, probably in an at-
tempt to avoid an implied limitation of “reasonableness”: 
No provision of this agreement or of any assignment [lease] made or issued 
hereunder shall be modified, altered or waived except by the express written 
agreement of Farmor. This agreement is personal to Farmee, and Farmee shall 
have neither the right nor the power to assign this agreement, in whole or in 
part, to another party without the express prior written consent of Farmor 
thereto. Likewise, Farmee shall have neither the right nor the power to assign 
any interest, in whole or in part, under any assignment [lease] made or issued 
pursuant hereto without the express prior written consent of Farmor thereto. 
Farmor may withhold its consent to any such proposed or attempted assignment 
for any reason or no reason in the sole discretion of Farmor. Any attempted 
assignment made in contravention of this provision shall be, at Farmor’s sole 
option (and in addition to any other remedy available to Farmor at law or in 
equity), voidable and of no force and effect. The granting of consent by Farmor 
to any such assignment shall be effective only as to the specific assignment 
then the express subject of such consent, and all subsequent assignments which 
may be proposed or attempted shall likewise be expressly subject to the 
hereinabove stated and reserved rights, power and authority of Farmor. 
Some parties have couched proscriptions in affirmative language, though their effect is still 
to limit: “This AGREEMENT shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the Parties 
hereto and their successors and assigns; provided, however, Farmee shall make no 
assignment of its rights hereunder without Farmor’s prior written consent.” 
 379. Gladys Belle Oil Co. v. Turner, 12 S.W.2d 847, 848–49 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 
1929, writ ref’d). A reassignment clause in a farmout provides that the farmee will reassign 
to the farmor any leases transferred under the agreement that it decides to surrender or not to 
develop. See supra text accompanying notes 360–71. 
 380. See Rainbow Oil Co. v. Christmann, 656 P.2d 538, 546–47 (Wyo. 1982). In 
Rainbow Oil Co. the court held that a right of first refusal included in a farmout agreement 
obligating the farmees to offer to sell the interest earned back to the farmor if the farmees 
“shall elect to sell their interest” was not triggered by a company officer’s transfer of 
interests to his company in satisfaction of his fiduciary obligations or by a gift to one of the 
farmees’ children. Id. at 543–44. In Palmer v. Liles, 677 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court held that a restriction on assignment without 
written consent did not create a right of first refusal, but merely gave rise to a claim for 
actual damages suffered. Id. at 663. 
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to raise money by assigning interests, it may be counter-productive.381 Thus, 
the parties may choose to make the rights of the farmee freely assignable,382 
to permit assignment to identified parties,383 to permit assignment when the 
proposed assignee is financially strong,384 to permit assignment when it is 
likely to be conducive to getting the property drilled,385 or to limit the 
restriction in time.386 
                                                                                                                 
 381. Glass, supra note 3, at 15. 
 382. A clause that permits assignment, but specifically keeps the original farmee 
obligated to the farmor is: 
The rights hereunder may be assigned in whole or in part by Farmee, but, prior 
to the date when an assignment or lease is earned hereunder, if Farmee assigns 
an interest in the Farmout Interests pursuant to this letter agreement, Farmee 
shall remain liable to Farmor and Farmor shall have the right to look solely to 
Farmee in connection with any cause of action it may have with respect to this 
agreement, to the same extent as if such assignment had not been made by 
Farmee. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 383. The following is an example of a clause that permits assignment to identified 
parties: 
This Agreement shall not be assigned in whole or in part . . . . However, 
Farmor specifically agrees to allow Farmee to make an assignment to its 
participants in the ____ Exploration Program, namely, ____. These participants 
currently share in all costs and liabilities of the Program with Farmee. Also, 
Farmor agrees to allow ____ to make an assignment to an affiliate. 
When such language is used, the agreement should define “affiliate.” 
 384. The following language addresses financial suitability as a basis for permitting 
assignment: 
Farmee shall not assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of any rights hereunder 
without first obtaining written consent from Farmor; provided however that 
Farmor shall neither unreasonably deny or delay its assent to such request if 
Farmee satisfies Farmor that its proposed assignee exercises at least the same 
degree of financial responsibility as Farmee. This agreement shall be binding 
upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, 
successors and assigns. 
 385. For example: 
The following assignments, conveyances and successions of a Farmee’s rights 
and interests under this Agreement may be effected without the prior written 
consent of Farmor, to-wit: 
(i) a conveyance by reason of the death or legal incapacity of a party 
comprising Farmee; 
(ii) a conveyance to a spouse or issue of a party comprising Farmee; 
(iii) a conveyance to a trust for the benefit of a spouse or issue of a party 
comprising Farmee; 
(iv) a transfer to another party comprising Farmee; 
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In addition, the farmor faces a risk that courts will regard a broadly 
drafted restriction upon assignment as an unenforceable disabling restraint 
against alienation.387 Most lawyers look to landlord and tenant law as they 
draft restrictions on assignments in farmout agreements, reasoning that the 
farmor’s interest in restricting earning rights under the farmout and operat-
ing rights after the farmed-out acreage has been earned is as important as 
the identity of the tenant to a landlord.388 The analogy overlooks the fact 
that the nature of an oil and gas lease differs from a real property lease. The 
former is either a fee simple determinable estate in land or a determinable 
profit à prendre or license, rather than a mere term of years. Courts are 
more likely to tolerate restrictions upon alienation that will eventually 
                                                                                                                 
(v) a transfer to a joint venture or partnership (general or limited) of 
which a party comprising Farmee is a member and has the sole 
authority, irrevocably during the term of such entity, to act for such 
entity with respect to the properties that are the subject matter of 
this Agreement. 
All other assignments, conveyances and successions of a Farmee’s rights and interests 
under this Agreement shall be effected only with the prior written consent of Farmor, 
which consent will not be withheld unreasonably. 
 386.  A restriction limited in time follows: 
Assignee agrees not to assign, either in whole or in part, its interest in said land, 
or in the oil or gas to be produced therefrom, without the written consent of 
Assignor, the restriction to be effective for fifteen (15) years from the date 
hereof Any assignment shall contain a limitation requiring that the written 
consent of Assignor must be obtained prior to any further assignment. No such 
assignment or assignments, although made with the written consent of 
Assignor, shall subject said land or any portion thereof, to any overriding 
royalty, payments out of production, net profit obligation, carried interest or 
any other obligation in addition to those created under the terms hereof. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 387. A disabling restraint is one that expressly denies the grantee the power to transfer 
the estate or declares any attempt to transfer automatically void. Except when used in 
spendthrift trusts, disabling restraints are always held void. R. BERNHARDT, REAL PROPERTY 
IN A NUTSHELL 77 (West 1982). 
 388. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 410 (1936) provides that: 
A promissory restraint or forfeiture restraint on alienation of a legal possessory 
estate for years is valid if, and only if 
(a) the estate for years is created as the result of a business transaction, 
the requirements of the rule against perpetuities are satisfied and the 
restraint is 
(i) imposed at the time the estate for years is created, or 
(ii) agreed to thereafter as a business transaction by the persons who 
are in the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . . 
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terminate than those that may be perpetual.389 Though no court appears to 
have thoroughly discussed the issue, a Canadian commentator has argued 
that broad restrictions on assignment in farmout agreements should not be 
enforceable.390 
A step short of declaring restrictions upon assignment to be invalid 
disabling restraints is to reason that they are not covenants running with the 
land, but mere personal service covenants. When this characterization is 
adopted, restrictions upon assignability are valid only as to executory 
contracts, because after performance “the contract is no longer one for 
personal services and the reason for non-assignability no longer exists.”391 
Following this reasoning, the Tenth Circuit upheld an order requiring 
specific performance of a promise to convey acreage under a farmout in 
Socony Mobil Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co.392 when the farmee’s 
assignment to which the farmor objected took place after the earning well 
had been drilled.393 
Something less than a complete proscription can, in most cases, meet the 
farmor’s interest in restricting assignability. The parties can restrict 
assignment until the farmee performs the farmout contract, but permit it 
thereafter, since the interests of the farmor are most acute while drilling is 
progressing.394 When the farmor’s likely reasons for objecting to an 
assignment can be identified, the farmout agreement can specifically spell 
out those reasons, and limit assignment in those circumstances.395 Assign-
                                                                                                                 
 389. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 406, 407, 410 (1973). A limitation upon 
the restriction similar to that supra in note 386, therefore, is doubly attractive. 
 390. Nowack, Restrictions Against Alienation in Agreements Relating to Oil and Gas 
Interests, 23 ALBERTA L. REV. 62, 73–74 (1985); see also Scott, Restrictions on Alienation 
Applied to Oil and Gas Transactions, 31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1 (1985) (discusses 
restrictions on assignment in agreements). 
 391. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Hartford Accident & Ins. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 
325 P.2d 899, 904 (1958). 
 392. 335 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1964). 
 393. Id. at 442. 
 394. For example: 
It is agreed that the Farmee’s rights and interests under this contract shall not be 
assigned prior to the time that the Farmee has earned the interest provided for 
in this agreement by drilling a conforming well; provided, however, that after 
the Farmee has earned an assignment of interest under this agreement, the 
Farmor agrees that Farmee may assign the interest so earned in whole or in 
part. 
 395. For example, the following: 
Farmee shall not assign any interest in this Assignment until it has given 
Farmor notice of the complete details of the proposed transaction and Farmee 
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ment may also be barred subject to the farmor’s consent, “which consent 
shall not be unreasonably withheld.”396 “Reasonableness” limitations 
should prevent classification of a restriction upon assignment as a disabling 
restraint.397 Finally, the agreement may permit the farmee to make partial 
assignments so long as it remains the operator and legally responsible to the 
farmor.398 
8. Calls on Production, Options to Purchase, and Prior Commitments 
Some integrated oil companies with refining capacity routinely include 
in their farmout agreements calls on production, options to purchase, or 
prior commitments. A farmor whose purpose in farming out is to obtain 
reserves or to acquire access to market may also include these devices. A 
call on production gives the holder a right to require another to sell its share 
of production to a purchaser designated by the farmor.399 An option to 
                                                                                                                 
has received Farmor’s written consent to assign. Farmor will not unreasonably 
withhold its consent to assign, but consent may be withheld when Farmor, in its 
sole discretion but in good faith, believes such assignment may diminish the 
value of Farmor’s rights, reservations, and exceptions under this Assignment. 
Of course, the more specific the standard the better. 
 396. For example: 
Farmee, for itself, its successors and assigns, covenants and agrees that prior to 
the drilling and completion of the Earning Test Well and Farmee’s compliance 
with the performance of all of the terms and provisions of this agreement, it 
will not transfer or assign this agreement without the prior written consent of 
Farmor, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
Often, the parties will couple a “reasonableness” limitation with more specific limitations. 
For example language, see supra note 385. 
 397. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 406 comment i (1973). This section 
includes a list of factors that tend to support a conclusion that a restraint is either reasonable 
or unreasonable. Id. Section 407 of the Restatement makes these factors applicable to 
defeasible possessory estates in fee. Id. § 407. 
 398. Glass, supra note 3, at 15; see supra note 382. 
 399. A very broad call might read as follows: 
 6.1 Oil Production. Farmor shall have a continuing option to purchase 
Farmee’s share of oil and liquid hydrocarbons produced and saved from the 
Farmout Lands through standard lease separator facilities, to the extent such 
production is attributable to the interest assigned to Farmee hereunder. The 
option may be exercised by Farmor at any time and from time to time while 
such production continues, by giving written notice thereof to Farmee not less 
than 30 days before the date on which farmor’s purchases are to commence. 
The price paid by Farmor for such production shall be equal to the prevailing 
wellhead market price then being paid in the same field for production of the 
same or similar grade and gravity, or if there is no such prevailing price being 
paid in the same field, the prevailing price being paid in the nearest field. 
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purchase is more limited. It gives the holder a right to purchase another’s 
production, but only if the other elects to sell.400 A prior commitment binds 
both the farmor and the farmee to a sales contract.401 
                                                                                                                 
Farmor may terminate its purchases by giving written notice thereof to Farmee 
not less than 30 days before the date of termination. 
 6.2 Gas Production. Farmor shall have the option to purchase Farmee’s 
share of gas, including casinghead gas, produced and saved from the Farmout 
Lands through standard lease separator facilities, to the extent such production 
is attributable to the interest assigned to Farmee hereunder. When Farmee’s gas 
becomes available for purchase initially and at any time thereafter, Farmee 
shall so advise Farmor in writing and Farmor shall have 60 days thereafter to 
give Farmee written notice of Farmor’s election to purchase the gas at the 
prevailing wellhead market price paid for gas at the same or similar quantity 
and quality in the same field (or if there is no such price then prevailing in the 
same field, then in the nearest field in which there is such a prevailing price) 
pursuant to comparable purchase contracts entered into on the same or nearest 
preceding date as the date of Farmor’s election to purchase gas hereunder. 
T. FAY, supra note 3, at 57. 
 400. An option to purchase might read as follows: 
Assignor reserves and is hereby given the optional preferential right at any time 
and from time to time to enter into a contract to purchase or designate a 
purchaser for all of Assignee’s gas produced from said land, such right to be 
exercised as follows. If Assignee elects to sell gas production and shall receive 
a bona fide offer acceptable to it to purchase such gas production, it shall 
promptly furnish Assignor written notice thereof and Assignor shall have 
ninety (90) days after receipt of such notice to elect either to enter into a 
contract to purchase such gas on the same terms and conditions of such offer, 
or to designate a third party purchaser of such gas on either the same terms and 
conditions or (in its sole judgment) on more favorable terms and conditions to 
Assignee, and if any such third party purchaser is designated, such designation 
shall be binding on Assignee. If Assignor fails to notify Assignee within said 
ninety (90) day period of its election to exercise such right, then it shall have no 
right to exercise said preferential right during the contract term. If Assignor 
does not exercise such optional preferential right and for any reason Assignee 
shall not thereafter accept said offer, or if Assignee accepts said offer and the 
resulting contract expires or is terminated or renegotiated, then the foregoing 
reservation of said optional preferential right shall continue in full force and 
effect and said optional preferential right shall apply with respect to any new 
offer or renegotiated offer to purchase gas from said land. 
 401. An example of a prior commitment clause for gas follows: 
All interests in natural gas and casinghead gas presently owned by farmee 
within the area of interest, and all interests in natural gas and casinghead gas 
hereafter owned, or, controlled by farmee within the area of interest will be 
subject to a gas purchase contract with farmor as buyer and farmee as seller, a 
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Calls on production and options to purchase present drafting problems. 
The duration of the call or the option, how and when it may be exercised, 
and how to determine the price to be paid for production are issues that the 
parties must address as specifically as possible to avoid the objection that 
the call or option is an unenforceable agreement to agree. Prior 
commitments present similar problems when the contract terms are to be 
determined later. 
All of these devices may present unsettled legal issues. Whether calls on 
production or options to purchase create interests subject to the rule against 
perpetuities is uncertain. To avoid the issue, some drafters limit calls and 
options to the perpetuities period402 and require that the contract to which 
production is committed be executed with the farmout.403 Another area of 
concern is that calls, options, or prior commitments may violate federal or 
state antitrust laws. Whether antitrust is a real problem will depend upon 
the characteristics of the companies involved, the amount of land subject to 
the call, option, or prior commitment, and the competition in the area. 
A third unsettled issue is whether a call, option, or prior commitment 
may subject the farmor and the farmee to corporate taxation, which would 
sharply limit the value of the intangible drilling cost deduction and the 
percentage depletion allowance to both parties, as well as subject them to 
double taxation of distributions. A farmout transaction creates an associa-
tion taxable as a corporation if it possesses sufficient corporate characteris-
tics.404 To avoid corporate taxation, the parties to oil and gas transactions 
                                                                                                                 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit ____. Said gas purchase contract is 
being executed contemporaneously with the execution of this agreement. 
Sometimes the commitment will be to enter into a contract at a later date on terms prevailing 
in the market at that time. In such cases, a prior commitment may contain price terms much 
like those of the call seen supra note 399. 
 402. For example: 
We shall have and shall reserve the optimal right for a period of twenty-one 
(21) years from the date hereof, to purchase all oil produced and saved from the 
lands and leases committed hereto at the prevailing market price; said price is 
meant to be that price being paid in the immediate field for oil of like kind, 
quality and gravity, in like quantities and under contracts providing for similar 
conditions and durations, such price to be determined from month to month. 
Some courts might imply a “reasonable” limitation upon the duration of the call. Rex Oil Co. 
v. Busk, 56 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 1953). 
 403. See supra note 401. 
 404. Treas. Reg. § 301,7701-2(a)(l) as amended in 1983 lists six corporate 
characteristics: associates, a joint profit objective, continuity of life, centralization of 
management, limited liability, and free transferability. For minerals transactions, whether 
title is in the name of one of the parties may be a seventh factor. 
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ordinarily structure the arrangement so that each has the right to take 
production in kind or separately dispose of it. One of the essential 
characteristics of an association taxable as a corporation is a joint profit 
objective.405 If the parties have the right to take in kind, they have no joint 
profit objective; they have separate individual profit objectives. When 
production is subject to a call, an option to purchase, or a prior 
commitment, the farmout agreement does not meet the literal requirements 
of an association taxable as a corporation. 
Perhaps the reason that calls on production, options to purchase, and 
prior commitments do not appear more frequently in farmout agreements, 
however, is the chilling impact that they have upon the business deal of the 
parties. In the usual situation, neither the farmor nor the farmee wants to tie 
up its share of production from the farmed-out property. Each prefers to 
reserve the flexibility to sell production at a later time. 
9. Liability, Insurance, and Indemnity 
The risks inherent in oil and gas drilling are enormous. People may be 
injured, massive pollution may occur, and great cost overruns are routine. 
Therefore, both the farmor and the farmee should be concerned about their 
potential liability, and the insurance and indemnity provisions of the 
farmout agreement. 
a) Liability 
The farmor and the farmee may assume that each will be liable only for 
its own contracts and torts since the relationship of the parties is no closer 
than that of cotenants. Nevertheless, the relationship established under a 
farmout agreement may provide grounds for vicarious liability. These 
include (i) joint ventures and mining partnerships, and (ii) liability as a 
record title owner. 
(1) Joint Ventures and Mining Partnerships 
A joint venture is “a special combination of two or more persons, where, 
in some specific adventure, a profit is jointly sought, without any actual 
partnership or corporate designation.”406 It is a partnership for a single 
transaction. A mining partnership is an association of two or more persons 
to jointly conduct a business and to share in the expenses, profits, and 
                                                                                                                 
 405. I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126 and I.T. 3948, 1949-1 C.B. 161 reason that if the parties 
have the right to take in kind, there is no joint profit objective. For a discussion of this 
subject, see Houghton, Braden & Harris, supra note 59, at 6-8 to -10. 
 406. Griffin v. Reilly, 275 S.W. 242, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1925, no writ). 
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losses of the enterprise.407 It is a cross between a tenancy in common and a 
true partnership.408 
The joint venture and mining partnership concepts may be viewed as 
separate409 or as indistinguishable.410 Either theory or both may be used to 
impose liability upon the farmor or the farmee for damages or expenses 
incurred in drilling under a farmout agreement.411 The classic case in the 
area is Shell Oil Co. v. Prestidge.412 In Prestidge the court held Shell liable 
as a joint adventurer for injuries suffered by Prestidge while Shell’s farmee 
drilled at a site in Idaho.413 The court held that the farmout agreement and 
the actions of Shell’s employee satisfied the elements of a joint venture: a 
contract between the parties, substantial contributions to the enterprise, and 
joint control.414  
A recent unreported case from Oklahoma that imposed liability upon a 
nonoperator under an operating agreement on the basis of a mining partner-
ship illustrates how that theory may be used against the parties to a farmout. 
In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Crystal Exploration & Production Co.415 the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found both the operator and Crystal, a non-
operating working interest owner, liable to pay for services and material 
provided by Dresser.416 The court held that a mining partnership requires a 
                                                                                                                 
 407. Ellis v. Lewis, 119 Okla. 201, 202, 249 P. 295, 296 (1926). 
 408. Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir. 1927). 
 409. The primary distinction between a joint venture and mining partnership is that the 
former has the characteristic of delectus personae; that is, the death or bankruptcy of one of 
the partners terminates a joint venture, and a joint venturer has the right to exercise choice in 
admitting new members to the enterprise. In contrast, a mining partnership does not 
automatically terminate upon death or bankruptcy; the purpose of the relationship is mining, 
and since that purpose would be thwarted and the property damaged by debate over new 
partners, the mining partnership interest is freely transferable. Munsey v. Mills & Garitty, 
115 Tex. 469, 480–89, 283 S.W. 754, 758–62 (1926). 
 410. In Smith v. Rampy, 198 S.W.2d 592, 594–98 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1946, no 
writ), the court used the terms interchangeably. 
 411. Brimmer, Mining Partnerships, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 85, 95 (1969). See 
generally Boigan & Murphy, Liabilities of Non Operating Mineral Interest Owners, 51 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 153, 164–82 (1980) (discusses contract and tort liability of mining 
partnerships and joint ventures); Fiske, Mining Partnership, 26 INST, ON OIL & GAS L. & 
TAX’N 187 (1975) (discusses generally mining partnerships and joint ventures); Jones, 
Mining Partnerships in Texas, 12 TEX. L. REV. 410, 414–31 (1933) (discusses elements of 
mining partnerships in Texas). 
 412. 249 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1957). 
 413. Id. at 416. 
 414. Id. 
 415. No. 84-1160 (10th Cir. July 12, 1985). 
 416. Id. slip. op. at 6–7. 
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joint interest in the property, an express or implied agreement to share in 
the profits and losses of the venture, and cooperation in the project.417 The 
court’s analysis focused on whether sufficient cooperation existed to 
impose liability.418 The court held that management or conduct of 
operations by the nonoperator was not necessary.419 It was sufficient that 
Crystal: 
kept in close contact with Schick [the operator], receiving almost 
daily reports; Crystal asked for and received completion 
procedures prior to their implementation in order to allow its 
engineers time to discuss the procedures with Schick; Crystal 
made recommendations regarding procedures with Schick and 
Schick accepted them; employees of Crystal visited the location 
and discussed procedures with Schick and engineering 
consultants hired to drill and complete the well.420 
These comments could refer to a farmor’s activities under many farmout 
agreements.421 
A realistic assessment of the risk of liability as a mining partner or joint 
venturer in a farmout agreement is difficult because precisely what will 
trigger liability is uncertain. In Blocker Exploration Co. v. Frontier 
Exploration, Inc.422 the Colorado Supreme Court held that a cotenant of an 
oil and gas lease is not liable as a mining partner unless the cotenant takes 
an active role in the conduct of operations or the agreement gives the 
cotenant a right to participate in management or control.423 The court stated 
that “co-ownership alone does not give rise to a mining partnership.”424 
                                                                                                                 
 417. Id at 4. 
 418. Id. at 4–6. 
 419. Id. at 5. 
 420. Id at 5–6. 
 421. Of course, the facts will vary from situation to situation: 
If the farmoutor simply waits to be advised of completion of the earning work, 
and upon verification makes the necessary assignment, in the absence of any 
other involvement, it probably is not a mining partnership. But if the farmoutor, 
with or without specific provisions in the agreement, injects himself into the 
drilling effort by offering or providing assistance, or exercising influence or 
discretion, then he may be committing himself to mining partnership status 
with the farmoutee. 
Fiske, supra note 411, at 207–08. 
 422. 740 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1987). 
 423. Id at 987. 
 424. Id. at 985. 
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Both Texas and Oklahoma courts have made similar comments.425 The 
Colorado court noted that: 
[A] non-operating working-interest member “should not be 
considered, without more, a mining partner if his only rights are 
to take in kind, receive reports, inspect books, make an election 
of whether to join in a particular phase of exploration/ 
development (commonly known as a ‘go-no-go’ decision), or 
has the right of approval of specified expenditures.”426 
Quoting the court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court held that “the 
determining factor is related to the degree of active participation in control 
or management of the venture that is exercised by a co-tenant or co-
owner.”427 
As a practical matter, the ease with which liability as a mining partner or 
joint venturer is triggered may differ from state to state. Oklahoma and 
Arkansas apparently require less than Colorado and Texas. Oklahoma 
apparently requires only (1) a joint interest in the property, (2) an 
agreement to share in profits and losses, and (3) cooperation in the project 
to establish a mining partnership.428 Arkansas may impose liability upon 
virtually any cooperative drilling arrangement on a joint venture theory.429 
Colorado and Texas, however, have not embraced the joint venture theory. 
                                                                                                                 
 425. See, e.g., Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 144 Tex. 475, 486–87, 
191 S.W.2d 716, 722 (1945); Templeton v. Wolverton, 142 Tex. 422, 428, 179 S.W.2d 252, 
255 (1944); Rucks v. Burch, 138 Tex. 79, 82–83, 156 S.W.2d 975, 976 (1941); Texas Oil & 
Gas Corp. v. Vela, 405 S.W.2d 68, 76–77 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1966), rev’d, 429 
S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968); Nolen v. Rig-Time, Inc., 392 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also McAnally v. Cochran, 170 Okla. 368, 46 
P.2d 955, 957 (1935). 
 426. 740 P.2d at 988 (quoting the Colorado Court of Appeals in Blocker, 709 P.2d 39, 
42–43). 
 427. Id. at 985 (emphasis in original) (quoting 709 P.2d at 42). 
 428. The Dresser case, supra note 415, is an example of the liberal Oklahoma view of 
what it takes to constitute a mining partnership. See also Oklahoma Co. v. O’Neil, 440 P.2d 
978, 984–85 (Okla. 1968) (evidence supported finding that mining partnership or joint 
venture in development and operation of oil and gas leases existed between plaintiff and 
defendants). 
 429. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, Inc., 282 Ark. 268, 668 S.W.2d 
16, 17 (1984). In Hawkins the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the 1977 model form 
operating agreement established a joint venture between the operator and the nonoperator. 
Id. at 17. Although the issue before the Arkansas Supreme Court was whether the operator 
owed a duty to the nonoperator, the court’s reasoning in finding a duty would also result in 
the imposition of liability upon the nonoperator. 
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In Colorado and Texas a plaintiff who seeks to establish a mining 
partnership must prove the right or exercise of “control” over the 
development of the property, rather than mere cooperation.430 
Because what will result in liability as a joint venturer or mining partner 
is uncertain, the parties should take great care in drafting the farmout agree-
ment. The parties should, and routinely do, disclaim status as partners or 
co-adventurers,431 though such “bootstrapping” language is not 
determinative.432 In evaluating any farmout proposal, a reviewer must take 
into account a substantial and ever-present risk of liability. The possibility 
that insurance or indemnification can protect against such liability is 
discussed below.433 
(2)  Liability by Status as Record Title Owner 
A court may impose liability on the basis of a party’s status as an owner 
of property. In Houser v. Brown434 an appellate court held that one who 
acquired an oil and gas lease upon which there were unplugged oil wells 
                                                                                                                 
 430. See Blocker Exploration Co. v. Frontier Exploration, Inc., 740 P.2d 983, 987 (Colo. 
1987). Frontier is an example of the relatively strict view of what it takes to impose liability 
as a mining partnership. See also Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 648 S.W.2d 316, 320–
21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1982, no writ) (when operator of oil and gas well had full control of 
all operations, operator and nonoperator working interest owner were not a joint venture); 
Dunigan Tool & Supply Co. v. Carroll, 60 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1933, 
writ ref’d) (to establish mining partnership, joint ownership of mining property, joint 
operation, shares of profits, community of interest, and mutual agency necessary). For an 
excellent discussion of the cases from the various states, see Boigan, Liabilities and 
Relationship of Co-Owners Under Agreements for Joint Development of Oil and Gas 
Properties, 37 OIL & GAS INST. 8-1, 8-39 to -48 (1986). 
 431. For example: 
The liabilities of the Farmor and the Farmee hereunder shall be several and not 
joint or collective, and nothing in this Agreement or in any instrument executed 
or delivered pursuant hereto shall be deemed to create a partnership, 
association, joint venture or agency relationship between the parties or to create 
any fiduciary obligation between them. No party hereto shall have the authority 
to bind any other party hereto for any obligation or otherwise to act as agent for 
another party for any purpose whatsoever, it being understood that all opera-
tions conducted by farmee as operator hereunder and under the Operating 
Agreement are conducted as an independent contractor not subject to the 
control or direction of Farmee as to the means or manner of performance. 
Such disclaimers may also buttress the position of the farmor and the farmee that they are 
not an association taxable as a corporation. See supra note 404. 
 432. Gragg v. James, 452 P.2d 579, 587 (Okla. 1969). 
 433. See infra text accompanying notes 439–45. 
 434. 29 Ohio App. 3d 358, 505 N.E.2d 1021 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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was liable to plug those wells, despite the fact that he did not know they 
existed when he purchased the lease.435 While the problem is not the fault 
of the lessee, he has a connection with the property that justifies application 
of the state’s police power. This reasoning could result in liability being 
imposed upon either party to a farmout for the default of the other. The 
Texas court of appeals in Austin applied similar reasoning in Railroad 
Commission v. Olin Corp.436 when it found a nonconsenting nonoperator 
under an operating agreement liable for plugging after the operator 
defaulted.437 The court held that the nonoperator’s reversionary rights was 
sufficient to support the liability.438 The inference is clear that the appeals 
court would find a farmor liable for a farmee’s default in plugging. 
The rationale of these cases may be extended to mechanics liens, surface 
restoration, and other potential liabilities. Again, though drafters should 
attempt to avoid liability by including boilerplate language in the farmout 
agreement, it is unlikely to be effective. Insurance, indemnity, and the 
financial stability of one’s economic partner are better protections. 
b) Insurance 
Even without a recognized theory of liability, both the farmor and the 
farmee are likely to find themselves in court if someone is hurt in drilling or 
operating. Many farmout agreements therefore specifically provide that the 
farmee must carry substantial insurance for liabilities such as workers’ 
compensation, employers’ liability, contractual liability, public liability, 
and automobile liability.439 A surprising number of the farmout agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 435. 505 N.E.2d at 1024. 
 436. 690 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 437. Id. at 631. 
 438. Id.; see Conine, Rights and Liabilities of Carried Interest and Nonconsent Parties in 
Oil and Gas Operations, 37 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N 3-1 (1986). 
 439. For example: “Farmee shall during its operations hereunder, maintain workmen’s 
compensation insurance and general liability insurance with bodily injury limits of $300,000 
per occurrence and property damage insurance with a limit of $100,000.” A more 
comprehensive example follows: 
During the term of this agreement, farmee shall provide the following 
minimum insurance coverage: 
(1) Worker’s Compensation Insurance in accordance with the laws 
of the State of Texas; 
(2) Employer’s Liability Insurance, with limits of not less than 
$500,000 per accident; 
(3) Comprehensive General Liability Insurance including 
contractual liability coverage insuring the indemnity agreement 
in this agreement with limits of not less than $500,000 for 
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reviewed, however, contained no insurance provisions. When the farmout 
agreement does not impose an obligation upon the farmee to provide insur-
ance, the operating agreement may.440 Article VII.G. of the 1982 Model 
Form Operating Agreement requires the operator to provide insurance for 
the joint account of the parties.441 Two problems exist with the provision, 
however. First, article VII.G. refers to an exhibit, which may not include all 
the desired coverages or amounts of coverages.442 Second, the operating 
agreement may not take effect at least until the farmee has earned its 
interest and perhaps until payout triggers the farmor’s conversion right.443 If 
the farmor relies upon the operating agreement to provide for insurance 
coverage, care must be taken that the operating agreement will be effective 
                                                                                                                 
bodily injury, sickness or death in any one occurrence and 
$500,00 for loss of or damage to property in any one 
occurrence; and 
(4) Comprehensive Automobile Liability Insurance covering all 
vehicles used by farmee, with minimum limits of $500,000 
applicable to bodily injury, sickness or death in any one 
occurrence and $500,000 for loss of or damage to property in 
any occurrence. 
For liabilities assumed hereunder by farmee its insurance shall be endorsed to 
provide that the underwriters waive subrogation against farmor and its agents 
and employees. Prior to the commencement of drilling operations, farmee shall 
furnish farmor with evidence of the required coverage. Any assignee of farmee 
shall comply with these requirements. Such evidence shall be furnished to 
farmor at [insert address] and shall identify the Contract Acreage. 
 440. See supra text accompanying notes 346–51. 
 441. Art. VII.G. of the 1982 A.A.P.L.-610 Model Form Operating Agreement (Kraftbilt, 
Tulsa) provides: 
 At all times while operations are conducted hereunder, Operator shall 
comply with the workmen’s compensation law of the state where the operations 
are being conducted; provided, however, that Operator may be a self-insurer for 
liability under said compensation laws in which event the only charge that shall 
be made to the joint account shall be as provided in Exhibit “C.” Operator shall 
also carry or provide insurance for the benefit of the joint account of the parties 
as outlined in Exhibit “D”, attached to and made a part hereof. Operator shall 
require all contractors engaged in work on or for the Contract Area to comply 
with the workmen’s compensation law of the state where the operations are be-
ing conducted and to maintain such other insurance as Operator may require. 
 In the event automobile public liability insurance is specified in said Exhibit 
“D”, or subsequently receives the approval of the parties, no direct charge shall 
be made by Operator for premiums paid for such insurance for Operator’s 
automotive equipment. 
 442. Id. 
 443. See supra text accompanying note 349. 
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during all operations under the farmout.444 The preferable approach is for 
the farmout to contain its own insurance provisions.445 
Unfortunately, providing for insurance coverage in the farmout is not a 
cure-all either. First, the farmor must ensure that the farmee actually obtains 
and maintains the required coverage. The farmor can do this in a variety of 
ways, including itself holding the policy and paying the premiums. Second, 
an insurance policy is no better than the coverage provided, and many 
policies specifically exclude or limit coverage for risks such as 
environmental pollution and blowout. Finally, the obligation to defend 
imposed by an insurance policy extends only to those designated as insured 
parties.446 
c) Indemnification Provisions 
Because of the risk of liability inherent in drilling arrangements and the 
uncertain protection of insurance, most farmout agreements contain provi-
sions requiring the farmee to indemnify the farmor against liability.447 Less 
often, the agreement will include an agreement of the farmor to indemnify 
the farmee. Of course, any indemnification is no better than the resources of 
the party offering it. 
                                                                                                                 
 444. Arguably, the insurance provisions of article VII.G. of the 1982 AAPL Model Form 
Operating Agreement are inconsistent with a typical agreement to transfer farmout, because 
the interests of the parties under the farmout are dissimilar from those of the operator and 
nonoperators under the operating agreement. 
 445. See, e.g., the second example supra note 439. 
 446. See Texaco, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem., 453 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (E.D. 
Okla. 1978). In Texaco Judge Joseph B. Morris ruled that an insurance company was not 
required to defend a claim against Texaco as a result of an explosion at a gas station because 
the policy in question covered the gasoline transporter and did not name Texaco. Id. at 1112. 
The court rejected the contention that the transporter was the agent of Texaco on the grounds 
that Texaco and the transporter had stipulated to the contrary. Id. at 1113. While the court 
specifically reserved the issues of liability and indemnity under the insurance policy, the 
case stands as a warning to farmors, and all nonoperators, because farmout agreements, and 
operating agreements, usually disclaim an agency relationship. One can deal with the 
problem, of course, by obtaining an endorsement to the policy. For a hair-raising discussion 
of the limits of liability insurance, see Boigan, supra note 430. 
 447. For example: 
Maintenance by farmee of said insurance is in no manner to be considered a 
limitation of the indemnities set out herein. To the extent allowed by law, 
farmee shall indemnify and hold farmor harmless from and against any and all 
claims for damages for every kind to persons or property arising out of or in 
connection with farmee’s operations on the lease, including claims based on 
acts of farmee’s contractors, successors, and assigns, except as to any liability 
arising out of operations and/or actions of the farmor . . . . 
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There is good reason for cross-indemnification. The greater risk is that 
the farmor will be targeted in a suit brought as a result of the farmee’s 
actions, since the farmee controls the drilling operations. The farmor will 
generally have representatives at the well site, however, and their 
negligence may expose the farmee to liability. 
A point to examine closely is whether the indemnification provision 
purports to indemnify the parties from their own negligence. The farmor 
may insert a provision totally shifting risk even for its own negligence.448 
More likely, the parties will agree to a “knock-for-knock” provision making 
each responsible for its own employees, contractors, or subcontractors 
regardless of negligence.449 Or, the farmor may convince the farmee that it 
                                                                                                                 
 448. For language that specifically excludes the operations or actions of the farmor from 
the indemnity, see supra note 447. The following provision, taken from a drilling contract, is 
not so limited. In fact, it specifically provides that the contractor will indemnify the company 
against claims of “the Company’s employees” . . . and damages to “property of the Com-
pany” including those “arising out of the sole or concurrent negligence of the Company”: 
Contractor agrees to protect, defend, indemnify and hold the Company, its 
employees, directors, officers, free and harmless from and against any and all 
losses, claims, liens, demands and causes of action of every kind and character 
and costs thereof including without limitation judgments, penalties, interest, 
court costs and any legal fees incurred by the Company in defense of same 
(including attorneys fees incurred in enforcing this indemnity), arising in favor 
of any party, including, without limitation governmental agencies, Contractor’s 
employees, the Company’s employees, or any third party, on account of claims, 
liens, demands, debts, personal injuries, death, damage to property including 
property of the Company, and all other claims of any character, which arise out 
of, result from or are in any way connected with Contractor’s work or its 
acts . . . including losses, claims, liens, demands and causes of action of every 
kind and character arising out of the sole or concurrent negligence of the 
Company to the full extent such indemnification is permitted by the applicable 
law. Contractor further agrees to investigate, handle, respond to, provide 
defense for and defend any claims or suits at its sole expense and agrees to bear 
all costs and expenses related thereto . . . . 
 449. An example of a knock-for-knock indemnity provision, taken from the American 
Petroleum Institute’s Model Form Drilling Contract 4C1 (1st ed. Feb. 1983) follows: 
 11.3 Contractor agrees to protect, defend, indemnify, and save Operator, its 
joint owners’ and their respective officers, directors, and employees harmless 
from and against all claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind and 
character, without limit and without regard to the cause or causes thereof or the 
negligence of any party or parties, arising in connection herewith in favor of 
Contractor’s employees or Contractor’s subcontractors or their employees, on 
account of bodily injury, death, or damage to property. If it is judicially deter-
mined that the monetary limits of insurance required hereunder or of the indem-
nities voluntarily and mutually assumed under Subparagraph 11.3 (which 
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should accept a modified knock-for-knock provision making the farmee 
responsible for the negligence of the farmor’s contractors and 
subcontractors as well as its own, on the theory that the farmee is in control 
of wellsite operations and therefore responsible for safety. 
Those drafting or analyzing indemnification provisions should be aware 
that state statutes may limit their effect. Several states, including Texas, 
have enacted anti-indemnity statutes that void agreements to the extent that 
they indemnify a party for its negligence or that of its employees, contrac-
tors, or agents.450 The policy of such legislation apparently is to redress the 
                                                                                                                 
Contractor and Operator hereby agree will be supported either by available lia-
bility insurance, under which the insurer has no right of subrogation against the 
indemnitees, or voluntarily self-insured in part or whole) exceed the maximum 
limits permitted under applicable law, it is agreed that said insurance require-
ments or indemnities shall automatically be amended to conform to the maxi-
mum monetary limits permitted under such law. 
 11.4 Operator agrees to protect, defend, indemnify, and save Contractor and 
its officers, directors, employees and joint owners harmless from and against all 
claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind and character, without 
limit and without regard to the cause or causes thereof or the negligence of any 
party or parties arising in connection herewith in favor of Operator’s employees 
or Operator’s contractors or their employees, other than those parties identified 
in Subparagraph 11.3, on account of bodily injury, death, or damage to 
property. If it is judicially determined that the monetary limits of insurance 
required hereunder or of the indemnities voluntarily and mutually assumed 
under Subparagraph 11.4 (which Contractor and Operator hereby agree will be 
supported either by available liability insurance, under which the insurer has no 
right of subrogation against the indemnitees, or voluntarily self-insured in part 
or whole) exceed the maximum limits permitted under applicable law, it is 
agreed that said insurance requirements or indemnities shall automatically be 
amended to conform to the maximum monetary limits permitted under such 
law. 
 450. A discussion of the Texas and Louisiana laws is found at Tade, The Texas and 
Louisiana Anti-Indemnity Statutes as Applied to Oil and Gas Industry Offshore Contracts, 
24 HOUS. L. REV. 665 (1987). The statutes include CAL. CIV. CODE § 2782 (West Supp. 
1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780 (West Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
691.991 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-5-41 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2 
(1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-324 (McKinney 1987); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 127.001.008 (Vernon 1986); WYO. STAT. § 30-1-131 (Supp. 1980). Section 127.003 
of the Texas statute provides in part that: 
(a)  Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a covenant, promise, agree-
ment, or understanding contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement 
pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water, or to a mine for a mineral is void and 
unenforceable if it purports to indemnify a person against loss or liability for 
damage that: 
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inequality of bargaining power that may force a contractor to accept 
onerous indemnification terms. 
Anti-indemnification statutes generally merely void offending 
provisions. Providing for prohibited indemnification carries no penalty 
other than limiting the offending provision.451 Furthermore, some anti-
indemnification statutes, like the Texas statute,452 have an exception that 
permits indemnification for one’s own negligence to the extent that 
insurance supports the indemnity. Thus, broad indemnity provisions should 
continue to be a priority for each party. 
10. Regulatory Provisions 
Some farmouts, particularly those drafted in recent years, include lengthy 
provisions addressing regulatory matters such as compliance with environ-
mental law, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations, 
conservation regulations, or securities laws. These provisions, typically 
regarded as boilerplate by the parties, become important in assigning 
responsibility or liability. 
  
                                                                                                                 
(1)  is caused by or results from the sole or concurrent negligence of the 
indemnitee, his agent or employee, or an individual contractor responsible 
to the indemnitee . . . . 
 451. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.003 (Vernon 1986). This provision is 
contrary to the general rule in Texas, as well as in most other states. Generally, indemnifica-
tion against one’s own negligence is not contrary to public policy so long as the agreement 
of the parties is clear. See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1987). In 
Ethyl Corp. the Texas Supreme Court adopted the “express negligence doctrine,” which 
requires the intent of the parties to indemnify the indemnitee from the consequences of its 
own negligence to be “specifically stated within the four corners of the contract” in order to 
be effective. Id. at 708. But see Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 784 F.2d 1320, 1322 (effect of 
Louisiana anti-indemnity statute limited to nullifying indemnity for indemnitee’s own 
negligence or fault), vacated, 792 F.2d 56, certified to La. S. Ct., 794 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
 452. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.005(a) (Vernon 1986) provides that the 
anti-indemnity provisions do not apply “to any agreement that provides for indemnity with 
respect to claims for personal injury or death to the indemnitor’s employees or agents or the 
employees or agents of the indemnitor's subcontractors” if the indemnity is supported by 
insurance. The section provides, however, that “[t]he amount of insurance required may not 
exceed 12 times the state’s basic limits for personal injury, as approved by the State Board 
of Insurance in accordance with Article 5.15, Insurance Code.” Id. § 127.005(c). On this 
basis, the maximum enforceable indemnity under § 127.005, as of the time this Article is 
written, was $300,000. 
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a) Environmental Regulations 
One of the most common regulatory provisions in farmout agreements 
provides that the farmee agrees to comply with all applicable environmental 
regulations. Such a regulatory clause may be short453 or long.454 An 
environmental compliance clause serves two major purposes. First, it 
should put the farmee on notice of environmental regulations of concern. Of 
course, the farmor should disclose any specific concerns. Likewise, counsel 
for a farmee who encounters an environmental compliance clause should 
inquire specifically whether the farmor is aware of particular potential 
problems. A second function of an environmental compliance clause is to 
provide clear notice of the applicability of the agreement’s indemnification 
provisions. 
                                                                                                                 
 453. A short version of an environmental compliance clause follows: 
You recognize that one of the primary concerns of the oil industry is 
compliance with anti-pollution provisions of the environmental regulations. 
One of the principal considerations of this contract, without which it would not 
have been made by Farmor, is your agreement, evidenced by your execution 
hereof, to comply with all Federal, State, and local laws and regulations 
concerned with prevention and/or control of pollution. You now and hereafter 
shall hold Farmor harmless from any claims, actions or causes instituted and/or 
damages or penalties incurred for your failure to timely comply therewith. 
 454. An example of a more elaborate environmental compliance clause follows: 
Operator agrees to comply with the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 1857) and the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251) when conducting 
operations involving nonexempt contracts. In all nonexempt contracts with 
subcontractors, Operator shall require: 
(1)  No facility to be utilized by Subcontractor in the performance of this 
contract with Operator is listed on the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) List of Violating Facilities. See Executive Order No. 11738 of 
September 12, 1973, and 40 C.F.R. § 15.20. 
(2)  Prompt written notification shall be given by Subcontractor to Operator of 
any communication indicating that any such facility is under consideration 
to be included on the EPA List of Violating Facilities. 
(3)  Subcontractor shall comply with all requirements of Section 114 of the 
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 1857) and Section 308 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251), relating to inspection, monitor-
ing, entry, reports, and information, as well as all other requirements 
specified in these Sections, and all regulations and guidelines issued 
thereunder. 
(4)  The foregoing criteria and requirements shall be included in all of Subcon-
tractor’s nonexempt subcontractors, and Subcontractor shall take such 
action as the Government may direct as a means of enforcing such 
provisions. See 40 C.F.R. § 15.4 & 5. 
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b) Equal Employment Opportunity Clause 
Equal employment opportunity compliance clauses now frequently 
appear in farmout agreements, particularly those drafted by counsel for 
large corporations. Federal law may well require such provisions.455 Even if 
not required, however, they are helpful because they put the farmee on 
notice and clarify responsibility. 
c) Compliance with Conservation Laws 
Some farmout agreements state specifically that the farmee must comply 
with all conservation laws and rules. Conservation compliance language 
probably mirrors the expectation of the parties to the farmout agreement. 
After all, the farmee has the responsibility for conducting drilling and 
paying drilling costs. It may also remind the farmee that it cannot count on 
the farmor to do the things that are usually done before a well is drilled, 
such as check and clear title. When a conservation compliance clause is 
used in an agreement that makes absolute performance the standard of 
performance, however, failure to comply with its terms may be cause for 
termination of the farmee’s rights. 
d) Securities Regulation 
Some attorneys counsel that farmout agreements should include an 
administrative clause addressing securities regulation to obtain the farmee’s 
representation and warranty that it is a “sophisticated investor” and that it 
will comply with the requirements of securities laws in its dealings with 
farmed-out leases. While such bootstrapping techniques do not guarantee 
compliance, they put the parties on notice of potential problems and make 
clearer the responsibility for taking action to comply with applicable securi-
ties regulations. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 455. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . . 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act defines an employer as a person engaged in 
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). 
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The number and length of miscellaneous administrative provisions 
increase as federal and state legislative branches work. A review of farmout 
agreements collected from major oil companies revealed that additional 
regulatory compliance clauses had obviously been added from time to time 
to cover a variety of regulatory concerns, including compliance with the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act,456 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,457 
veterans preferences, and affirmative action plans, to note only a few.458 
11. Dealing with Bankruptcy 
The possibility that one’s business partners will go bankrupt must enter 
into the planning of anyone active in the oil and gas industry. When 
bankruptcy occurs before the drilling of the earning well or before the 
delivery and recording of the earned assignment, the Bankruptcy Code may 
undo what the farmee and the armor have sought to accomplish in their 
agreement. 
The farmor whose farmee files for bankruptcy is very likely to fail to 
achieve whatever purpose motivated it to make the agreement. While a 
farmee’s bankruptcy trustee may drill under a farmout agreement, more 
likely nothing will happen until the property subject to the farmout has been 
tied up in bankruptcy proceedings for so long that it is too late for the 
farmor to drill itself or to find someone else to perform. 
                                                                                                                 
 456. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (1982). 
 457. Id. §§ 701–796(i). 
 458. As this manuscript was being prepared for the printer, the industry began using a 
new kind of regulatory clause in farmouts, growing out of FERC Order No. 500, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 30,334 (Aug. 14, 1987). Order No. 500 was adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to address the plight of pipelines confronted with take-or-pay 
liabilities. It established an interim rule requiring that a producer of natural gas that wished 
to use open-access transportation under FERC’s rules had to offer to credit gas transported 
against the transporting pipeline’s take-or-pay obligations under pre-June 23, 1987, gas 
contracts on a volumetric basis. Order No. 500 also required that the offers to credit come 
from the owner of the lease as of June 23, 1987, even though the lease was transferred 
thereafter. Thus, a farmor might be required to offer credits against its take-or-pay claims 
against a pipeline so that its farmee could transport gas for the farmee’s account. If the 
farmor refused, the farmee might find itself unable to get its gas to market. Overnight, 
clauses clarifying the rights of the farmor and farmee began to appear in farmout 
agreements. Generally, such clauses stated either (1) that the farmor would offer take-or-pay 
credits, or (2) that the farmor would not offer such credits and specifically put the farmee on 
notice of its risk. 
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The farmee’s position is even worse. If its farmor goes bankrupt while 
the farmee is conducting drilling operations under a farmout that makes 
drilling an option of the farmee, the farmee may face the hard choice of 
either walking away from its expensive hole in the ground or finishing its 
operations and confronting the claim of the bankruptcy trustee that he can 
reject the farmout agreement, and the farmee’s earned right. If the farmout 
agreement makes drilling an obligation, the farmee must consider the 
possibility that the bankruptcy trustee will reject the contract and the 
interest earned by the farmee, even if the farmout well is drilled. 
Two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are especially troublesome. 
First, section 544 gives a bankruptcy trustee power to avoid any transfer or 
obligation voidable by a bona fide purchaser.459 These so-called “strong-
arm” powers probably empower a bankruptcy trustee to set aside any 
unrecorded transaction. Thus, the trustee may avoid both farmout 
agreements structured as contracts to assign after performance by the 
farmee and assignments actually made but not recorded when the 
bankruptcy proceedings are filed. 
Section 541(d) imposes possible limits upon the strong-arm powers of 
the bankruptcy trustee. Section 541(d) limits the interest acquired by the 
trustee in property in which the debtor owns only a legal interest rather than 
an equitable interest to the legal interest.460 The legislative history suggests, 
however, that the intent of Congress may have been to protect only mort-
gages by section 541(d), and the case law is inconclusive.461 
                                                                                                                 
 459. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (Supp. Ill 1985) provides that: 
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard 
to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or 
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by 
the debtor that is voidable by . . . a bona fide purchaser of real property, other 
than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such trans-
fer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has 
perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether 
or not such a purchaser exists. 
 460. Id. § 541(d) provides in part: 
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only 
legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real 
property . . . sold by the debtor but as to which the debtor retains legal title to 
service or supervise the servicing of such mortgage . . . becomes property of the 
estate . . . only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not 
to the extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not 
hold. 
 461. See Davis, Unassigned Oil and Gas Interest in Bankruptcy, 22 TULSA L.J. 325, 329–
34 (1987). 
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The parties can avoid the problem presented by section 544 by the 
relatively simple but cumbersome device of recording the farmout 
agreement.462 Farmout agreements are almost never executed with the 
formalities required for recording, however. In addition, whatever their 
form, farmout agreements may not qualify as recordable instruments in the 
eyes of some recording officers. Finally, the recording fees for an extensive 
farmout agreement are high, and many farmors and farmees will prefer to 
take the risk of bankruptcy of the other rather than have the terms of their 
business deal spread on the record. The parties will more likely accept the 
recording of a memorandum of the farmout agreement. Memorandum 
filings are not generally done, but one commentator has urged that they 
become the norm and provided forms to use to do so.463 
The parties cannot so easily avoid section 365, the second provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code that is likely to apply. Section 365 gives a bankruptcy 
trustee authority to accept or reject “any executory contract of the 
debtor.”464 If a farmout agreement is “executory,” the trustee may reject the 
agreement, leaving the farmee with a successful drilling venture, but a 
financial disaster.465 The precise meaning of “executory” is unclear. The 
                                                                                                                 
 462. See infra text accompanying notes 477–81. 
 463. A. DERMAN PROTECTING OIL AND GAS LIEN AND SECURITY INTERESTS (A.B.A. Sec. 
Nat. Res. L. Monograph Series No. 6, 1987). While this monograph primarily analyzes 
memorandum filings for operating agreements, it also addresses the use of memorandum 
filings for farmout agreements. Id. It notes that the use of memorandum filings may also 
perfect interests under the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. 
 464. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985). 
 465. Disaster may be too strong a term. Arguably, § 365(i)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
which permits a purchaser in possession under a contract “for the sale of real property” to 
obtain title notwithstanding the trustee’s rejection of the contract, will protect the farmee in 
this situation. Whether a farmout agreement is a contract subject to § 365(i)(l) is not clear, 
however. The argument appears particularly questionable in states like Oklahoma and 
Kansas, in which oil and gas leases are not clearly “real estate.” See Hinds v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699–700 (Okla. 1979) (oil and gas leases create interest in 
realty, but interest created is personal property, not real property, interest); see also In re J.H. 
Land & Cattle Co., 8 Bankr. 237, 239 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (applying Kansas law that oil and 
gas lease is personal property in nature of profit à prendre to conclude that bankruptcy 
trustee possessed authority to reject lease as executory contract). In In re Heston Oil Co., 69 
Bankr. 34, 36 (N.D. Okla. 1986), however, a U.S. district court rejected the holding of J.H. 
Land & Cattle Co., ruling that an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma creates a profit à prendre 
and an estate in real property in the nature of a fee interest and is not executory since it has 
been fully performed by the lessor. Even if § 365(i)(l) does not apply, the farmee would be 
able to assert a nonadministrative claim for damages under §§ 501 and 502. 11 U.S.C. §§ 
501, 502 (1982 & Supp. HI 1985). Still, the farmee that becomes entangled in the 
bankruptcy proceedings of its farmor is likely to lose the benefit of the risk it took. 
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seminal law journal article on the subject has suggested it should mean 
contracts “so far unperformed that the failure of either to perform would 
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”466 The 
Tenth Circuit has defined “executory,” however, as meaning that “neither 
party [has] completely performed and the obligations of each [remain] 
complex.”467 By either definition, however, the typical agreement to 
transfer farmout structure should be subject to the powers of the trustee 
under section 365, until the farmee has drilled the earning well, and perhaps 
until the assignment is actually made.468 
To avoid the application of section 365 the parties must structure the 
farmout agreement to conditionally assign the farmee’s interest when the 
agreement is signed or before drilling is commenced, rather than after the 
well is drilled. Even this may not be enough, however. The conditions of 
the assignment (e.g., reversion upon failure to drill or reversion of deep 
rights after drilling) may be enough to keep the contract executory, since 
the parties will have to file title-clearing releases.469 In addition, the trustee 
may consider a conditional assignment of the farmee’s interest a 
“fraudulent” transfer that the trustee may set aside under section 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Section 548(a)(2) gives the trustee authority to avoid 
transfers made within a year before the filing of bankruptcy for less than the 
reasonable equivalent sale of the property transferred when the debtor was 
either insolvent when the transfer took place or became insolvent as a 
result.470 If the farmout agreement is of the typical “option to drill” variety, 
                                                                                                                 
 466. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 
(1973). 
 467. Workman v. Harrison, 282 F.2d 693, 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 
(1973). 
 468. Cf. Davis, supra note 461, at 336–40 (discusses defining executory contract). See 
also Pearce, Keeping Oil and Gas Leases Alive: A Review of Both the Mineral Lessee’s 
Obligations and Possible Ways to Keep the Lease in Effect, 1986 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. 
SPECIAL INSTITUTE ON HARD TIMES IN THE MINERALS INDUSTRY 8-54. 
 469. Some bankruptcy cases suggest that a contract is executory even though the only act 
remaining to be accomplished under the purchase agreement is the delivery of the deed. See 
Davis, supra note 461, at 339. But see the reasoning of the court in In re Heston Oil Co., 69 
Bankr. 34, 36 (N.D. Okla. 1986). Is making an assignment any more onerous that defending 
title? 
 470. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985) provides in part: 
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . that was made or incurred on or within 
one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or 
involuntarily—. . . . 
  (2)(A)  received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such 
transfer or obligation; and 
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there is a strong argument that consideration for the transfer was 
inadequate, since the farmee promised to do nothing.471 The inadequate 
consideration argument is also available when the assignment is 
conditional; the farmee has no binding obligation. The only sure way of 
avoiding treatment of the farmout agreement as an executory contract under 
section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code is to couple the advance assignment of 
the farmee’s interest with a binding obligation to drill by the farmee, a 
structure that will often not fit the business needs of the parties.472 
The farmor and the farmee may well choose to take the risk of 
bankruptcy of one of the parties and the intervention of the bankruptcy 
courts in structuring farmout agreements. Pre- and post-contract 
administration can lessen the risks to some degree, however. The financial 
stability of one’s business partners is a primary consideration in whether to 
make a deal. Once the contract is executed, the farmee, which has the 
obligation to pay drilling costs and thus more to lose, should continue to 
monitor the fortunes of the farmor and avoid spending money or entering 
into binding contracts when the farmor’s finances look shaky. 
12. Terms of the Assignment 
Few farmout agreements are recorded. Once an agreement has been fully 
performed, however, the farmee generally receives a recordable assignment 
of interest. When this structure is followed, it is important that the terms of 
the farmout agreement and the terms of the assignment not conflict, or a 
dispute may arise as to which prevails. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stack473 
illustrates this problem. In Stack the assignment followed the farmout 
agreement by a day, before the drilling of either of the two required wells. 
Subsequently, Stack, the farmee, refused to assign Phillips the overriding 
royalties on lease extensions and renewal leases that were required by the 
farmout, but not mentioned in the assignment. Stack contended that the 
                                                                                                                 
  (B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
     obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such 
    transfer or obligation; 
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction or was about to engage 
in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining 
with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital; or 
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts 
that would be beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as such debts 
matured. 
 471. Hardwick, supra note 226, at 6-22. 
 472. Id. at 6-21. 
 473. 231 So. 2d 475 (Miss. 1969). 
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agreement had merged into the assignment, or that the assignment had 
superseded the agreement. The Mississippi Supreme Court focused upon 
Stack’s admission that he had been obligated to drill the two wells provided 
for by the farmout even though the assignment did not mention that require-
ment.474 The court concluded that the intent of the parties was that the two 
instruments together constituted the contract between the parties.475 
The Stack result is not a foregone conclusion in similar fact situations, 
because it turned upon the Mississippi court’s finding of the intent of the 
parties. Another court confronted with similar facts might well mechani-
cally apply the rules of merger to conclude that the terms of the assignment 
prevail in the event of conflict. Both the farmor and the farmee, therefore, 
should pay close attention to the terms of the assignment to be certain that 
they are correct and complete. In the alternative, incorporating the terms of 
the assignment in an attached appendix can minimize the possibilities of 
conflict. Thus, the farmout agreement will provide merely that the 
assignment will be made “on the terms and conditions set forth” in the 
appendix.476 
13. Recording 
As discussed above, the parties do not usually record farmout 
agreements. They probably should. Other than the administrative expense 
that may be involved for the farmor to clear the record if the farmee fails to 
perform, which the farmor can deal with by having the farmee execute 
releases or reconveyances when the farmout is executed, and which at worst 
is no more burdensome than the routine land work of clearing title of old 
leases, there really is no good reason not to record the farmout or a 
memorandum of it.477 
Recording the farmout agreement does not prejudice the farmor. 
Whether or not the parties record the farmout agreement, the farmor’s 
leasehold interest is likely to be subject to mechanics’ and materialmen’s 
                                                                                                                 
 474. Id. at 481. 
 475. Id. at 482. 
 476. See supra note 126. 
 477. See the discussion of memorandum filing at A. DERMAN, supra note 463; 
Morgenthaler, Planning Ahead fora Co-Participant’s Bankruptcy: A Stitch in Time, 32 
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-1, 13-6 to -20 (1986). A simple statement that “upon request 
of any party, the parties hereto shall execute and acknowledge a memorandum of this 
Agreement in recordable form” can provide authority to file a memorandum. The parties 
could also execute a memorandum at the signing of the farmout. 
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liens if the farmee fails to pay its bills.478 A recorded agreement, however, 
may save the farmor’s retained nonparticipating interest.479 
Recording is particularly important to the farmee. One can argue that the 
farmee’s interest ought not to require recording for protection because the 
practice of not recording farmouts is so well established that third parties 
should be placed on inquiry notice of the possibility of their existence. One 
may assert that the farmee’s possession of the property under a farmout 
agreement should put others on notice of its claims. These arguments are 
tenuous and dependent upon particular facts, however.480 The surest way 
for the farmee to protect its rights is by recording. In many states, recording 
puts third parties on notice of the provisions of unrecorded agreements 
referred to in the recorded instrument, as well as of the terms on the 
record.481 
V. Conclusion 
The review of more than one hundred example farmout agreements, and 
discussions with dozens of lawyers incident to the preparation of this 
Article, have largely confirmed the author’s personal preconceptions about 
farmout agreements. First, the structure of farmout agreements is very much 
a function of tax rules. Farmout agreements are business agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 478. See Superior Oil Co. v. Etheridge, 219 Ark. 289, 242 S.W.2d 718, 720–23 (1951); 
Zone Oil & Gas Co. v. Dudley & Heath Drilling Co., 474 P.2d 395, 397–99 (Okla. 1970). 
Cf. Texon Energy Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 733 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 1987, no writ), holding a farmor liable for drilling costs where the farmor had 
approved an authorization for expenditure and executed an operating agreement. But see 
Dews v. Halliburton Indus., Inc., 708 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Ark. 1986), holding that a farmor is not 
liable either for legal or equitable liens upon the leasehold as a result of a farmee’s default. 
 479. See Zone Oil & Gas Co. v. Dudley & Heath Drilling Co., 474 P.2d 395, 399 (Okla. 
1970). In Zone the court refused even to consider the argument that Zone’s production 
payment was not subject to the lien because the parties had not recorded the conveyance in 
which the payment was reserved. Id. 
 480. See O’Kane v. Walker, 561 F.2d 207, 209 (10th Cir. 1977). In O’Kane the court 
held that a conveyance for a low, but not unreasonably low, price was not sufficient to put 
the purchaser on inquiry notice. Id. The case also contains an excellent discussion of when 
inquiry notice is given. Id. at 208–09; see also Hill, Title Repositories, Recording, and 
Constructive Notice, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 469, 477 (1983). 
 481. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. 1982). 
In Gulf Oil Corp. the court held that an assignment gave notice not only of the operating 
agreement referred to in the assignment, but also to farmout agreements referred to in the 
operating agreement. Id.; see also Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 790 F.2d 
828, 830 (10th Cir. 1986) (farmee bound by terms of operating agreement referred to in its 
farmout agreement). 
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entered into by people who seek to make a profit, and compliance with the 
tax rules often makes the difference between profit and loss in our society. 
All farmout agreements reviewed were obviously drafted with an eye to 
giving the farmee the full benefit of the intangible drilling cost deduction. 
Concern with other tax issues was also apparent. 
Second, although the tax structure of farmout agreements is very much 
the same, their substantive provisions vary widely. In part, the difference in 
substantive provisions is reflexive; once a company has been burned by a 
particular problem, it drafts to avoid it in the future. In part, also, the wide 
variety of substantive provisions in farmout agreements reflects the vitality 
of American businessmen and their lawyers. “Dealmaking” is often every 
bit as important in whether or not a venture is profitable for both of the 
parties as the underlying value of the properties farmed out. The agreements 
reviewed reflected the high creativity index of the oil and gas industry. 
Finally, however, farmout agreements are susceptible to orderly analysis, 
and not enough attention is given to that analysis. Understanding the 
purposes that may lead the farmor or the farmee to enter into a farmout 
agreement, the essential provisions that the agreement must contain to 
achieve those goals, and the alternatives available to the draftsman are the 
keys to successfully preparing or analyzing a farmout agreement. The goals 
of each of the parties will determine how the agreement will be put together 
and what provisions will be emphasized. The essential provisions of an 
agreement are those without which any farmout agreement will be 
incomplete. Drafting alternatives help keep the agreement flexible and 
responsive to the parties’ needs. 
The aim of this Article has been to develop an analysis of the purposes 
and essential considerations of a farmout, and to collect alternative 
provisions that may be of use to the draftsman. In a sense, this Article is 
unfinished. It will never be finished, because only the creativity of 
businessmen and their lawyers limits the variety of provisions that may be 
included in a farmout agreement. 
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